LECTURE II.<\/p>\n
MORAL GOVERNMENT.<\/p>\n
THE primary idea of government, is that of direction, guidance, control
\nby, or in accordance with, rule or law.<\/p>\n
All government is, and must be, either moral or physical; that is, all
\nguidance and control must be exercised in accordance with either moral
\nor physical law; for there can be no laws that are neither moral nor
\nphysical.<\/p>\n
Physical government is control, exercised by a law of necessity or
\nforce, as distinguished from the law of free will, or liberty. It is
\nthe control of substance, as opposed to free will. The only government
\nof which substance, as distinguished from free will, is capable, is and
\nmust be physical. This is true, whether the substance be material or
\nimmaterial, whether matter or mind. States and changes, whether of
\nmatter or mind, that are not actions of free will, must be subject to
\nthe law of necessity. They must therefore belong to the department of
\nphysical government. Physical government, then, is the administration
\nof physical law, or the law of force.<\/p>\n
Moral government consists in the declaration and administration of
\nmoral law. It is the government of free will by motives as
\ndistinguished from the government of substance by force. Physical
\ngovernment presides over and controls physical states and changes of
\nsubstance or constitution, and all involuntary states and changes.
\nMoral government presides over and controls, or seeks to control the
\nactions of free will: it presides over intelligent and voluntary states
\nand changes of mind. It is a government of motive, as opposed to a
\ngovernment of force–control exercised, or sought to be exercised, in
\naccordance with the law of liberty, as opposed to the law of necessity.
\nIt is the administration of moral as opposed to physical law.<\/p>\n
Moral government includes the dispensation of rewards and punishments;
\nand is administered by means as complicated and vast as the whole of
\nthe works, and providence, and ways, and grace of God.<\/p>\n
The fundamental reason of moral government.<\/p>\n
Government must be founded in a good and sufficient reason, or it is
\nnot right. No one has a right to prescribe rules for, and control the
\nconduct of another, unless there is some good reason for his doing so.
\nThere must be a necessity for moral government, or the administration
\nof it is tyranny. Moral government is indispensable to the highest
\nwell-being of the universe of moral agents. The universe is dependent
\nupon this as a means of securing the highest good. This dependence is a
\ngood and sufficient reason for the existence of moral government. Let
\nit be understood, then, that moral government is a necessity of moral
\nbeings, and therefore right.<\/p>\n
Our nature and circumstances demand that we should be under a moral
\ngovernment; because no community can perfectly harmonize in all their
\nviews and feelings, without perfect knowledge, or to say the least, the
\nsame degree of knowledge on all subjects on which they are called to
\nact. But no community ever existed, or will exist, in which all possess
\nexactly the same amount of knowledge, and where the members are,
\ntherefore, entirely agreed in all their thoughts, views, and opinions.
\nBut if they are not agreed in opinion, or have not exactly the same
\namount of knowledge, they will not, in every thing, harmonize, as it
\nrespects their courses of conduct. There must, therefore, be in every
\ncommunity, some standard or rule of duty, to which all the subjects of
\nthe community are to conform themselves. There must be some head or
\ncontrolling mind, whose will shall be law, and whose decision shall be
\nregarded as infallible, by all the subjects of the government. However
\ndiverse their intellectual attainments are, in this they must all
\nagree, that the will of the lawgiver is right, and universally the rule
\nof duty. This will must be authoritative, and not merely advisory.
