LECTURE IV.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

In the discussion of this question, I will first state what is intended
by the foundation, or ground, of obligation.

I shall use the terms ground and foundation as synonymous. Obligation
must be founded on some good and sufficient reason. Be it remembered,
that moral obligation respects moral action. That moral action is
voluntary action. That properly speaking, obligation respects
intentions only. That still more strictly, obligation respects only the
ultimate intention. That ultimate intention or choice, which terms I
use as synonymous, consists in choosing an object for its own sake, i.
e. for what is intrinsic in the object, and for no reason that is not
intrinsic in that object. That every object of ultimate choice must,
and does, possess that in its own nature, the perception of which
necessitates the rational affirmation, that it ought to be universally
chosen, by moral agents, for its own sake, or, which is the same thing,
because it is what it is, or, in other words still, because it is
intrinsically valuable and not on account of its relations.

The ground of obligation, then, is that reason, or consideration,
intrinsic in, or belonging to, the nature of an object, which
necessitates the rational affirmation, that it ought to be chosen for
its own sake. It is that reason, intrinsic in the object, which thus
creates obligation by necessitating this affirmation. For example, such
is the nature of the good of being that it necessitates the
affirmation, that benevolence is a universal duty.

I will next call attention to some points of general agreement, and
some principles essentially self-evident.

1. In the most strict and proper sense, moral obligation extends to
moral actions only.

2. Strictly speaking, involuntary states of mind are not moral actions.

3. Intentions alone are, properly, moral actions.

4. In the most strict and proper sense, ultimate intentions alone are
moral actions, ultimate intention being the choice of an object for its
own sake, or for what is intrinsic in the object.

5. While, in the strictest sense, obligation respects only the ultimate
intention, yet, in a less strict and proper sense, obligation extends
to the choice of the conditions and means of securing an intrinsically
valuable end, and also to executive acts put forth with design to
secure such end: Hence there are different forms of obligation; for
example, obligation to put forth ultimate choice–to choose the known
necessary conditions and means–to put forth executive volitions, etc.

6. These different forms of obligation must have different conditions.
For example, moral agency, including the possession of the requisite
powers, together with the development of the ideas of the intrinsically
valuable, of obligation, of right and wrong, is a condition of
obligation in its universal form, namely, obligation to will the good
of being in general, for its own sake; while obligation to will the
existence of the conditions and means to the end, or to put forth
executive efforts to secure the end, have not only the conditions above
named, but obligation in these forms must be conditional, also, upon
the knowledge that there are conditions and means, and what they are,
and also that executive efforts are necessary, possible, and useful.

7. The well-being of God, and of the universe of sentient existences,
and especially of moral agents, is intrinsically important, or
valuable, and all moral agents are under obligation to choose it for
its own sake. Entire, universal, uninterrupted consecration to this
end, or disinterested benevolence is the duty of all moral agents.

8. This consecration is really demanded by the law of God, as revealed
in the two great precepts laid down by Christ, and this benevolence,
when perfect, is in fact a compliance with the entire spirit of the
law. This is right in itself, and consequently is always duty and
always right, and that in all possible circumstances; and, of course,
no obligation inconsistent with this can ever, in any case, exist.
Reason and revelation agree in this; that the law of benevolence is the
law of right, the law of nature, and no moral law, inconsistent with
this, can exist.

9. Holiness, or obedience to moral law, or, in other words still,
disinterested benevolence, is a natural, and of course necessary
condition of the existence of that blessedness which is an ultimate or
intrinsic good to moral agents, and ought to be chosen for that reason,
i. e., that is a sufficient reason. Of course, the ground of obligation
to choose holiness, and to endeavor to promote it in others, as a
condition of the highest well-being of the universe, is the intrinsic
nature of that good or well-being, and the relation of holiness to this
end is a condition of the obligation to choose it, as a means to this
end.

10. Truth, and conformity of heart and life to all known and practical
truths, are conditions and means of the highest good of being. Of
course, the obligation to conform to such truths is universal, because
of this relation of truth, and of conformity to truth, to the highest
good. The intrinsic value of the good must be the ground, and the
relation only a condition, of the obligation.

11. God’s ultimate end, in all he does, or omits, is the highest
well-being of himself, and of the universe, and in all his acts and
dispensations, his ultimate object is the promotion of this end. All
moral agents should have the same end, and this comprises their whole
duty. This intention or consecration to this intrinsically and
infinitely valuable end, is virtue, or holiness, in God and in all
moral agents. God is infinitely and equally holy in all things, because
he does all things for the same ultimate reason, namely, to promote the
highest good of being.

12. All God’s moral attributes are only so many attributes of love or
of disinterested benevolence; that is, they are only benevolence
existing and contemplated in different relations. Creation and moral
government, including both law and gospel, together with the infliction
of penal sanctions, are only efforts of benevolence to secure the
highest good.

13. He requires, both in his law and gospel, that all moral agents
should choose the same end, and do whatever they do for its promotion;
that is, this should be the ultimate reason for all they do.
Consequently, all obligation resolves itself into an obligation to
choose the highest good of God, and of being in general, for its own
sake, and to choose all the known conditions and means of this end, for
the sake of the end.

14. The intrinsic value of this end is the ground of this obligation,
both as it respects God and all moral agents in all worlds. The
intrinsic value of this end rendered it fit, or right, that God should
require moral agents to choose it for its own sake; and of course, its
intrinsic value, and not any arbitrary sovereignty, was, and is, his
reason for requiring moral agents to choose it for its own sake.

15. Its known intrinsic value would, of itself, impose obligation on
moral agents to choose it for its own sake, even had God never required
it; or, if such a supposition were possible, had he forbidden it. Thus,
disinterested benevolence is a universal and an invariable duty. This
benevolence consists in willing the highest good of being, in general,
for its own sake, or, in other words, in entire consecration to this
good as the end of life. The intrinsic value of this good does, of its
own nature, impose obligation upon all moral agents to will it for its
own sake, and consecrate the whole being, without intermission, to its
promotion.

