LECTURE VI.
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
I now enter upon the discussion of the theory, that the goodness, or
moral excellence of God is the foundation of moral obligation.
To this philosophy I reply,
1. That the reason of obligation, or that which imposes obligation, is
identical with the end on which the intention ought to terminate. If,
therefore, the goodness of God be the reason, or foundation of moral
obligation, then the goodness of God is the ultimate end to be
intended. But as this goodness consists in love or benevolence, it is
impossible that it should be regarded or chosen, as an ultimate end;
and to choose it were to choose the divine choice, to intend the divine
intention as an ultimate end, instead of choosing what God chooses, and
intending what he intends. Or if the goodness or moral excellence of
God is to be regarded not as identical with, but as an attribute or
moral quality of benevolence, then, upon the theory under
consideration, a moral agent ought to choose a quality or attribute of
the divine choice or intention as an ultimate end, instead of the end
upon which the divine intention terminates. This is absurd.
2. It is impossible that virtue should be the foundation of moral
obligation. Virtue consists in a compliance with moral obligation. But
obligation must exist before it can be complied with. Now, upon this
theory, obligation cannot exist until virtue exists as its foundation.
Then this theory amounts to this: virtue is the foundation of moral
obligation; therefore virtue must exist before moral obligation can
exist. But as virtue consists in a conformity to moral obligation,
moral obligation must exist before virtue can exist. Therefore neither
moral obligation nor virtue, can ever by any possibility, exist. God’s
virtue must have existed prior to his obligation, as its foundation.
But as virtue consists in compliance with moral obligation, and as
obligation could not exist until virtue existed as its foundation; in
other words, as obligation could not exist without the previous
existence of virtue as its foundation, and as virtue could not exist
without the previous existence of obligation, it follows, that neither
God nor any other being could ever be virtuous, for the reason that he
could never be the subject of moral obligation. Should it be said, that
God’s holiness is the foundation of our obligation to love him, I ask
in what sense it can be so. What is the nature or form of that love,
which his virtue lays us under an obligation to exercise? It cannot be
a mere emotion of complacency, for emotions being involuntary states of
mind and mere phenomena of the sensibility, are not strictly within the
pale of legislation and morality. Is this love resolvable into
benevolence or good-will? But why will good to God rather than evil?
Why, surely, because good is valuable in itself. But if it is valuable
in itself, this must be the fundamental reason for willing it as a
possible good; and his virtue must be only a secondary reason or
condition of the obligation to will his actual blessedness. But again,
the foundation of moral obligation must be the same in all worlds, and
with all moral agents, for the simple reason that moral law is one and
identical in all worlds. If God’s virtue is not the foundation of moral
obligation in him, which it cannot be, it cannot be the foundation of
obligation in us, as moral law must require him to choose the same end
that it requires us to choose. His virtue must be a secondary reason of
his obligation to will his own actual blessedness, and the condition of
our obligation to will his actual and highest blessedness, but cannot
be the fundamental reason, that always being the intrinsic value of his
well-being.
If this theory is true, disinterested benevolence is a sin. Undeniably
benevolence consists in willing the highest well-being of God and the
universe for its own sake, in devoting the soul anal all to this end.
But this theory teaches us, either to will the moral excellence of God,
for its own sake, or as an ultimate end, or to will his good and the
good of the universe, not for its own sake, but because he is morally
excellent. The benevolence theory regards blessedness as the end, and
holiness or moral excellence only as a condition of the end. This
theory regards moral excellence itself as the end. Does the moral
excellence of God impose obligation to will his moral excellence for
its own sake? If not, it cannot be a ground of obligation. Does his
moral excellence impose obligation to will his highest good, and that
of the universe, for its own sake? No, for this were a contradiction.
For, be it remembered, no one thing can be a ground of obligation to
choose any other thing, for its own sake. That which creates obligation
to choose, by reason of its own nature, must itself be the identical
object of choice; the obligation is to choose that object for its own
sake.
If the divine moral excellence is the ground of obligation to choose,
then this excellence must be the object of this choice, and
disinterested benevolence is never right, but always wrong.
2. But for the sake of a somewhat systematic examination of this
subject, I will–
(1.) Show what virtue, or moral excellence is.
(2.) That it cannot be the foundation of moral obligation.
(3.) Show what moral worth or good desert is.
(4.) That it cannot be the foundation of moral obligation.
(5.) Show what relation virtue, merit, and moral worth sustain to moral
obligation.
(6.) Answer objections.
(1.) Show what virtue, or moral excellence is.