\nThere must of necessity be a penalty attached to, and incurred by,
\nevery act of disobedience to this will. If disobedience be persisted
\nin, exclusion from the privileges of the government is the lowest
\npenalty that can consistently be inflicted. The good, then, of the
\nuniverse imperiously requires that there should be a moral governor.<\/p>\n
Whose right is it to govern?<\/p>\n
We have just seen that the highest well-being of the universe demands,
\nand is the end of moral government. It must, therefore, be his right
\nand duty to govern, whose attributes, physical and moral, best qualify
\nhim to secure the end of government. To him all eyes and hearts should
\nbe directed, to fill this station, to exercise this control, to
\nadminister all just and necessary rewards and punishments. It is both
\nhis right and duty to govern.<\/p>\n
That God is a moral governor, we infer–<\/p>\n
1. From our own nature. From the very laws of our being, we naturally
\naffirm our responsibility to him for our conduct. As God is our
\ncreator, we are naturally responsible to him for the right exercise of
\nour powers. And as our good and his glory depend upon our conformity to
\nthe same rule to which he conforms his whole being, he is under a moral
\nobligation to require us to be holy, as he is holy.<\/p>\n
2. His natural attributes qualify him to sustain the relation of a
\nmoral governor to the universe.<\/p>\n
3. His moral character also qualifies him to sustain this relation.<\/p>\n
4. His relation to the universe as creator and preserver, when
\nconsidered in connection with the necessity of government, and with his
\nnature and attributes, confers on him the right of universal
\ngovernment.<\/p>\n
5. His relation to the universe, and our relations to him and to each
\nother, render it obligatory upon him to establish and administer a
\nmoral government over the universe. It would be wrong for him to create
\na universe of moral beings, and then refuse or neglect to administer
\nover them a moral government, since government is a necessity of their
\nnature and relations.<\/p>\n
6. His happiness must demand it, as he could not be happy unless he
\nacted in accordance with his conscience.<\/p>\n
7. If God is not a moral governor he is not wise. Wisdom consists in
\nthe choice of the best ends, and in the use of the most appropriate
\nmeans to accomplish those ends. If God is not a moral governor, it is
\ninconceivable that he should have had any important end in view in the
\ncreation of moral beings, or that he should have chosen the best or any
\nsuitable means for the promotion of their happiness as the most
\ndesirable end.<\/p>\n
8. The conduct or providence of God plainly indicates a design to exert
\na moral influence over moral agents.<\/p>\n
9. His providence plainly indicates that the universe of mind is
\ngoverned by moral laws, or by laws suited to the nature of moral
\nagents.<\/p>\n
10. If God is not a moral governor, the whole universe, so far as we
\nhave the means of knowing it, is calculated to mislead mankind in
\nrespect to this fundamental truth. All nations have believed that God
\nis a moral governor.<\/p>\n
11. We must disapprove the character of God, if we ever come to a
\nknowledge of the fact that he created moral agents, and then exercised
\nover them no moral government.<\/p>\n
12. The Bible, which has been proved to be a revelation from God,
\ncontains a most simple and yet comprehensive system of moral
\ngovernment.<\/p>\n
13. If we are deceived in respect to our being subjects of moral
\ngovernment, we are sure of nothing.<\/p>\n
What is implied in the right to govern?<\/p>\n
1. From what has just been said, it must be evident, that the right to
\ngovern implies the necessity of government, as a means of securing an
\nintrinsically valuable end.<\/p>\n
2. Also that the right to govern implies the duty, or obligation to
\ngovern. There can be no right, in this case, without corresponding
\nobligation; for the right to govern is founded in the necessity of
\ngovernment, and the necessity of government imposes obligation to
\ngovern.<\/p>\n
3. The right to govern, implies obligation, on the part of the subject,
\nto obey. It cannot be the right, or duty, of the governor to govern,
\nunless it is the duty of the subject to obey. The governor and subjects
\nare alike dependent upon government, as the indispensable means of
\npromoting the highest good. The governor and the subject must,
\ntherefore, be under reciprocal obligation, the one to govern, and the
\nother to be governed, or to obey. The one must seek to govern, the
\nother must submit to be governed.<\/p>\n
4. The right to govern, implies the right and duty to dispense just and
\nnecessary rewards and punishments–distribute rewards proportioned to
\nmerit, and penalties proportioned to demerit, whenever the public
\ninterest demands their execution.<\/p>\n
5. It implies obligation, on the part of the subject, cheerfully to
\nacquiesce in any measure that may be necessary to secure the end of
\ngovernment, and in case of disobedience, to submit to merited
\npunishment, and also, if necessary, to aid in the infliction of the
\npenalty of law.<\/p>\n
6. It implies obligation, on the part both of the ruler and the ruled,
\nto be always ready, and when occasion arises, actually to make any