Thus it is self-evident that moral character belongs to the ultimate
intention, and that a man’s character is as the end for which he lives,
and moves, and has his being. Virtue consists in consecration to the
right end, the end to which God is consecrated. This end is, and must
be, by virtue of its own nature, the ground of obligation. That is, the
nature of this end is such as to compel the reason of every moral agent
to affirm, that it ought to be chosen for its own sake. This end is the
good of being, and therefore disinterested benevolence, or good will,
is a universal duty.

Now, with these facts distinctly kept in mind, let us proceed to the
examination of the various conflicting and inconsistent theories of the
ground of obligation.

Of the Will of God as the ground of obligation.

I will first consider the theory of those who hold that the sovereign
will of God is the ground, or ultimate reason, of obligation. They hold
that God’s sovereign will creates, and not merely reveals and enforces,
obligation. To this I reply:

1. That moral law legislates directly over voluntary action only–that
moral obligation respects, primarily and strictly, the ultimate
intention–that ultimate intention consists in choosing its object, for
its own sake–that ultimate intention must find its reasons exclusively
in its object–that the intrinsic nature and value of the object must
impose obligation to choose it for its own sake–that therefore this
intrinsic value is the ground, and the only possible ground, of
obligation to choose it for its own sake. It would be our duty to will
the highest good of God and of the universe, even did God not will that
we should, or were he to will that we should not. How utterly unfounded
then, is the assertion, that the sovereign will of God is the ground of
obligation. Obligation to do what? Why to love God and our neighbor.
That is to will their highest good. And does God’s will create this
obligation? Should we be under no such obligation, had he not commanded
it? Are we to will this good, not for its own value to God and our
neighbor, but because God commands it? The answer to these questions is
too obvious to need so much as to be named. But what consistency is
there in holding that disinterested benevolence is a universal duty,
and at the same time that the sovereign will of God is the foundation
of obligation; How can men hold, as many do, that the highest good of
being ought to be chosen for its own sake — that to choose it for its
own sake is disinterested benevolence — that its intrinsic value
imposes obligation to choose it for its own sake, and that this
intrinsic value is therefore the ground of obligation, and yet that the
will of God is the ground of obligation?

Why, if the will of God be the ground of obligation, then disinterested
benevolence is sin. If the will of God does of itself create, and not
merely reveal obligation, then the will, and not the interest and
well-being of God, ought to be chosen for its own sake, and to be the
great end of life. God ought to be consecrated to his own will, instead
of his own highest good. Benevolence in God, and in all beings, must be
sin, upon this hypothesis. A purely arbitrary will and sovereignty in
God is, according to this theory, of more value than his highest
well-being, and than that of the whole universe.

But observe,

Moral obligation respects ultimate intention, or the choice of an end.

The foundation, or fundamental reason for choosing a thing, is that
which renders it obligatory to choose it.

This reason is the thing on which the choice ought to terminate, or the
true end is not chosen.

Therefore the reason and the end are identical.

If, then, the will of God be the foundation of obligation, it must also
be the ultimate end of choice.

But it is impossible for us to will or choose the divine willing as an
ultimate end. God’s willing reveals a law, a rule of choice, or of
intention. It requires something to be intended as an ultimate end, or
for its own intrinsic value. This end cannot be the willing,
commandment, law, itself. Does God will that I should choose his
willing as an ultimate end? This is impossible. It is a plain
contradiction to say that moral obligation respects, directly, ultimate
intention only, or the choice of an end, for its own intrinsic value,
and yet, that the will of God is the foundation, or reason of the
obligation. This is affirming at the same breath that the intrinsic
value of the end which God requires me to choose, is the reason, or
foundation of the obligation to choose it, and yet that this is not the
reason, but that the will of God is the reason.

Willing can never be an end. God cannot will our willing as an end. Nor
can he will his willing as an end. Willing, choosing, always, and
necessarily, implies an end willed entirely distinct from the willing,
or choice, itself. Willing, cannot be regarded, or willed, as an
ultimate end, for two reasons:–

(1.) Because that on which choice or willing terminates, and not the
choice itself, must be regarded as the end.

(2.) Because choice or willing is of no intrinsic value and of no
relative value, aside from the end willed or chosen.

2. The will of God cannot be the foundation of moral obligation in
created moral agents. God has moral character, and is virtuous. This
implies that he is the subject of moral obligation, for virtue is
nothing else than compliance with obligation. If God is the subject of
moral obligation, there is some reason, independent of his own will,
why he wills as he does; some reason, that imposes obligation upon him
to will as he does. His will, then, respecting the conduct of moral
agents, is not the fundamental reason of their obligation; but the
foundation of their obligation must be the reason which induces God, or
makes it obligatory on him, to will in respect to the conduct of moral
agents, just what he does.

3. If the will of God were the foundation of moral obligation, he
could, by willing it, change the nature of virtue and vice, which is
absurd.

4. If the will of God were the foundation of moral obligation, he not
only can change the nature of virtue and vice, but has a right to do
so; for if there is nothing back of his will that is as binding upon
him as upon his creatures, he has a right, at any time, to make
malevolence a virtue, and benevolence a vice. For if his will is the
ground of obligation, then his will creates right, and whatever he
wills, or might will, is right simply and only because so he wills.

5. If the will of God be the foundation of moral obligation, we have no
standard by which to judge of the moral character of his actions, and
cannot know whether he is worthy of praise or blame. Upon the
supposition in question, were God a malevolent being, and did he
require all his creatures to be selfish, and not benevolent, he would
be just ns virtuous and worthy of praise as now; for the supposition
is, that his sovereign will creates right, and of course, will as he
might, that would be right, simply because he willed it.

6. If the will of God is the foundation of moral obligation, he has no
standard by which to judge of his own character, as he has no rule but
his own will, with which to compare his own actions.

7. If the will of God is the foundation of moral obligation, he is not
himself a subject of moral obligation. But,

8. If God is not a subject of moral obligation, he has no moral
character; for virtue and vice are nothing else but conformity or
non-conformity to moral obligation. The will of God, as expressed in
his law, is the rule of duty to moral agents. It defines and marks out
the path of duty, but the fundamental reason why moral agents ought to
act in conformity to the will of God, is plainly not the will of God
itself.

9. The will of no being can be law. Moral law is an idea of the divine
reason, and not the willing of any being. If the will of any being were
law, that being could not, by natural possibility, will wrong; for
whatever he willed would be right, simply and only because he willed
it.