Virtue, or moral excellence, consists in conformity of will to moral
law. It must either be identical with love or good-will, or it must be
the moral attribute or element of good-will or benevolence.
(2.) It cannot be the foundation of moral obligation.
It is agreed, that the moral law requires love; and that, this term
expresses all that it requires. It is also agreed that this love is
good-will, or that it resolves itself into choice, or ultimate
intention. It must, then, consist in the choice of an ultimate end. Or,
in more common language, this love consists in the supreme devotion of
heart and soul to God and to the highest good of being. But since
virtue either consists in choice, or is an attribute of choice, or
benevolence, it is impossible to will it as an ultimate end. For this
would involve the absurdity of choosing choice, or intending intention,
as an end, instead of choosing that as an end upon which virtuous
choice terminates. Or, if virtue be regarded as the moral attribute of
love or benevolence, to make it an ultimate end would be to make an
attribute of choice an ultimate end, instead of that on which choice
terminates, or ought to terminate. This is absurd.
(3.) Show what moral worth, or good desert is.
Moral worth, or good desert, is not identical with virtue, or obedience
to moral law, but is an attribute of character, resulting from
obedience. Virtue, or holiness, is a state of mind. It is an active and
benevolent state of the will. Moral worth is not a state of mind, but
is the result of a state of mind. We say that a man’s obedience to
moral law is valuable in such a sense that a holy being is worthy, or
deserving of good, because of his virtue, or holiness. But this
worthiness, this good desert, is not a state of mind, but, as I said,
it is a result of benevolence. It is an attribute or quality of
character, and not a state of mind.
(4.) Moral worth or good desert cannot be the foundation of moral
obligation.
(a.) It is admitted, that good, or the intrinsically valuable to being,
must be the foundation of moral obligation. The law of God requires the
choice of an ultimate end. This end must be intrinsically valuable, for
it is its intrinsic value that imposes obligation to will it. Nothing,
then, can be the foundation of moral obligation but that which is a
good, or intrinsically valuable in itself.
(b.) Ultimate good, or the intrinsically valuable, must belong to, and
be inseparable from, sentient existences. A block of marble cannot
enjoy, or be the subject of, good. That which is intrinsically good to
moral agents, must consist in a state of mind. It must be something
that is found within the field of consciousness. Nothing can be to them
an intrinsic good, but that of which they can be conscious. By this it
is not intended that everything of which they are conscious, is to them
an ultimate good, or a good in any sense; but it is intended, that that
cannot be to them an ultimate, or intrinsic good, of which they are not
conscious. Ultimate good must consist in a conscious state of mind.
Whatever conduces to the state of mind that is necessarily regarded by
us as intrinsically good or valuable, is to us a relative good. But the
state of mind alone is the ultimate good. From this it is plain, that
moral worth, or good desert, cannot be the foundation of moral
obligation, because it is not a state of mind, and cannot be an
ultimate good. The consciousness of good desert, that is, the
consciousness of affirming of ourselves good desert, is an ultimate
good. Or, more strictly, the satisfaction which the mind experiences,
upon occasion of affirming its good desert, is an ultimate good. But
neither the conscious affirmation of good desert, nor the satisfaction
occasioned by the affirmation, is identical with moral worth or good
desert. Merit, moral worth, good desert, is the condition, or occasion,
of the affirmation, and of the resulting conscious satisfaction, and is
therefore a good, but it is not, and cannot be an ultimate, or
intrinsic good. It is valuable; but not intrinsically valuable. Were it
not that moral beings are so constituted, that it meets a demand of the
intelligence, and therefore produces satisfaction in its contemplation,
it would not be, and could not reasonably be regarded as a good in any
sense. But since it meets a demand of the intelligence, it is a
relative good, and results in ultimate good.
(5.) Show what relation moral excellence, worth, merit, desert, sustain
to moral obligation.
(a.) We have seen, that neither of them can be the foundation of moral
obligation; that neither of them has in it the element of the
intrinsic, or ultimate good, or valuable; and that, therefore, a moral
agent can never be under obligation to will or choose them as an
ultimate end.
(b.) Worth, merit, good desert, cannot be a distinct ground, or
foundation, of moral obligation, in such a sense as to impose
obligation, irrespective of the intrinsic value of good. All obligation
must respect, strictly, the choice of an object for its own sake, with
the necessary conditions and means. The intrinsic value of the end is
the foundation of the obligation to choose both it and the necessary
conditions and means of securing it. But for the intrinsic value of the
end there could be no obligation to will the conditions and means.