\npersonal and private sacrifice demanded by the higher public good–to
\ncheerfully meet any emergency, and exercise any degree of self-denial,
\nthat can, and will, result in a good of greater value to the public
\nthan that sacrificed by the individual, or by any number of
\nindividuals, it always being understood, that present voluntary
\nsacrifices shall have an ultimate reward.<\/p>\n
7. It implies the right and duty to employ any degree of force, which
\nis indispensable to the maintenance of order, the execution of
\nwholesome laws, the suppression of insurrections, the punishment of
\nrebels and disorganizers, and sustaining the supremacy of moral law. It
\nis impossible that the right to govern should not imply this; and to
\ndeny this right, is to deny the right to govern. Should an emergency
\noccur, in which a ruler had no right to use the indispensable means of
\nsecuring order, and the supremacy of law, the moment this emergency
\noccurred, his right to govern would, and must, cease: for it is
\nimpossible that it should be his right to govern, unless it be at the
\nsame time, and for the same reason, his duty to govern; and it is
\nabsurd to say, that it is his right and duty to govern, and yet at the
\nsame time, that he has not a right to use the indispensable means of
\ngovernment. If it be asked, whether an emergency like the one under
\nconsideration is possible, and if so what might justly be regarded as
\nsuch an emergency, I answer, that should circumstances occur under
\nwhich the sacrifice necessary to sustain, would overbalance the good to
\nbe derived from the prevalence of government, this would create the
\nemergency under consideration, in which the right to govern would
\ncease.<\/p>\n
The limits of this right.<\/p>\n
The right to govern is, and must be, just co-extensive with the
\nnecessity of government. We have seen, that the right to govern is
\nfounded in the necessities of moral beings. In other words, the right
\nto govern is founded upon the fact, that the highest good of moral
\nagents cannot be secured, but by means of government. But to avoid
\nmistake, and to correct erroneous impressions, which are sometimes
\nentertained, I must show what is not the foundation of the right to
\ngovern. The boundary of the right must, as will be seen, depend upon
\nthe foundation of the right. The right must be as broad as the reason
\nfor it. If the reason of the right be mistaken, then the limits of the
\nright cannot be ascertained, and must necessarily be mistaken also.<\/p>\n
1. The right to govern the universe cannot be founded in the fact, that
\nGod sustains to it the relation of Creator. This is by itself no reason
\nwhy he should govern it, unless it needs to be governed–unless some
\ngood will result from government. Unless there is some necessity for
\ngovernment, the fact that God created the universe can give him no
\nright to govern it.<\/p>\n
2. The fact that God is owner and sole proprietor of the universe is no
\nreason why he should govern it. Unless either his own good or the good
\nof the universe, or of both together, demand government, the relation
\nof owner cannot confer the right to govern. Neither God, nor any other
\nbeing, can own moral beings, in such a sense as to have a right to
\ngovern them, when government is wholly unnecessary, and can result in
\nno good whatever to God, or to his creatures. Government, in such a
\ncase, would be perfectly arbitrary and unreasonable, and consequently
\nan unjust, tyrannical and wicked act. God has no such right. No such
\nright can, by possibility, in any case exist.<\/p>\n
3. The right to govern cannot be founded in the fact, that God
\npossesses all the attributes, natural and moral, that are requisite to
\nthe administration of moral government. This fact is no doubt a
\ncondition of the right; for without these qualifications he could have
\nno right, however necessary government might be. But the possession of
\nthese attributes cannot confer the right independently of the necessity
\nof government: for however well qualified he may be to govern, still,
\nunless government is necessary to securing his own glory and the
\nhighest well-being of the universe, he has no right to govern it.
\nPossessing the requisite qualifications is the condition, and the
\nnecessity of government is the foundation of the right to govern. More
\nstrictly, the right is founded in the intrinsic value of the interests
\nto be secured by government, and conditioned upon the fact, that
\ngovernment is the necessary means of securing the end.<\/p>\n
4. Nor is the right to govern conferred by the value of the interests
\nto be secured, nor by the circumstance of the necessity of government
\nmerely, without respect to the condition just above mentioned. Did not
\nGod’s natural and moral attributes qualify him to sustain that relation
\nbetter than any one else, the right could not be conferred on him by
\nany other fact or relation.<\/p>\n
5. The right to govern is not, and cannot be, an abstract right based
\non no reason whatever. The idea of this right is not an ultimate idea
\nin such a sense, that our intelligence affirms the right without
\nassigning any reason on which it is founded. The human intelligence
\ncannot say that God has a right to govern, because he has such a right;
\nand that this is reason enough, and all the reason that can be given.