10. But let us bring this philosophy into the light of divine
revelation. “To the law and to the testimony; if it agree not
therewith, it is because it hath no light in it.”

The law of God, or the moral law, requires that God shall be loved with
all the heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. Now it is manifest that
the love required is not mere emotion, but that it consists in choice,
willing, intention–i. e., in the choice of something on account of its
own intrinsic value, or in the choice of an ultimate end. Now what is
this end? What is that which we are to choose for its own intrinsic
value? Is it the will or command of God? Are we to will as an ultimate
end, that God should will that we should thus will? What can be more
absurd, self-contradictory, and ridiculous than this? But again, what
is this loving, willing, choosing, intending, required by the law? We
are commanded to love God and our neighbor. What is this, what can it
be, but to will the highest good or well-being of God and our neighbor?
This is intrinsically and infinitely valuable. This must be the end,
and nothing can possibly be law that requires the choice of any other
ultimate end. Nor can that, by any possibility, be true philosophy,
that makes anything else the reason or foundation of moral obligation.

But it is said that we are conscious of affirming our obligation to
obey the will of God, without reference to any other reason than his
will; and this, it is said, proves that his will is the foundation of
obligation.

To this I reply, the reason does indeed affirm that we ought to will
that which God commands, but it does not and cannot assign his will as
the foundation of the obligation. His whole will respecting our duty,
is summed up in the two precepts of the law. These, as we have seen,
require universal good-will to being, or the supreme love of God and
the equal love of our neighbor–that we should will the highest
well-being of God and of the universe, for its own sake, or for its own
intrinsic value. Reason affirms that we ought thus to will. And can it
be so self-contradictory as to affirm that we ought to will the good of
God and of the universe, for its own intrinsic value; yet not for this
reason, but because God wills that we should will it? Impossible! But
in this assertion, the objector has reference to some outward act, some
condition or means of the end to be chosen, and not to the end itself.
But even in respect to any act whatever, his objection does not hold
good. For example, God requires me to labor and pray for the salvation
of souls, or to do anything else. Now his command is necessarily
regarded by me as obligatory, not as an arbitrary requirement, but as
revealing infallibly the true means or conditions of securing the great
and ultimate end, which I am to will for its intrinsic value. I
necessarily regard his commandment as wise and benevolent, and it is
only because I so regard it, that I affirm, or can affirm, my
obligation to obey him. Should he command me to choose, as an ultimate
end, or for its own intrinsic value, that which my reason affirmed to
be of no intrinsic value, I could not possibly affirm my obligation to
obey him. Should he command me to do that which my reason affirmed to
be unwise and malevolent, it were impossible for me to affirm my
obligation to obey him. This proves, beyond controversy, that reason
does not regard his command as the foundation of the obligation, but
only as infallible proof that that which he commands is wise and
benevolent in itself, and commanded by him for that reason.

If the will of God were the foundation of moral obligation, he might
command me to violate and trample down all the laws of my being, and to
be the enemy of all good, and I should not only be under obligation,
but affirm my obligation to obey him. But this is absurd. This brings
us to the conclusion that he who asserts that moral obligation respects
the choice of an end for its intrinsic value, and still affirms the
will of God to be the foundation of moral obligation, contradicts his
own admissions, the plainest intuitions of reason and divine
revelation. His theory is grossly inconsistent and nonsensical. It
overlooks the very nature of moral law as an idea of reason, and makes
it to consist in arbitrary willing.

Paley’s theory of Self-interest.

This theory, as every reader of Paley knows, makes self-interest the
ground of moral obligation. Upon this theory I remark–

1. That if self-interest be the ground of moral obligation, then
self-interest is the end to be chosen for its own sake. To be virtuous
I must in every instance intend my own interest as the supreme good.
Then, according to this theory, disinterested benevolence is sin. To
live to God and the universe, is not right. It is not devotion to the
right end. This theory affirms self-interest to be the end for which we
ought to live. Then selfishness is virtue, and benevolence is vice.
These are directly opposite theories. It cannot be a trifle to embrace
the wrong view of this subject. If Dr. Paley was right, all are
fundamentally wrong who hold the benevolence theory.

2. Upon this hypothesis, I am to treat my own interest as supremely
valuable, when it is infinitely less valuable than the interests of
God. Thus I am under a moral obligation to prefer an infinitely less
good, because it is my own, to one of infinitely greater value that
belongs to another. This is precisely what every sinner in earth and
hell does.

3. But let us examine this theory in the light of the revealed law. If
this philosophy be correct, the law should read, “Thou shalt love
thyself supremely, and God and thy neighbor not at all.” For Dr. Paley
holds the only reason of the obligation to be self-interest. If this is
so, then I am under an obligation to love myself alone, and never do my
duty when I at all love God or my neighbor. He says, it is the utility
of any rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it. (Paley’s
Moral Philos., book ii. chap. 6.) Again he says, “And let it be asked
why I am obliged (obligated) to keep my word? and the answer will be,
Because I am urged to do so by a violent motive, namely, the
expectation of being after this life rewarded if I do so, or punished
if I do not.”–(Paley’s Moral Philos., book ii. chap. 3.) Thus it would
seem, that it is the utility of a rule to myself only, that constitutes
the ground of obligation to obey it.

But should this be denied, still it cannot be denied that Dr. Paley
maintains that self-interest is the ground of moral obligation. If this
is so, i. e. if this be the foundation of moral obligation, whether
Paley or any one else holds it to be true, then, undeniably, the moral
law should read, “Thou shalt love thyself supremely, and God and thy
neighbor subordinately;” or, more strictly, “Thou shalt love thyself as
an end, and God and thy neighbor, only as a means of promoting thine
own interest.”

If this theory be true, all the precepts in the Bible need to be
altered. Instead of the injunction, “Whatever you do, do it heartily
unto the Lord,” it should read, “Whatever you do, do it heartily unto
yourself.” Instead of the injunction, “Whether, therefore, ye eat or
drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God,” it should
read, “Do all to secure your own interest.” Should it be said that this
school would say, that the meaning of these precepts is, Do all to the
glory of God to secure your own interest thereby, I answer; This is a
contradiction. To do it to or for the glory of God is one thing; to do
it to secure my own interest is an entirely different and opposite
thing. To do it for the glory of God, is to make his glory my end. But
to do it to secure my own interest, is to make my own interest the end.