Whenever a thing is seen to be a necessary condition or means of
securing an intrinsically valuable end, this perceived relation is the
condition of our obligation to will it. The obligation is, and must be,
founded in the intrinsic value of the end, and conditionated upon the
perceived relation of the object to the end. The intelligence of every
moral agent, from its nature and laws, affirms, that the ultimate good
and blessedness of moral beings is, and ought to be, conditionated upon
their holiness and good desert. This being a demand of reason, reason
can never affirm moral obligation to will the actual blessedness of
moral agents, but upon condition of their virtue, and consequent good
desert, or merit. The intelligence affirms that it is fit, suitable,
proper, that virtue, good desert, merit, holiness, should be rewarded
with blessedness. Blessedness is a good in itself, and ought to be
willed for that reason, and moral agents are under obligation to will
that all beings capable of good may be worthy to enjoy, and may,
therefore, actually enjoy blessedness. But they are not under
obligation to will that every moral being should actually enjoy
blessedness, but upon condition of holiness and good desert. The
relation that holiness, merit, good desert, etc., sustain to moral
obligation, is this: they supply the condition of the obligation to
will the actual blessedness of the being or beings who are holy. The
obligation must be founded in the intrinsic value of the good we are to
will to them. For it is absurd to say, that we are, or can be, under
obligation to will good to them for its own sake, or as an ultimate
end, and yet that the obligation should not be founded in the intrinsic
value of the good. Were it not for the intrinsic value of their good,
we should no sooner affirm obligation to will good to them than evil.
The good or blessedness is the thing, or end, we are under obligation
to will. But obligation to will an ultimate end cannot possibly be
founded in anything else than the intrinsic value of the end. Suppose
it should be said, that in the case of merit, or good desert, the
obligation is founded in merit, and only conditioned on the intrinsic
value of the good I am to will. This would be to make desert the end
willed, and good only the condition, or means. This were absurd.
(c.) But again, to make merit the ground of the obligation, and the
good willed only a condition, amounts to this: I perceive merit,
whereupon I affirm my obligation to will–what? Not good to the
deserving because of its value to him, nor from any disposition to see
him enjoy blessedness for its own sake, but because of his merit. But
what does he merit? Why, good, or blessedness. It is good, or
blessedness, that I am to will to him, and this is the end I am bound
to will; that is, I am to will his good, or blessedness, for its own
intrinsic value. The obligation, then, must be founded in the intrinsic
value of the end, that is, his well-being, or blessedness, and only
conditioned upon merit.
(6.) I am to answer objections.
(a.) It is objected, that, if virtue is meritorious, if it merits,
deserves anything, this implies corresponding obligation, and that
merit, or desert, must impose, or be the ground of, the obligation to
give that which is merited. But this objection is either a mere begging
of the question, or it is sheer logomachy. It assumes that the words,
desert and merit, mean what they cannot mean. Let the objector
remember, that he holds that obligation respects ultimate intention.
That ultimate intention must find the grounds of its obligation
exclusively in its object. Now, if desert or merit is a ground of
obligation, then merit or desert must be the object of the intention.
Desert, merit, must be willed for its own sake. But is this the thing
that is deserved, merited? Does a meritorious being deserve that his
merit or desert should be willed for its own sake? Indeed, is this what
he deserves? We understandingly speak of good desert, the desert of
good and of evil; can a being deserve that his desert shall be chosen
for its own sake? If not, then it is impossible that desert or merit
should be a ground of obligation; for be it remembered, that whatever
is a ground of obligation ought to be chosen for its own sake. But if
good desert deserves good, it is self-evident that the intrinsic value
of the good is the ground, and merit only a condition, of obligation to
will the actual and particular enjoyment of the good by the meritorious
individual. Thus merit changes merely the form of obligation. If an
individual is wicked, I ought to will his good as valuable in itself,
and that he should comply with the necessary conditions of happiness,
and thereupon actually enjoy happiness. If he is virtuous, I am to will
his good still for its intrinsic value; and, since he has complied with
the conditions of enjoyment, that he actually enjoy happiness. In both
cases, I am bound to will his good, and for the same fundamental
reason, namely, its intrinsic value. Neither the fact nor the ground of
obligation to will his good is changed by his virtue; the form only of
the obligation is changed. I may be under obligation to will evil to a
particular being, but in this case I am not bound to will the evil for
its own sake, and therefore, not as an end or ultimate. I ought
sometimes to will the punishment of the guilty, not for its own sake,
but for the sake of the public good; and the intrinsic value of the
good to be promoted is the ground of the obligation, and guilt or
demerit is only a condition of the obligation in that form. If merit or
desert be a ground of obligation, then merit or desert ought to be
chosen for its own sake. It would follow from this, that ill desert
ought to be chosen for its own sake, as well as good desert. But who
will pretend that ill desert ought to be willed for its own sake? But
if this is not, cannot be so, then it follows, that desert is not a
ground of obligation, and that is not an object of ultimate choice, or
of choice at all, only as a means to an end.