\nOur reason does not affirm that government is right because it is
\nright; and that this is a first truth, and an ultimate idea. If this
\nwere so, then God’s arbitrary will would be law, and no bounds could
\npossibly be assigned to the right to govern. If God’s right to govern
\nbe a first truth, an ultimate truth, fact, and idea, founded in no
\nassignable reason, then he has the right to legislate as little, and as
\nmuch, and as arbitrarily, as unnecessarily, as absurdly, and
\ninjuriously as possible, and no injustice is, or can be done; for he
\nhas, by the supposition, a right to govern, founded in no reason, and
\nof course without any limit. Assign any other reason, as the foundation
\nof the right to govern, than the value of the interests to be secured
\nand the necessity of government, and you may search in vain for any
\nlimit to the right. But the moment the foundation and the condition of
\nthe right are discovered, we see instantly, that the right must be
\nco-extensive with the reason upon which it is founded, or in other
\nwords, must be limited by, and only by the fact, that thus far, and no
\nfarther, government is necessary to the highest good of the universe.
\nNo legislation can be valid in heaven or earth–no enactments can
\nimpose obligation, except upon the condition, that such legislation is
\ndemanded by the highest good of the governor and the governed.
\nUnnecessary legislation is invalid legislation. Unnecessary government
\nis tyranny. It can, in no case be founded in right. It should, however,
\nbe observed, that it is often, and in the government of God universally
\ntrue, that the sovereign, and not the subject, is to be the judge of
\nwhat is necessary legislation and government. Under no government,
\ntherefore, are laws to be despised or rejected because we are unable to
\nsee at once their necessity, and hence their wisdom. Unless they are
\npalpably unnecessary, and therefore unwise and unjust, they are to be
\nrespected and obeyed as a less evil than contempt and disobedience,
\nthough at present we are unable to see their wisdom. Under the
\ngovernment of God there can never be any doubt nor of course any ground
\nfor distrust and hesitancy as it respects the duty of obedience.<\/p>\n
MORAL OBLIGATION.<\/p>\n
The idea of obligation, or of oughtness, is an idea of the pure reason.
\nIt is a simple, rational conception, and, strictly speaking, does not
\nadmit of a definition, since there are no terms more simple by which it
\nmay be defined. Obligation is a term by which we express a conception
\nor idea which all men have, as is manifest from the universal language
\nof men. All men have the ideas of right and wrong, and have words by
\nwhich these ideas are expressed, and, perhaps, no idea among men more
\nfrequently reveals itself in words than that of oughtness or
\nobligation. The term cannot be defined, for the simple reason that it
\nis too well and too universally understood to need or even to admit of
\nbeing expressed in any language more simple and definite than the word
\nobligation itself.<\/p>\n
The conditions of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
There is a distinction of fundamental importance between the condition
\nand the ground of obligation. The ground of obligation is the
\nconsideration which creates or imposes obligation, the fundamental
\nreason of the obligation. Of this I shall inquire in its proper place.
\nAt present I am to define the conditions of obligation. But I must in
\nthis place observe that there are various forms of obligation. For
\nexample, obligation to choose an ultimate end of life as the highest
\ngood of the universe; obligation to choose the necessary conditions of
\nthis end, as holiness, for example; and obligation to put forth
\nexecutive efforts to secure this end. The conditions of obligation vary
\nwith the form of obligation, as we shall fully perceive in the course
\nof our investigations.<\/p>\n
A condition of obligation in any particular form is a sine qua non of
\nobligation in that particular form. It is that, without which,
\nobligation in that form could not exist, and yet is not the fundamental
\nreason of the obligation. For example, the possession of the powers of
\nmoral agency is a condition of the obligation to choose the highest
\ngood of being in general, as an ultimate end, or for its own sake. But
\nthe intrinsic value of this good is the ground of the obligation. This
\nobligation could not exist without the possession of these powers; but
\nthe possession of these powers cannot of itself create the obligation
\nto choose the good in preference to the ill of being. The intrinsic
\ndifference between the good and the ill of being is the ground of the
\nobligation to will the one rather than the other. I will first define
\nthe conditions upon which all obligation depends, and without which
\nobligation in no form can exist, and afterward proceed to point out the
\nconditions of distinct forms of obligation.<\/p>\n
1. Moral agency is universally a condition of moral obligation. The
\nattributes of moral agency are intellect, sensibility, and free-will.<\/p>\n
(1.) Intellect includes, among other functions which I need not name,