4. But let us look at this theory in the light of the revealed
conditions of salvation. “Except a man forsake all that he hath he
cannot be my disciple.” If the theory under consideration be true, it
should read: “Except a man make his own interest the supreme end of
pursuit, he cannot be my disciple.” Again, “If any man will come after
me, let him deny himself and take up his cross,” etc. This, in
conformity with the theory in question, should read: “If any man will
come after me, let him not deny himself, but cherish and supremely seek
his own interest.” A multitude of such passages might be quoted, as
every reader of the Bible knows.

5. But let us examine this theory in the light of other scripture
declarations. “It is more blessed to give than to receive.” This,
according to the theory we are opposing, should read, “It is more
blessed to receive than to give.” “Charity (love) seeketh not her own.”
This should read, “Charity seeketh her own.” “No man (that is, no
righteous man) liveth to himself.” This should read, “Every (righteous)
man liveth to himself.”

6. Let this theory be examined in the light of the spirit and example
of Christ. “Even Christ pleased not himself.” This should read, if
Christ was holy and did his duty, “Even Christ pleased himself, or
which is the same thing, sought his own interest.” “I seek not mine own
glory, but the glory of him who sent me.” This should read, “I seek not
the glory of him who sent me, but mine own glory.”

But enough; we cannot fail to see that this is a selfish philosophy,
and the exact opposite of the truth of God.

The Utilitarian philosophy.

This maintains that the utility of an act or choice renders it
obligatory. That is, utility is the foundation of moral obligation;
that the tendency of an act, choice, or intention, to secure a good or
valuable end, is the foundation of the obligation to put forth that
choice or intention. Upon this theory I remark–

1. That utilitarians must hold, in common with others, that it is our
duty to will the good of God and our neighbor for its own sake; and
that the intrinsic value of this good creates obligation to will it,
and to endeavor to promote it; that the tendency of choosing it, would
be neither useful nor obligatory, but for its intrinsic value. How,
then, can they hold that the tendency of choosing to secure its object,
instead of the intrinsic value of the object, should be a ground of
obligation. It is absurd to say that the foundation of the obligation
to choose a certain end, is to be found, not in the value of the end
itself, but in the tendency of the intention to secure the end. The
tendency is valuable or otherwise, as the end is valuable or otherwise.
It is, and must be, the value of the end, and not the tendency of an
intention to secure the end, that constitutes the foundation of the
obligation to intend.

2. We have seen that the foundation of obligation to will or choose any
end as such, that is, on its own account, must consist in the intrinsic
value of the end, and that nothing else whatever can impose obligation
to choose anything as an ultimate end, but its intrinsic value. To
affirm the contrary is to affirm a contradiction. It is the same as to
say, that I ought to choose a thing as an end, and not yet as an end,
that is, for its own sake, but for some other reason, to wit, the
tendency of my choice to secure that end. Here I affirm at the same
breath, that the thing intended is to be an end, that is, chosen for
its own intrinsic value, and yet not as an end or for its intrinsic
value, but for an entirely different reason, to wit, the tendency of
the choice to secure it.

3. But the very announcement of this theory implies its absurdity. A
choice is obligatory, because it tends to secure good. But why secure
good rather than evil? The answer is, because good is valuable. Alt!
here then we have another reason, and one which must be the true
reason, to wit, the value of the good which the choice tends to secure.
Obligation to use means to do good may, and must, be conditioned upon
the tendency of those means to secure the end, but the obligation to
use them is founded solely in the value of the end.

4. Does the law require us to love God and our neighbor, because loving
God and our neighbor tends to the well-being either of God, our
neighbor, or ourselves? Is it the tendency or utility of love that
makes it obligatory upon us to exercise it? What! will good, not from
regard to its value, but because willing good will do good! But why do
good? What is this love? Here let it be distinctly remembered that the
love required by the law of God is not a mere emotion or feeling, but
willing, choosing, intending, in a word, that this love is nothing else
than ultimate intention. What, then, is to be intended as an end, or
for its own sake? Is it the tendency of love, or the utility of
ultimate intention, that is the end to be intended? It must be, if
utilitarianism is true.

According to this theory, when the law requires supreme love to God,
and equal love to our neighbor, the meaning is, not that we are to
will, choose, intend the well-being of God and our neighbor for its own
sake, or because of its intrinsic value, but because of the tendency of
the intention to promote the good of God, our neighbor and ourselves.
But let the tendency of love or intention be what it may, the utility
of it depends upon the intrinsic value of that which it tends to
promote. Suppose love or intention tends to promote its end, this is a
useful tendency only because the end is valuable in itself. It is
nonsense then to say that love to God and man, or an intention to
promote their good, is required, not because of the value of their
well-being, but because love tends to promote their well-being. This
represents the law as requiring love, not to God and our neighbor as an
end, but to tendency as an end. The law in this case should read thus:
“Thou shalt love the utility or tendency of love with all thy heart,”
etc.

If the theory under consideration is true, this is the spirit and
meaning of the law: “Thou shalt love the Lord and thy neighbor, that
is, thou shalt choose their good, not for its own sake or as an end,
but because choosing it tends to promote it.” This is absurd; for, I
ask again, why promote it but for its own value? If the law of God
requires ultimate intention, it is a contradiction to affirm that the
intention ought to terminate on its own tendency as an end.

5. But it is said that we are conscious of affirming obligation to do
many things, on the ground, that those things are useful, or tend to
promote good.

I answer, that we are conscious of affirming obligation to do many
things upon condition of their tendency to promote good, but that we
never affirm obligation to be founded on this tendency. I am under an
obligation to use the means to promote good, not for the sake of its
intrinsic value, but for the sake of the tendency of the means to
promote it! This is absurd.

I say again, the obligation to use means may and must be conditionated
upon perceived tendency, but never founded in this tendency. Ultimate
intention has no such condition. The perceived intrinsic value imposes
obligation without any reference to the tendency of the intention.