(b.) It is asserted, in support of the theory we are examining, that
the Bible represents the goodness of God as a reason for loving him, or
as a foundation of the obligation to love him.
To this I answer, the Bible may assign, and does assign the goodness of
God as a reason for loving him, but it does not follow, that it
affirms, or assumes, that this reason is the foundation, or a
foundation of the obligation. The inquiry is, in what sense does the
Bible assign the goodness of God as a reason for loving him? Is it that
the goodness of God is the foundation of the obligation, or only a
condition of the obligation to will his actual blessedness in
particular? Is his goodness a distinct ground of obligation to love
him? But what is this love that his goodness lays us under an
obligation exercise to him? It is agreed, that it cannot be an emotion,
that it must consist in willing something to him. It is said by some,
that the obligation is to treat him as worthy. But I ask, worthy of
what? Is he worthy of anything? If so, what is it? For this is the
thing that I ought to will to him. Is he merely worthy that I should
will his worthiness for its own sake? This must be, if his worthiness
is the ground of obligation; for that which is the ground of obligation
to choose must be the object of choice. Why, he is worthy of blessing,
and honor, and praise. But these must all be embraced in the single
word, love. The law has forever decided the point, that our whole duty
to God is expressed by this one term. It has been common to make
assertions upon the subject, that involve a contradiction of the Bible.
The law of God, as revealed in the two precepts, “Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself,” covers
the whole ground of moral obligation. It is expressly and repeatedly
taught in the Bible, that love to God and our neighbor is the
fulfilling of the law. It is, and must be admitted, that this love
consists in willing something to God and our neighbor. What, then, is
to be willed to them? The command is, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself.” This says nothing about the character of my neighbor. It is
the value of his interests, of his well-being, that the law requires me
to regard. It does not require me to love my righteous neighbor merely,
nor to love my righteous neighbor better than I do my wicked neighbor.
It is my neighbor that I am to love. That is, I am to will his
well-being, or his good, with the conditions and means thereof,
according to its value. If the law contemplated the virtue of any being
as a distinct ground of obligation, it could not read as it does. It
must, in that case, have read as follows: If thou art righteous, and
thy neighbor is as righteous as thou art, thou shalt love him as
thyself. But if he is righteous and thou art not, thou shalt love him
and not thyself. If thou art righteous, and he is not, thou shalt love
thyself, and not thy neighbor.” How far would this be from the gloss of
the Jewish rabbies so fully rebuked by Christ, namely, “Ye have heard
that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt love thy
neighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies;
bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you; and pray for
them that despitefully use and persecute you. For if ye love them that
love you, what thank have ye? Do not even the publicans the same?” The
fact is, the law knows but one ground of moral obligation. It requires
us to love God and our neighbor. This love is good will. What else
ought we to will, or can we possibly will to God and our neighbor, but
their highest good, or well-being, with all the conditions and means
thereof? This is all that can be of any value to them, and all that we
can or ought to, will to them under any circumstances whatever. When we
have willed this to them, we have done our whole duty to them. “Love is
the fulfilling of the law.” We owe them nothing more, absolutely. They
can have nothing more. But this the law requires us to will to God and
our neighbor, on account of the intrinsic value of their good, whatever
their character may be; that is, this is to be willed to God and our
neighbor, as a possible good, whether they are holy or unholy, simply
because of its intrinsic value.
But while the law requires that this should be willed to all, as a
possible and intrinsic good, irrespective of character; it cannot, and
does not require us to will that God, or any moral agent in particular,
shall be actually blessed, but upon condition that he be holy. Our
obligation to the unholy, is to will that they might be holy, and
perfectly blessed. Our obligation to the holy, is to will that they be
perfectly blessed. As has been said, virtue only modifies the form, but
does not change the ground of obligation. The Bible represents love to
enemies as one of the highest forms of virtue: “God commendeth his love
toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.” But
if love to enemies be a high and a valuable form of virtue, it must be
only because the true spirit of the law requires the same love to them
as to others, and because of the strong inducements not to love them.