\nreason, conscience, and self-consciousness. As has been said on a
\nformer occasion, reason is the intuitive faculty or function of the
\nintellect. It gives by direct intuition the following among other
\ntruths: the absolute–for example, right and wrong; the
\nnecessary–space exists; the infinite–space is infinite; the
\nperfect–God is perfect–God’s law is perfect, etc. In short, it is the
\nfaculty that intuits moral relations and affirms moral obligation to
\nact in conformity with perceived moral relations. It is that faculty
\nthat postulates all the\u00a0\u00a0 priori truths of science whether
\nmathematical, philosophical, theological, or logical.<\/p>\n
Conscience is the faculty or function of the intellect that recognizes
\nthe conformity or disconformity of the heart and life to the moral law
\nas it lies revealed in the reason, and also awards praise to
\nconformity, and blame to disconformity to that law. It also affirms
\nthat conformity to the moral law deserves reward, and that
\ndisconformity deserves punishment. It also possesses a propelling or
\nimpulsive power, by which it urges the conformity, and denounces the
\nnonconformity of will to moral law. It seems, in a certain sense, to
\npossess the power of retribution.<\/p>\n
Consciousness is the faculty or function of self-knowledge. It is the
\nfaculty that recognizes our own existence, mental actions, and states,
\ntogether with the attributes of liberty or necessity, belonging to
\nthose actions or states.<\/p>\n
?Consciousness is the mind in the act of knowing itself.? By
\nconsciousness I know that I am–that I affirm that space is,–that I
\nalso affirm that the whole is equal to all its parts–that every event
\nmust have a cause, and many such like truths. I am conscious not only
\nof these affirmations, but also that necessity is the law of these
\naffirmations, that I cannot affirm otherwise than I do, in respect to
\nthis class of truths. I am also conscious of choosing to sit at my desk
\nand write, and I am just as conscious that liberty is the law of this
\nchoice. That is, I am conscious of necessarily regarding myself as
\nentirely free in this choice, and affirming my own ability to have
\nchosen not to sit at my desk, and of being now able to choose not to
\nsit and write. I am just as conscious of affirming the liberty or
\nnecessity of my mental states as I am of the states themselves.
\nConsciousness gives us our existence and attributes, our mental acts
\nand states, and all the attributes and phenomena of our being, of which
\nwe have any knowledge. In short, all our knowledge is given to us by
\nconsciousness. The intellect is a receptivity as distinguished from a
\nvoluntary power. All the acts and states of the intellect are under the
\nlaw of necessity, or physical law. The will can command the attention
\nof the intellect. Its thoughts, perceptions, affirmations, and all its
\nphenomena are involuntary, and under a law of necessity. Of this we are
\nconscious. Another faculty indispensable to moral agency is–<\/p>\n
(2.) Sensibility. This is the faculty or susceptibility of feeling. All
\nsensation, desire, emotion, passion, pain, pleasure, and, in short,
\nevery kind and degree of feeling, as the term feeling is commonly used,
\nis a phenomenon of this faculty. This faculty supplies the
\nchronological condition of the idea of the valuable, and hence of right
\nand wrong, and of moral obligation. The experience of pleasure or
\nhappiness develops the idea of the valuable, just as the perception of
\nbody develops the idea of space.. But for this faculty the mind could
\nhave no idea of the valuable, and hence of moral obligation to will the
\nvaluable, nor of right and wrong, nor of praise-worthiness and
\nblame-worthiness.<\/p>\n
Self-love is a phenomenon of this department of the mind. It consists
\nin a constitutional desire of happiness, and implies a corresponding
\ndread of misery. It is doubtless through, or by, this constitutional
\ntendency that the rational idea of the intrinsic value of happiness or
\nenjoyment is at first developed. Animals, doubtless, have enjoyment,
\nbut we have no evidence that they possess the faculty of reason in the
\nsense in which I have defined the term. Consequently they have not, as
\nwe suppose, the rational conception of the intrinsic worth or value of
\nenjoyment. They seek enjoyment from a mere impulse of their animal
\nnature, without, as we suppose, so much as a conception of moral law,
\nobligation, right or wrong.<\/p>\n
But we know that moral agents have these ideas. Self-love is
\nconstitutional. Its gratification is the chronological condition of the
\ndevelopment of the reason’s idea of the intrinsically valuable to
\nbeing. This idea develops that of moral law, or in other words, the
\naffirmation that this intrinsic good ought to be universally chosen and
\nsought for its own sake.<\/p>\n
The sensibility, like the intellect, is a receptivity or purely a
\npassive, distinguished from a voluntary faculty. All its phenomena are
\nunder the law of necessity. I am conscious that I cannot, by any direct
\neffort, feel when and as I will. This faculty is so correlated to the
\nintellect that when the intellect is intensely occupied with certain