6. But suppose any utilitarian should deny that moral obligation
respects ultimate intention only, and maintain that it also respects
those volitions and actions that sustain to the ultimate end the
relation of means, and therefore assert that the foundation of moral
obligation in respect to all those volitions and actions, is their
tendency to secure a valuable end. This would not at all relieve the
difficulty of utilitarianism; for in this case tendency could only be a
condition of the obligation, while the fundamental reason of the
obligation would and must be, the intrinsic value of the end, which
these may have a tendency to promote. Tendency to promote an end can
impose no obligation. The end must be intrinsically valuable, and this
alone imposes obligation to choose the end, and to use the means to
promote it. Upon condition that anything is perceived to sustain to
this end the relation of a necessary means, we are, for the sake of the
end alone, under obligation to use the means.
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LECTURE V.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

The theory of Right as the foundation of obligation.

In the examination of this philosophy I must begin by defining terms.
What is right? The primary signification of the term is straight. When
used in a moral sense it means fit, suitable, agreeable to the nature
and relations of moral agents. Right, in a moral sense, belongs to
choice, intention, and is an intention straight with, or conformed to,
moral law. The inquiry before us is, what is the ground of obligation
to put forth choice or intention. Rightarians say that right is the
ground of such obligation. This is the answer given to this question by
a large school of philosophers and theologians. But what does this
assertion mean? It is generally held by this school, that right, in a
moral sense, pertains primarily and strictly to intentions only. They
maintain, as I do, that obligation pertains primarily and strictly to
ultimate choice or intentions, and less strictly to executive
volitions, and to choice of the conditions and means of securing the
object of ultimate choice. Now in what sense of the term right do they
regard it as the ground of obligation?

Right is objective and subjective. Right in the objective sense of the
term, has been recently defined to consist in the relation of intrinsic
fitness existing between ultimate choice and its object. [1] For
example, the nature or intrinsic value of the highest well-being of God
and of the universe, creates the relation of intrinsic fitness between
it and choice, and this relation, it is insisted, creates, or is the
ground of, obligation.

Subjective right is synonymous with righteousness, uprightness, virtue.
It consists in, or is an attribute of, that state of the will which is
conformed to objective right or to moral law. It is a term that
expresses the moral quality, element, or attribute of that ultimate
intention which the law of God requires. In other words still, it is
conformity of heart to the law of objective right; or, as I just said,
it is more strictly the term that designates the moral character of
that state of heart. Some choose to regard subjective right as
consisting in this state of heart, and others insist that it is only an
element, attribute, or quality of this state of heart, or of this
ultimate intention. I shall not contend about words, but shall show
that it matters not, so far as the question we are about to examine is
concerned, in which of these lights subjective right is regarded,
whether as consisting in ultimate intention conformed to law, or, as
being an attribute, element, or quality of this intention.

The theory under consideration was held by the ancient Greek and Roman
philosophers. It was the theory of Kant, and is now the theory of the
transcendental school in Europe and America. Cousin, in manifest
accordance with the views of Kant, states the theory in these words:
“Do right for the sake of the right, or rather, will the right for the
sake of the right. Morality has to do with the
intentions.”–(Enunciation of Moral Law–Elements of Psychology, p.
162.) Those who follow Kant, Cousin, and Coleridge state the theory
either in the same words, or in words that amount to the same thing.
They regard right as the foundation of moral obligation. “Will the
right for the sake of the right.” This must mean, will the right as an
ultimate end, that is, for its own sake. Let us examine this very
popular philosophy, first, in the light of its own principles, and
secondly in the light of revelation.

The writer first above alluded to, has professedly given a critical
definition of the exact position and teaching of rightarians. They
hold, according to him, and I suppose he has rightly defined the
position of that school, that subjective right is the ground of
obligation. We shall see, hereafter, that subjective right, or
righteousness, can never be a ground of moral obligation. We will here
attend to the critically defined position of the rightarian who holds
that the relation of intrinsic fitness existing between choice and an
intrinsically valuable object, is the ground of obligation to choose
that object.

Now observe, this writer strenuously maintains, that the reason for
ultimate choice must be found exclusively in the object of such choice,
in other words, that ultimate choice, is the choice of its object for
its own sake, or for what is intrinsic in the object itself. He also
affirms repeatedly, that the ground of obligation is, and must be,
found exclusively in the object of ultimate choice, and also that the
ground of obligation is the consideration, intrinsic in the object of
choice, which compels the reason to affirm the obligation to choose it
for its own sake. But all this as flatly as possible contradicts his
rightarian theory, as above stated. If the ground of obligation to put
forth ultimate choice is to be found, as it certainly must be, in the
nature of the object of choice, and in nothing extrinsic to it, how can
it consist in the relation of intrinsic fitness existing between the
choice and its object? Plainly it cannot. This relation is not
intrinsic in the object of choice.

Observe, the obligation is to choose the object of ultimate choice, not
for the sake of the relation existing between the choice and its
object, but exclusively for the sake of what is intrinsic in the object
itself. The relation is not the object of choice, but the relation is
created by the object of choice. Choice being what it is, the intrinsic
nature or value of the object, as the good of being for example,
creates both the relation of rightness and the obligation to choose the
object for its own sake. That which creates the relation of objective
rightness must, for the same reason, create the obligation, for it is
absurd to say that the intrinsic value of the object creates the
relation of rightness between itself and choice, and yet that it does
not impose or create obligation to choose itself for its own sake.

It is self-evident then, that since the object ought to be chosen for
the sake of its own nature, or for what is intrinsic in it, and not for
the sake of the relation in question, the nature of the object, and not
the relation, is, and must be, the ground of obligation.

But, the writer who has given the above defined position of the
rightarians, says that “the intelligence, in judging an act to be right
or wrong, does not take into the account the object nor the act by
itself, but both together, in their intrinsic relations, as the ground
of its affirmation.”