Who does not regard the virtue of the atonement as being as great as if
it had been made for the friends, instead of the enemies of God? And
suppose God were supremely selfish and unreasonably our enemy, who
would not regard good-will exercised toward him as being as
praiseworthy as it now is. Now if he were unjustly our enemy, would not
a hearty good-will to him in such a case be a striking and valuable
instance of virtue? In such a case we could not, might not, will his
actual blessedness, but we might and should be under infinite
obligation to will that he might become holy, and thereupon be
perfectly blessed. We should be under obligation to will his good in
such a sense, that should he become holy, we should will his actual
blessedness, without any change in our ultimate choice or intention,
and without any change in us that would imply an increase of virtue.
So of our neighbor: we are bound to will his good, even if he is
wicked, in such a sense as to need no new intention or ultimate choice,
to will his actual blessedness, should he become holy. We may be as
holy in loving a sinner, and in seeking his salvation while he is a
sinner, as in willing his good after he is converted and becomes a
saint. God was as virtuous in loving the world, and seeking to save it
while in sin, as he is in loving those in it who are holy. The fact is,
if we are truly benevolent, and will the highest well-being of all,
with the conditions and means of their blessedness, it follows of
course, and of necessity, that when one becomes holy we shall love him
with the love of complacency; that we shall, of course, will his actual
blessedness, seeing that he has fulfilled the necessary conditions, and
rendered himself worthy of blessedness. It implies no increase of
virtue in God, when a sinner repents, to exercise complacency toward
him. Complacency, as a state of will or heart, is only benevolence
modified by the consideration or relation of right character in the
object of it. God, prophets, apostles, martyrs, and saints, in all
ages, are as virtuous in their self-denying and untiring labors to save
the wicked, as they are in their complacent love to the saints.
This is the universal doctrine of the Bible. It is in exact accordance
with the spirit and letter of the law. “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself;” that is, whatever his character may be. This is the doctrine
of reason, and accords with the convictions of all men. But if this is
so, it follows that virtue is not a distinct ground of moral
obligation, but only modifies the form of obligation. We are under
obligation to will the actual blessedness of a moral being, upon
condition of his holiness. We ought to will good or blessedness for its
own value, irrespective of character; but we ought to will the
enjoyment of it, by an individual, in particular, only upon condition
of his holiness. Its intrinsic value is the foundation of the
obligation, and his holiness changes not the fact, but form, of the
obligation, and is the condition of the obligation to will his actual
enjoyment of perfect blessedness in particular. When, therefore, the
Bible calls on us to love God for his goodness, it does not and cannot
mean to assign the fundamental reason, or foundation of the obligation
to will his good; for it were absurd to suppose, that his good is to be
willed, not for its intrinsic value, but because he is good. Were it
not for its intrinsic value, we should as soon affirm our obligation to
will evil as good to him. The Bible assumes the first truths of reason.
It is a first truth of reason, that God’s well-being is of infinite
value, and ought to be willed as a possible good whatever his character
may be; and that it ought to be willed as an actual reality upon
condition of his holiness. Now the Bible does just as in this case
might be expected. It asserts his actual and infinite holiness, and
calls on us to love him, or to will his good, for that reason. But this
is not asserting nor implying that his holiness is the foundation of
the obligation to will his good in any such sense as that we should not
be under obligation to will it with all our heart, and soul, and mind,
and strength, as a possible good, whether he were holy or not. It is
plain that the law contemplates only the intrinsic value of the end to
be willed. It would require us to will the well-being of God with all
our heart, etc., or as the supreme good, whatever his character might
be. Were not this so, it could not be moral law. His interest would be
the supreme and the infinite good, in the sense of the intrinsically
and infinitely valuable, and we should, for that reason, be under
infinite obligation to will that it might be, whether he were holy or
sinful, and upon condition of his holiness, to will the actual
existence of his perfect and infinite blessedness. Upon our coming to
the knowledge of his holiness, the obligation is instantly imposed, not
merely to will his highest well-being as a possible, but as an actually
existing, good.
Again, it is impossible that goodness, virtue, good desert, merit,
should be a distinct ground or foundation of moral obligation, in such
a sense as to impose or properly to increase obligation. It has been
shown that neither of these can be an ultimate good and impose
obligation to choose itself as an ultimate end, or for its intrinsic
value.
But if goodness or merit can impose moral obligation to will, it must
be an obligation to will itself as an ultimate end. But this we have
seen cannot be; therefore these things cannot be a distinct ground or
foundation of moral obligation.
But again, the law does not make virtue, good desert, or merit, the
ground of obligation, and require us to love them and to will them as
an ultimate end; but to love God and our neighbor as an ultimate good.