\nconsiderations, the sensibility is affected in a certain manner, and
\ncertain feelings exist in the sensibility by a law of necessity. I am
\nconscious that when certain conditions are fulfilled, I necessarily
\nhave certain feelings, and that when these conditions are not
\nfulfilled, I cannot be the subject of those feelings. I know by
\nconsciousness that my feelings and all the states and phenomena of the
\nsensibility are only indirectly under the control of my will. By
\nwilling I can direct my intellect to the consideration of certain
\nsubjects, and in this way alone affect my sensibility, and produce a
\ngiven state of feeling. So on the other hand, if certain feelings exist
\nin the sensibility which I wish to suppress, I know that I cannot
\nannihilate them by directly willing them out of existence, but by
\ndiverting my attention from the cause of them, they cease to exist of
\ncourse and of necessity. Thus, feeling is only indirectly under the
\ncontrol of the will.<\/p>\n
(3.) Moral agency implies the possession of free-will. By free-will is
\nintended the power of choosing, or refusing to choose, in every
\ninstance, in compliance with moral obligation. Free-will implies the
\npower of originating and deciding our own choices, and of exercising
\nour own sovereignty, in every instance of choice upon moral
\nquestions–of deciding or choosing in conformity with duty or otherwise
\nin all cases of moral obligation. That man cannot be under a moral
\nobligation to perform an absolute impossibility, is a first truth of
\nreason. But man’s causality, his whole power of causality to perform or
\ndo anything, lies in his will. If he cannot will, he can do nothing.
\nHis whole liberty or freedom must consist in his power to will. His
\noutward actions and his mental states are connected with the actions of
\nhis will by a law of necessity. If I will to move my muscles, they must
\nmove, unless there be a paralysis of the nerves of voluntary motion, or
\nunless some resistance be opposed that overcomes the power of my
\nvolitions. The sequences of choice or volition are always under the law
\nof necessity, and unless the will is free, man has no freedom; and if
\nhe has no freedom he is not a moral agent, that is, he is incapable of
\nmoral action and also of moral character. Free-will then, in the above
\ndefined sense, must be a condition of moral agency, and of course, of
\nmoral obligation.<\/p>\n
As consciousness gives the rational affirmation that necessity is an
\nattribute of the affirmations of the reason, and of the states of
\nsensibility, so it just as unequivocally gives the reason’s affirmation
\nthat liberty is an attribute of the actions of the will. I am as
\nconscious of the affirmation that I could will differently from what I
\ndo in every instance of moral obligation, as I am of the affirmation
\nthat I cannot affirm, in regard to truths of intuition, otherwise than
\nI do. I am as conscious of affirming that I am free in willing, as I am
\nof affirming that I am not free or voluntary in my feelings and
\nintuitions.<\/p>\n
Consciousness of affirming the freedom of the will, that is, of power
\nto will in accordance with moral obligation, or to refuse thus to will,
\nis a necessary condition of the affirmation of obligation. For example,
\nno man affirms, or can affirm, his obligation to undo all the acts of
\nhis past life, and to live his life over again. He cannot affirm
\nhimself to be under this obligation, simply because he cannot but
\naffirm the impossibility of it. He cannot but affirm his obligation to
\nrepent and obey God in future, because he is conscious of affirming his
\nability to do this. Consciousness of the affirmation of ability to
\ncomply with any requisition, is a necessary condition of the
\naffirmation of obligation to comply with that requisition. Then no
\nmoral agent can affirm himself to be under obligation to perform an
\nimpossibility.<\/p>\n
2. A second condition of moral obligation is light, or so much
\nknowledge of our moral relations as to develop the idea of oughtness.
\nThis implies–<\/p>\n
(1.) The perception or idea of the intrinsically valuable.<\/p>\n
(2.) The affirmation of obligation to will the valuable for its own
\nsake. Before I can affirm my obligation to will, I must perceive
\nsomething in that which I am required to will as an ultimate end, that
\nrenders it worthy of being chosen. I must have an object of choice.
\nThat object must possess, in itself, that which commends itself to my
\nintelligence as worthy of being chosen.<\/p>\n
All choice must respect means or ends. That is, everything must be
\nwilled either as an end or a means. I cannot be under obligation to
\nwill the means until I know the end. I cannot know an end, or that
\nwhich can possibly be chosen as an ultimate end, until I know that
\nsomething is intrinsically valuable. I cannot know that it is right or
\nwrong to choose or refuse a certain end, until I know whether the
\nproposed object of choice is intrinsically valuable or not. It is
\nimpossible for me to choose it, as an ultimate end, unless I perceive
\nit to be intrinsically valuable. This is self-evident; for choosing it
\nas an end is nothing else than choosing it for its intrinsic value.