But the nature of ultimate choice, and the nature of its object, the
good of being, for example, with their intrinsic relations to each
other, form a ground of obligation to choose–what? the choice, the
object, and their intrinsic relations? No, but simply and only to
choose the good for its own sake, or solely for the sake of what is
intrinsic in it. Observe, it is often affirmed by this writer, that
ultimate choice is the choice of an object for its own sake, or for
what is intrinsic in the object itself. That the ground of obligation
to put forth ultimate choice, must in every case, be intrinsic in the
object of choice. But the object of choice in this case is the good of
being, and not the nature of the choice and of the good of being,
together with the intrinsic relation of rightness existing between
them. The form of the obligation discloses the ground of it. The form
of the obligation is to choose the good of being, i. e. the object of
choice, for what is intrinsic in it. Then, the ground of the obligation
must be, the intrinsic nature of the good, i. e. of the object of
choice. The nature of choice, and the intrinsic relations of the
choice, and the good, are conditions, but not the ground, of the
obligation. Had this writer only kept in mind his own most critical
definition of ultimate intention, his often repeated assertions that
the ground of obligation must be, in every case, found intrinsically in
the object of ultimate choice, and in nothing extraneous to it, he
never could have made the statement we have just examined.

The duty of universal disinterested benevolence is universally and
necessarily affirmed and admitted. But if the rightarian be the true
theory, then disinterested benevolence is sin. According to this
scheme, the right, and not the good of being, is the end to, and for
which, God and all moral agents ought to live. According to this
theory, disinterested benevolence can never be duty, can never be
right, but always and necessarily wrong. I do not mean that the
advocates of this theory see and avow this conclusion. But it is
wonderful that they do not, for nothing is more self-evident. If moral
agents ought to will the right for the sake of the right, or will good,
not for the sake of the good, but for the sake of the relation of
rightness existing between the choice and the good, then to will the
good for its own sake is sin. It is not willing the right end. It is
willing the good and not the right as an ultimate end. These are
opposing theories. Both cannot be true. Which is the right to will, the
good for its own sake, or the right? Let universal reason answer.

But let us examine this philosophy in the light of the oracles of God.

1. In the light of the moral law. The whole law is expressed by the
great Teacher thus: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy
heart, and with all thy soul, with all thy might, and with all thy
strength; and thy neighbor as thyself.” Paul says: “All the law is
fulfilled in one word–love: therefore love is the fulfilling of the
law.” Now it is admitted by this philosophy, that the love required by
the law is not a mere emotion, but that it consists in willing, choice,
intention; that it consists in the choice of an ultimate end, or in the
choice of something for its own sake, or, which is the same thing, for
its intrinsic value. What is this which the law requires us to will to
God and our neighbor? Is it to will something to, or respecting, God
and our neighbor, not for the sake of the intrinsic value of that
something, but for the sake of the relation of rightness existing
between choice and that something? This were absurd. Besides, what has
this to do with loving God and our neighbor? To will the something, the
good, for example, of God, and our neighbor, for the sake of the
relation in question, is not the same as to love God and our neighbor,
as it is not willing their good for its own sake. It is not willing
their good, out of any regard to them, but solely out of regard to the
relation of fitness existing between the willing and the object willed.
Suppose it be said, that the law requires us to will the good, or
highest blessedness of God and our neighbor, because it is right. This
is a contradiction and an impossibility. To will the blessedness of God
and our neighbor, in any proper sense, is to will it for its own sake,
or as an ultimate end. But this is not to will it because it is right.
To will the good of God and our neighbor for its own sake, or its
intrinsic value, is right. But to will it, not for the sake of its
intrinsic value to them, but for the sake of the relations in question,
is not right. To will the good because it is good, or the valuable
because it is valuable, is right, because it is willing it for the
right reason. But to will it, not for its value, but for the sake of
the relation of fitness between the willing and the object, is not
right, because it is not willing it for the right reason. The law of
God does not, cannot, require us to love right more than God and our
neighbor. What! right of greater value than the highest well being of
God and of the universe? Impossible! It is impossible that the moral
law should require anything else than to will the highest good of
universal being as an ultimate end, i. e. for its own sake. It is a
first truth of reason, that this is the most valuable thing possible or
conceivable; and that could by no possibility be law, which should
require anything else to be chosen as an ultimate end. According to
this philosophy, the revealed law should read: “Thou shalt love the
right for its own sake, with all thy heart and with all thy soul.” The
fact is, the law requires the supreme love of God, and the equal love
of our neighbor. It says nothing, and implies nothing, about doing
right for the sake of the right. Rightarianism is a rejection of the
divine revealed law, and a substituting in its stead an entirely
different rule of moral obligation: a rule that deifies right, that
rejects the claim of God, and exalts right to the throne.

2. “Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to
the glory of God.” Does this precept require us to will the glory of
God for its intrinsic or relative value, or for the sake of intrinsic
fitness between the willing and its object? The glory and renown of God
is of infinite value to him, and to the universe, and for this reason
it should be promoted. The thing required here is doing, an executive
act. The spirit of the requisition is this: Aim to spread abroad the
renown or glory of God, as the means of securing the highest well-being
of the universe. Why? I answer: for the sake of the intrinsic value of
this well-being, and not for the sake of the relation of fitness
existing between the willing and the object.

3. “Do good unto all men, as ye have opportunity.” Here again, are we
required to do the good, for the sake of the good, or for the sake of
the relation of rightness, between the doing and the good? I answer: we
are to do the good for the sake of the good.

4. Take the commands to pray and labor for the salvation of souls. Do
such commandments require us to go forth to will or do the right for
the sake of the right, or to will the salvation of souls for the
intrinsic value of their salvation? When we pray and preach and
converse, must we aim at right, must the love of right, and not the
love of God and of souls influence us? When I am engaged in prayer, and
travail night and day for souls, and have an eye so single to the good
of souls and to the glory of God, and am so swallowed up with my
subject as not so much as to think of the right, am I all wrong? Must I
pray because it is right, and do all I do, and suffer all I suffer, not
from good-will to God and man, but because it is right? Who does not
know, that to intend the right for the sake of the right in all these
things, instead of having an eye single to the good of being, would and
must be anything rather than true religion?

5. Examine this philosophy in the light of the scripture declaration:
“God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that
whosoever believeth in him might not perish, but have everlasting
life.” Now, are we to understand that God gave his Son, not from any
regard to the good of souls for its own sake, but for the sake of the
right? Did he will the right for the sake of the right? Did he give his
Son to die for the right, for the sake of the right, or to die to
render the salvation of souls possible, for the sake of the souls? Did
Christ give himself to labor and die for the right, for the sake of the
right, or for souls, from love to souls? Did prophets, and apostles,
and martyrs, and have the saints in all ages, willed the right for the
sake of the right, or have they labored and suffered and died for God
and souls, from love to them?