It does, no doubt, require us to will God’s goodness, good desert,
worthiness, merit, as a condition and means of his highest well-being,
and of the well-being of the universe; but it is absurd to say that it
requires us to will either of these things as an ultimate end, instead
of his perfect blessedness, to which these sustain only the relation of
a condition. Let it be distinctly understood that nothing can impose
moral obligation but that which is an ultimate and an intrinsic good;
for if it impose obligation, it must be an obligation to choose itself
for what it is, in and of itself. All obligation must respect the
choice either of an end or of means. Obligation to choose means is
founded in the value of the end. Whatever, then, imposes obligation
must be an ultimate end. It must possess that, in and of itself, that
is worthy or deserving of choice as an intrinsic and ultimate good.
This we have seen, virtue, merit, etc. cannot be; therefore they cannot
be a foundation of moral obligation. But it is said they can increase
obligation to love God and holy beings. But we are under infinite
obligation to love God and to will his good with all our power, because
of the intrinsic value of his well-being, whether he is holy or sinful.
Upon condition that he is holy, we are under obligation to will his
actual blessedness, but certainly we are under obligation to will it
with no more than all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strength. But
this we are required to do because of the intrinsic value of his
blessedness, whatever his character might be. The fact is, we can do no
more, and can be under obligation to do no more, than to will his good
with all our power, and this we are bound to do for its own sake; and
no more than this can we be under obligation to do, for any reason
whatever. Our obligation is to will his good with all our strength, by
virtue of its infinite value, and it cannot be increased by any other
consideration than our increased knowledge of its value, which
increases our ability.
(c.) But it is said that favors received impose obligation to exercise
gratitude; that the relation of benefactor itself imposes obligation to
treat the benefactor according to this relation.
Answer: I suppose this objection contemplates this relation as a
virtuous relation, that is, that the benefactor is truly virtuous and
not selfish in his benefaction. If not, then the relation cannot at all
modify obligation.
If the benefactor has in the benefaction obeyed the law of love, if he
has done his duty in sustaining this relation, I am under obligation to
exercise gratitude toward him. But what is gratitude? It is not a mere
emotion or feeling; for this is a phenomenon of the sensibility, and,
strictly speaking, without the pale both of legislation and morality.
Gratitude, when spoken of as a virtue and as that of which moral
obligation can be affirmed, must be an act of will. An obligation to
gratitude must be an obligation to will something to the benefactor.
But what am I under obligation to will to a benefactor, but his actual
highest well-being? If it be God, I am under obligation to will his
actual and infinite blessedness with all my heart and with all my soul.
If it be my neighbor, I am bound to love him as myself, that is, to
will his actual well-being as I do my own. What else can either God or
man possess or enjoy, and what else can I be under obligation to will
to them? I answer, nothing else. To the law and to the testimony; if
any philosophy agree not herewith, it is because there is no light in
it. The virtuous relation of benefactor modifies obligation, just as
any other and every other form of virtue does, and in no other way.
Whenever we perceive virtue in any being, this supplies the condition
upon which we are bound to will his actual highest well-being. He has
done his duty. He has complied with obligation in the relation he
sustains. He is truthful, upright, benevolent, just, merciful, no
matter what the particular form may be in which the individual presents
to me the evidence of his holy character. It is all precisely the same
so far as my obligation extends. I any, independently of my knowledge
of his character, under obligation to will his highest well-being for
its own sake. That is, to will that he may fulfil all the conditions,
and thereupon enjoy perfect blessedness. But I am not under obligation
to will his actual enjoyment of blessedness until I have evidence of
his virtue. This evidence, however I obtain it, by whatever
manifestations of virtue in him or by whatever means, supplies the
condition upon which I am under obligation to will his actual enjoyment
or highest well-being. This is my whole obligation. It is all he can
have, and all I can will to him. All objections of this kind, and
indeed all possible objections to the true theory, and in support of
the one I am examining, are founded in an erroneous view of the subject
of moral obligation, or in a false and anti-scriptural philosophy that
contradicts the law of God, and sets up another rule of moral
obligation.
Again, if gratitude is a moral act, according to this objector, it is
an ultimate intention, and as such must terminate on its object, and
find its reasons or ground of obligation exclusively in its object. If
this is so, then if the relation of benefactor is the ground of
obligation to exercise gratitude, gratitude must consist in willing
this relation for its own sake, and not at all in willing anything to
the benefactor. This is absurd. It is certain that gratitude must
consist in willing good to the benefactor, and not in willing the
relation for its own sake, and that the ground of the obligation must
be the intrinsic value of the good, and the relation only a condition
of the obligation in the particular form of willing his enjoyment of
good in particular. It is now said, in reply to this, that the “inquiry
is not, what is gratitude? but, why ought we to exercise it?” But the
inquiry is after the ground of the obligation; this, it is agreed, must
be intrinsic in its object; and is it impertinent to inquire what the
object is? Who can tell what is the ground of the obligation to
exercise gratitude until he knows what the object of gratitude is, and
consequently what gratitude is? The objector affirms that the relation
of benefactor is a ground of obligation to put forth ultimate choice.