\nMoral obligation, therefore, always and necessarily implies the
\nknowledge that the well-being of God and of the universe is valuable in
\nitself, and the affirmation that it ought to be chosen for its own
\nsake, that is, impartially and on account of its intrinsic value. It is
\nimpossible that the ideas of right and wrong should be developed until
\nthe idea of the valuable is developed. Right and wrong respect
\nintentions, and strictly nothing else, as we shall see. Intention
\nimplies an end intended. Now that which is chosen as an ultimate end,
\nis and must be chosen for its own sake or for its intrinsic value.
\nUntil the end is apprehended, no idea or affirmation of obligation can
\nexist respecting it. Consequently, no idea of right or wrong in respect
\nto that end can exist. The end must first be perceived. The idea of the
\nintrinsically valuable must be developed. Simultaneously with the
\ndevelopment of the idea of the valuable the intelligence affirms, and
\nmust affirm, obligation to will it, or, which is, strictly speaking,
\nthe same thing, that it is right to will it, and wrong not to will it.<\/p>\n
It is impossible that the idea of moral obligation, or of right and
\nwrong, should be developed upon any other conditions than those just
\nspecified. Suppose, for instance, it should be said that the idea of
\nthe intrinsically valuable is not necessary to the development of the
\nidea of moral obligation, and of right and wrong. Let us look at it. It
\nis agreed that moral obligation, and the ideas of right and wrong
\nrespect, directly, intentions only. It is also admitted that all
\nintentions must respect either means or ends. It is also admitted that
\nobligation to will means, cannot exist until the end is known. It is
\nalso admitted that the choice of an ultimate end implies the choice of
\na thing for its own sake, or because it is intrinsically valuable. Now,
\nfrom these admissions, it follows that the idea of the intrinsically
\nvaluable is the condition of moral obligation, and also of the idea of
\nmoral obligation. It must follow also that the idea of the valuable
\nmust be the condition of the idea that it would be right to choose, or
\nwrong not to choose, the valuable. It is, then, nonsense to affirm that
\nthe ideas of right and wrong are developed antecedently to the idea of
\nthe valuable. It is the same as to say that I affirm it to be right to
\nwill an end, before I have the idea of an end; or wrong not to will an
\nend when as yet I have no idea or knowledge of any reason why it should
\nbe willed, or, in other words, while I have no idea of an ultimate end.<\/p>\n
Let it be distinctly understood then, that the conditions of moral
\nobligation, in the universal form of obligation to will the highest
\nwell-being of God and of the universe, for its own sake, are the
\npossession of the powers, or faculties, and susceptibilities of a moral
\nagent, and light or the development of the ideas of the valuable, of
\nmoral obligation, of right and wrong.<\/p>\n
I have defined the conditions of obligation in its universal form, i.
\ne. obligation to be benevolent, to love God and our neighbor, or to
\nwill the universal good of being for its intrinsic value. Obligation in
\nthis form is universal and always a unit, and has always the same
\nconditions. But there are myriads of specific forms of obligation which
\nrelate to the conditions and means of securing this ultimate end. We
\nshall have occasion hereafter fully to show that obligation respects
\nthree classes of the will’s actions, viz. the choice of an ultimate
\nend–the choice of the conditions and means of securing that end–and
\nexecutive volitions or efforts put forth to secure the end. I have
\nalready shown that moral agency, with all that is implied in it, has
\nthe universal conditions of obligation to choose the highest good of
\nbeing, as an ultimate end. This must be self-evident.<\/p>\n
Obligation to choose the conditions of this end, the holiness of God
\nand of all moral agents, for example, must be conditioned upon the
\nperception that these are the conditions. In other words, the
\nperception of the relation of these means to the end must be a
\ncondition of the obligation to will their existence. The perception of
\nthe relation is not the ground but simply the condition of obligation
\nin this form. The relation of holiness to happiness as a condition of
\nits existence, could not impose obligation to will the existence of
\nholiness without reference to the intrinsic value of happiness, as the
\nfundamental reason for willing it as a necessary condition and means.
\nThe ground of the obligation to will the existence of holiness, as a
\nmeans of happiness, is the intrinsic value of happiness, but the
\nperceived relation of holiness to happiness is a condition of the
\nobligation. But for this perceived relation the obligation could not
\nexist, yet the perceived relation could not create the obligation.