6. But take another passage which is quoted in support of this
philosophy: “Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is
right.” Now what is the spirit of this requirement? What is it to obey
parents? Why, if as this philosophy holds, it must resolve itself into
ultimate intention, what must the child intend for its own sake? Must
he will good to God and his parents, and obey his parents as the means
of securing the highest good, or must he will the right as an end, for
the sake of the right, regardless of the good of God or of the
universe? Would it be right to will the right for the sake of the
right, rather than to will the good of the universe for the sake of the
good, and obey his parents as a means of securing the highest good?

It is right to will the highest good of God and of the universe, and to
use all the necessary means, and fulfil all the necessary conditions of
this highest well-being. For children to obey their parents, is one of
the means, and for this reason it is right, and upon no other condition
can it be required. But it is said that children affirm their
obligation to obey their parents, entirely irrespective of the
obedience having any reference, or sustaining any relation, to the good
of being. This is a mistake. The child, if he is a moral agent, and
does really affirm moral obligation, not only does, but must perceive
the end upon which his choice or intention ought to terminate. If he
really makes an intelligent affirmation, it is and must be, that he
ought to will an end; that this end is not, and cannot be the right, as
has been shown. He knows that he ought to will his parents’ happiness,
and his own happiness, and the happiness of the world, and of God; and
he knows that obedience to his parents sustains the relation of a means
to this end; The fact is, it is a first truth of reason, that he ought
to will the good of his parents, and the good of everybody. He also
knows that obedience to his parents is a necessary means to this end.
If he does not know these things, it is impossible for him to be a
moral agent, to make any intelligent affirmation at all; and if he has
any idea of obedience, it is, and must be, only such as animals have
who are actuated wholly by hope, fear and instinct. As well might we
say, that an ox or a dog, who gives indication of knowing, in some
sense, that he ought to obey us, affirms moral obligation of himself,
as to say this of a child in whose mind the idea of the good, or
valuable to being is not developed. What! does moral obligation respect
ultimate intention only; and does ultimate intention consist in the
choice of something for its own intrinsic value, and yet is it true
that children affirm moral obligation before the idea of the
intrinsically valuable is at all developed? Impossible! But this
objection assumes that children have the idea of right developed before
the idea of the valuable. This cannot be. The end to be chosen must be
apprehended by the mind, before the mind can have the idea of moral
obligation to choose an end, or of the right or wrong of choosing or
not choosing it. The development of the idea of the good or valuable,
must precede the development of the ideas of right and of moral
obligation.

Take this philosophy on its own ground, and suppose the relation of
rightness existing between choice and its object to be the ground of
obligation, it is plain that the intrinsically valuable object must be
perceived, before this relation can be perceived. So that the idea of
the intrinsically valuable must be developed, as a condition of the
existence of the idea of the relation in question. The law of God,
then, is not, and cannot be, developed in the mind of a child who has
no knowledge or idea of the valuable, and who has, and can have, no
reference to the good of any being, in obedience to his parents.

It is one thing to intend that, the intending of which is right, and
quite another to intend the right as an end. For example, to choose my
own gratification as an end, is wrong. But this is not choosing the
wrong as an end. A drunkard chooses to gratify his appetite for strong
drink as an end, that is, for its own sake. This is wrong. But the
choice does not terminate on the wrong, but on the gratification. The
thing intended is not the wrong. The liquor is not chosen, the
gratification is not intended, because it is wrong, but notwithstanding
it is wrong. To love God is right, but to suppose that God is loved
because it is right, is absurd. It is to suppose that God is loved, not
from any regard to God, but from a regard to right. This is an
absurdity and a contradiction. To love or will the good of my neighbor,
is right. But to will the right, instead of the good of my neighbor, is
not right. It is loving right instead of my neighbor; but this is not
right.

1. But it is objected, that I am conscious of affirming to myself that
I ought to will the right. This is a mistake. I am conscious of
affirming to myself, that I ought to will that, the willing of which is
right, to wit, to will the good of God and of being. This is right. But
this is not choosing the right as an end.

But it is still insisted, that we are conscious of affirming obligation
to will, and do, many things, simply and only because it is right thus
to will, and do, and in view of this rightness.

To this I reply, that the immediate reason for the act, thought of at
the time, and immediately present to the mind, may be the rightness of
the act, but in such cases the rightness is only regarded by the mind
as a condition and never as the ground of obligation. The act must be
ultimate choice, or the choice of conditions and means. In ultimate
choice, surely, the mind can never affirm, or think of the relation of
rightness between the choice and its object, instead of the intrinsic
value of the object, as the ground of obligation. Nor can the mind
think of the relation of rightness between the choice of conditions and
means, and its object, as the ground of the obligation to choose them.
It does, and must, assume, the value of the end, as creating both the
obligation to choose, and the relation in question. The fact is, the
mind necessarily assumes, without always thinking of this assumption,
its obligation to will the good, for its own sake, together with all
the known conditions and means. Whenever therefore it perceives a
condition, or a means of good, it instantly and necessarily affirms
obligation to choose it, or, which is the same thing, it affirms the
rightness of such choice. The rightness of the choice may be, and often
is the thing immediately thought of, but the assumption is, and must
be, in the mind, that this obligation, and hence the rightness is
created by the nature of the object to which this thing sustains the
relation of a condition or a means.

2. But it is said again, “I am conscious of affirming to myself that I
ought to will the good of being, because it is right.” That is, to will
the good of being, as a means, and the right as an end! which is making
right the supreme good, and the good of being a means to that end. This
is absurd. But to say, that I am conscious of affirming to myself my
obligation to love or will the good of God and my neighbor, because it
is right, is a contradiction. It is the same as to say, I ought to
love, or intend the good of God and my neighbor, as an ultimate end,
and yet not to intend the good of God and my neighbor, but intend the
right.