Of course, according to him, and in fact, if this relation is the
ground of the obligation, it is, and must be, the object chosen for its
own sake. To exercise gratitude to a benefactor, then, according to
this teaching is, not to will any good to him, nor to myself, nor to
any being in existence, but simply to will the relation of benefactor
for its own sake. Not for his sake, as a good to him. Not for my sake
as a good to me, but for its own sake. Is not this a sublime
philosophy?
(d.) But it is also insisted that when men attempt to assign a reason
why they are under moral obligation of any kind, as to love God, they
all agree in this, in assigning the divine moral excellence as the
reason of that obligation.
I answer:–The only reason why any man supposes himself to assign the
goodness of God as the foundation of the obligation to will good to him
is, that he loosely confounds the conditions of the obligation to will
his actual blessedness, with the foundation of the obligation to will
it for its own sake, or as a possible good. Were it not for the known
intrinsic value of God’s highest well-being, we should as soon affirm
our obligation to will evil as good to him, as has been said. But if
the divine moral excellence were the foundation of moral obligation, if
God were not holy and good, moral obligation could not exist in any
case.
That every moral agent ought to will the highest well-being of God and
of all the universe for its own sake, as a possible good, whatever
their characters may be, is a truth of reason. Reason assigns and can
assign no other reason for willing their good as an ultimate end than
its intrinsic value; and to assign any other reason as imposing
obligation to will it as an end, or for its own sake, were absurd and
self-contradictory. Obligation to will it as an end and for its own
sake, implies the obligation to will its actual existence in all cases,
and to all persons, when the indispensable conditions are fulfilled.
These conditions are seen to be fulfilled in God, and therefore upon
this condition reason affirms obligation to will his actual and highest
blessedness for its own sake, the intrinsic value being the fundamental
reason of the obligation to will it as an end, and the divine goodness
the condition of the obligation to will his highest blessedness in
particular. Suppose that I existed and had the idea of blessedness and
its intrinsic value duly developed, together with an idea of all the
necessary conditions of it; but that I did not know that any other
being than myself existed, and yet I knew their existence and
blessedness possible; in this case I should be under obligation to will
or wish that beings might exist and be blessed. Now suppose that I
complied with this obligation, my virtue is just as real and as great
as if I knew their existence, and willed their actual blessedness,
provided my idea of its intrinsic value were as clear and just as if I
knew their existence. And now suppose I came to the knowledge of the
actual existence and holiness of all holy beings, I should make no new
ultimate choice in willing their actual blessedness. This I should do
of course, and, remaining benevolent, of necessity; and if this
knowledge did not give me a higher idea of the value of that which I
before willed for its own sake, the willing of the real existence of
their blessedness would not make me a whit more virtuous than when I
willed it as a possible good, without knowing that the conditions of
its actual existence would ever, in any case, be fulfilled.
The Bible reads just as it might be expected to read, and just as we
should speak in common life. It being a truth of reason that the
well-being of God is of infinite value, and therefore ought to be
willed for its own sake, it also being a truth that virtue is an
indispensable condition of fulfilling the demands of his own reason and
conscience, and of course of his actual blessedness, and of course also
a condition of the obligation to will it, we might expect the Bible to
exhort and require us to love God or will his actual blessedness, and
mention his virtue as the reason or fulfilled condition of the
obligation, rather than the intrinsic value of his blessedness as the
foundation of the obligation. The foundation of the obligation, being a
truth of reason, needs not to be a matter of revelation. Nor needs the
fact that virtue is the condition of his blessedness, nor the fact that
we are under no obligation to will his actual blessedness but upon
condition of his holiness. But that in him this condition is fulfilled,
needs to be impressed upon us, and therefore the Bible announces it as
a reason or condition of the obligation to love him, that is, to will
his actual blessedness.
God’s moral excellence is naturally, and rightly, assigned by us as a
condition, not the ground of obligation to receive his revealed will as
our law. Did we not assume the rectitude of the divine will, we could
not affirm our obligation to receive it as a rule of duty. This
assumption is a condition of the obligation, and is naturally thought
of when obligation to obey God is affirmed. But the intrinsic value and
importance of the interest he requires us to seek, is the ground of the
obligation.
(e.) Again: it is asserted that when men would awaken a sense of moral
obligation they universally contemplate the moral excellence of God as
constituting the reason of their obligation, and if this contemplation
does not awaken their sense of obligation nothing else can or will.
I answer: — The only possible reason why men ever do or can take this
course, is that they loosely consider religion to consist in feelings
of complacency in God, and are endeavoring to awaken these complacent
emotions. If they conceive of religion as consisting in these emotions,
they will of course conceive themselves to be under obligation to
exercise them, and to be sure they take the only possible course to
awaken both these and a sense of obligation to exercise them. But they
are mistaken both in regard to their obligation and the nature of
religion. Did they conceive of religion as consisting in good-will, or
in willing the highest well-being of God and of the universe for its
own sake, would they, could they, resort to the process in question,
that is, the contemplation of the divine moral excellence, as the only
reason for willing good to him, instead of considering the infinite
value of those interests to the realization of which they ought to
consecrate themselves?
If men often do resort to the process in question, it is because they
love to feel and have a self-righteous satisfaction in feelings of
complacency in God, and take more pains to awaken these feelings than
to quicken and enlarge their benevolence. A purely selfish being may be
greatly affected by the great goodness and kindness of God to him. I
know a man who is a very niggard so far as all benevolent giving and
doing for God and the world are concerned, who, I fear, resorts to the
very process in question, and is often much affected with the goodness
of God. He can bluster and denounce. all who do not feel as he does.
But ask him for a dollar to forward any benevolent enterprise, and he
will evade your request, and ask you how you feel, whether you are
engaged in religion, etc.
But it may well be asked, why does the Bible and why do we, so often
present the character of God and of Christ as a means of awakening a
sense of moral obligation and of inducing virtue? Answer:–
It is to lead men to contemplate the infinite value of those interests
which we ought to will. Presenting the example of God and of Christ, is
the highest moral means that can be used. God’s example and man’s
example is the most impressive and efficient way in which he can
declare his views, and hold forth to public gaze the infinite value of
those interests upon which all hearts ought to be set. For example,
nothing can set the infinite value of the soul in a stronger light than
the example of God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost has done.
Nothing can beget a higher sense of obligation to will the glory of the
Father and the salvation of souls, than the example of Christ. His
example is his loudest preaching, his clearest, most impressive
exhibition, not merely of his own goodness, but of the intrinsic and
infinite value of the interest he sought and which we ought to seek. It
is the love, the care, the self-denial, and the example of God, in his
efforts to secure the great ends of benevolence, that hold those
interests forth in the strongest light, and thus beget a sense of
obligation to seek the same end. But let it be observed, it is not a
contemplation of the goodness of God that awakens this sense of
obligation, but the contemplation of the value of those interests which
he seeks, in the light of his pains-taking and example; this quickens
and gives efficiency to the sense of obligation to will what he wills.
Suppose, for example, that I manifest the greatest concern and zeal for
the salvation of souls; it would not be the contemplation of my
goodness that would quicken in a bystander a sense of obligation to
save souls, but my zeal, and life, and spirit would have the strongest
tendency to arouse in him a sense of the infinite and intrinsic value
of the soul, and thus quicken a sense of obligation. Should I behold
multitudes rushing to extinguish a flaming house, it would not be a
contemplation of their goodness, but the contemplation of the interests
at stake, to the consideration of which their zeal would lead me, that
would quicken a sense of obligation in me to hasten to lend my aid.
Revelation is concerned to impress the fact that God is holy, and of
course calls on us, in view of his holiness, to love and worship him.
But in doing this, it does not, cannot mean that his holiness is the
foundation of the obligation to will his good as an ultimate end.
Our obligation, when viewed apart from his character, is to will or
wish that God might fulfil all the conditions of perfect blessedness,
and upon that condition, that he might actually enjoy perfect and
infinite satisfaction. But seeing that he meets the demands of his own
intelligence and the intelligence of the universe, and that he
voluntarily fulfils all the necessary conditions of his highest
well-being, our obligation is to will his actual and most perfect and
eternal blessedness.
I am obliged to repeat much to follow the objector, because all his
objections resolve themselves into one, and require to be answered much
in the same way.
On this day…
- Revelation 18 – 2025
- Revelation 17 – 2025
- Genesis 10 – 2024
- Genesis 9 – 2024
- John 7:18 – 2011
- Romans 15:13 – 2011
- Romans 15:8-9 – 2011
- Romans 15:1-3 – 2011
- Ezekiel 46:20 – 2011
- Ezekiel 46:16-18 – 2011
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