3. But it is said, that “I ought to love God in compliance with, and
out of respect to my obligation; that I ought to will it, because and
for the reason that I am bound to will it.” That is, that in loving God
and my neighbor, I must intend to discharge or comply with my
obligation; and this, it is said, is identical with intending the
right. But ought my supreme object to be to discharge my duty–to meet
obligation, instead of willing the well-being of God and my neighbor
for its own sake? If my end is to do my duty, I do not do it. For what
is my obligation? Why, to love, or will the good of God and my
neighbor, that is, as an end, or for its own value. To discharge my
obligation, then, I must intend the good of God and my neighbor, as an
end. That is, I must intend that which I am under an obligation to
intend. But I am not under an obligation to intend the right, because
it is right, nor do my duty because it is my duty, but to intend the
good of God and of my neighbor, because it is good. Therefore, to
discharge my obligation, I must intend the good, and not the right–the
good of God and my neighbor and not to do my duty. I say again, to
intend the good, or valuable, is right but to intend the right is not
right.

4. But it is said, that in very many instances, at least, I am
conscious of affirming my moral obligation to do the right, without any
reference to the good of being, when I can assign no other reason for
the affirmation of obligation than the right. For example, I behold
virtue; I affirm spontaneously and necessarily, that I ought to love
that virtue. And this, it is said, has no reference to the good of
being. Is willing the right for the sake of the right, and loving
virtue, the same thing? But what is it to love virtue? Not a mere
feeling of delight or complacency in it. It is agreed that moral
obligation, strictly speaking, respects the ultimate intention only.
What, then, do I mean by the affirmation that I ought to love virtue?
What is virtue? It is ultimate intention, or an attribute of ultimate
intention. But what is loving virtue? It consists in willing its
existence. But it is said that I affirm my obligation to love virtue as
an end, or for its own sake, and not from any regard to the good of
being. This is absurd, and a contradiction. To love virtue, it is said,
is to will its existence as an end. But virtue consists in intending an
end. Now, to love virtue, it is said, is to will, intend its existence
as an end, for its own sake. Then, according to this theory, I affirm
my obligation to intend the intention of a virtuous being as an end,
instead of intending the same end that he does. This is absurd; his
intention is of no value, is neither naturally good nor morally good,
irrespective of the end intended. It is neither right nor wrong,
irrespective of the end chosen. It is therefore impossible to will,
choose, intend the intention as an end, without reference to the end
intended. To love virtue, then, is to love or will the end upon which
virtuous intention terminates, namely, the good of being; or, in other
words, to love virtue is to will its existence for the sake of the end
it has in view, which is the same thing as to will the same end. Virtue
is intending, choosing an end. Loving virtue is willing that the
virtuous intention should exist for the sake of its end. Take away the
end, and who would or could will the intention? Without the end, the
virtue, or intention, would not and could not exist. It is not true,
therefore, that in the case supposed, I affirm my obligation to will,
or intend, without any reference to the good of being.

5. But again, it is said, that when I contemplate the moral excellence
of God, I affirm my obligation to love him solely for his goodness,
without any reference to the good of being, and for no other reason
than because it is right. But to love God because of his moral
excellence, and because it is right, are not the same thing. It is a
gross contradiction to talk of loving God for his moral excellence,
because it is right. It is the same as to say, I love God for the
reason that he is morally excellent, or worthy, yet not at all for this
reason, but for the reason that it is right. To love God for his moral
worth, is to will good to him for its own sake upon condition that he
deserves it. But to will his moral worth because it is right, is to
will the right as an ultimate end, to have supreme regard to right,
instead of the moral worth, or the well-being of God.

But it may reasonably be asked, why should rightarians bring forward
these objections? They all assume that moral obligation may respect
something else than ultimate intention. Why, I repeat it, should
rightarians affirm that the moral excellence of God is the foundation
of moral obligation, since they hold that right is the foundation of
moral obligation? Why should the advocates of the theory that the moral
excellence of God is the foundation of moral obligation, affirm that
right is the foundation, or that we are bound to love God for his moral
excellence, because this is right? These are gross contradictions.
Rightarians hold that disinterested benevolence is a universal duty;
that this benevolence consists in willing the highest good of being in
general, for its own sake; that this good, by virtue of its own nature,
imposes obligation to choose it, for its own sake, and therefore, and
for this reason, it is right thus to choose it. But notwithstanding all
this, they most inconsistently affirm that right is universally the
ground of obligation. Consistency must compel them to deny that
disinterested benevolence ever is, or can be, duty and right, or to
abandon the nonsensical dogma, that right is the ground of obligation.
There is no end to the absurdities in which error involves its
advocates, and it is singular to see the advocates of the different
theories, each in his turn, abandon his own and affirm some other, as
an objection to the true theory. It has also been, and still is, common
for writers to confound different theories with each other, and to
affirm, in the compass of a few pages, several different theories. At
least this has been done in some instances.

Consistent rightarianism is a godless, Christless, loveless philosophy.
This Kant saw and acknowledged. He calls it pure legality, that is, he
understands the law as imposing obligation by virtue of its own nature,
instead of the intrinsic value of the end, which the law requires moral
agents to choose. He loses sight of the end, and does not recognize any
end whatever. He makes a broad distinction between morality and
religion. Morality consists, according to him, in the adoption of the
maxim, “Do right for the sake of the right,” or, “Act at all times upon
a maxim fit for law universal.” The adoption of this maxim is morality.
But now, having adopted this maxim, the mind goes abroad to carry its
maxim into practice. It finds God and being to exist, and sees it to be
right to intend their good. This intending the good is religion,
according to him. Thus, he says, ethics lead to or result in
religion.–(See Kant, on Religion.) But we feel prompted to inquire
whether, when we apprehend God and being, we are to will their
well-being as an end, or for its own sake, or because it is right? If
for its own sake, where then is the maxim, “Will the right for the sake
of the right?” For if we are to will the good, not as an ultimate end,
but for the sake of the right, then right is the end that is preferred
to the highest well-being of God and of the universe. It is impossible
that this should be religion. Indeed Kant himself admits that this is
not religion.

But enough of this cold and loveless philosophy. As it exalts right
above all that is called God, and subverts all the teachings of the
Bible, it cannot be a light thing to be deluded by it. But it is
remarkable and interesting to see Christian rightarians, without being
sensible of their inconsistency, so often confound this philosophy with
that which teaches that good-will to being constitutes virtue. Numerous
examples of it occur everywhere in their writings, which demonstrate
that rightarianism is with them only a theory that plays round the head
but comes not near the heart.”
__________________________________________________________________

[1] Mahan’s Moral Philosophy.

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