\nSuppose that holiness is the means of happiness, yet no obligation to
\nwill holiness on account of this relation could exist but for the
\nintrinsic value of happiness.<\/p>\n
Conditions of obligation to put forth executive acts.<\/p>\n
Having now defined the conditions of obligation in its universal form,
\nand also in the form of obligation to choose the existence of holiness
\nas a necessary means of happiness, I now proceed to point out the
\nconditions of obligation to put forth executive volitions or efforts to
\nsecure holiness, and secure the highest good of being. Our busy lives
\nare made up in efforts to secure some ultimate end, upon which the
\nheart is set. The sense in which obligation extends to these executive
\nvolitions or acts I shall soon consider; at present I am concerned only
\nto define the conditions of these forms of obligation. These forms of
\nobligation, be it understood, respect volitions and consequent outward
\nacts. Volitions, designed as executive acts, always suppose an existing
\nchoice of the end designed to be secured by them. Obligation to put
\nforth executive efforts to secure an end must be conditioned upon the
\npossibility, supposed necessity, and utility of such efforts. If the
\nend chosen does not need to be promoted by any efforts of ours, or if
\nsuch efforts are impossible to us, or if they are seen to be of no use,
\nthere can be no obligation to make them.<\/p>\n
It is important, however, to observe that the utility of ultimate
\nchoice, or the choice of an object for its own sake, is not a condition
\nof obligation in that form. Ultimate choice, or the choice of an object
\nfor its own sake, or for its intrinsic value, is not an effort designed
\nto secure or obtain that object; that is, is not put forth with any
\nsuch design. When the object which the mind perceives to be
\nintrinsically valuable (as the good of being, for example), is
\nperceived by the mind, it cannot but choose or refuse it. Indifference
\nin this case is naturally impossible. The mind, in such circumstances,
\nis under a necessity of choosing one way or the other. The will must
\nembrace or reject it. The reason affirms the obligation to choose the
\nintrinsically valuable for its own sake, and not because choosing it
\nwill secure it. Nor does the real choice of it imply a purpose or an
\nobligation to put forth executive acts to secure it, except upon
\ncondition that such acts are seen to be necessary, and possible, and
\ncalculated to secure it.<\/p>\n
Ultimate choice is not put forth with design to secure its object. It
\nis only the will’s embracing the object or willing it for its own sake.
\nIn regard to ultimate choice the will must choose or refuse the object
\nentirely irrespectively of the tendency of the choice to secure the
\nobject. Assuming this necessity, the reason affirms that it is right,
\nfit, suitable, or, which is the same thing, that the will ought, or is
\nunder obligation to choose, the good or valuable, and not refuse it,
\nbecause of its intrinsic nature, and without regard to whether the
\nchoosing will secure the object chosen.<\/p>\n
But executive acts, be it remembered, are, and must be put forth with
\ndesign to secure their object, and of course, cannot exist unless the
\ndesign exist, and the design cannot exist unless the mind assumes the
\npossibility, necessity, and utility of such efforts.
\n__________________________________________________________________<\/p>\n
LECTURE III.<\/p>\n
MORAL OBLIGATION.<\/p>\n
Man is a subject of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
That man has intellect and sensibility, or the powers of knowing and
\nfeeling, has not, to my knowledge, been doubted. In theory, the freedom
\nof the will in man has been denied. Yet the very deniers, have, in
\ntheir practical judgment, assumed the freedom of the human will, as
\nwell, and as fully as the most staunch defenders of human liberty of
\nwill. Indeed, nobody ever did or can, in practice, call in question the
\nfreedom of the human will, without justly incurring the charge of
\ninsanity. By a necessity of his nature, every moral agent knows himself
\nto be free. He can no more hide this fact from himself, or reason
\nhimself out of the conviction of its truth, than he can speculate
\nhimself into a disbelief of his own existence. He may, in speculation,
\ndeny either, but in fact he knows both. That he is, that he is free,
\nare truths equally well known, and known precisely in the same way,
\nnamely, he intuits them–sees them in their own light, by virtue of the
\nconstitution of his being. I have said that man is conscious of
\npossessing the powers of a moral agent. He has also the idea of the
\nvaluable, of right and of wrong; of this he is conscious. But nothing
\nelse is necessary to constitute man or any other being a subject of
\nmoral obligation, and the possession of these powers, together with
\nsufficient light on moral subjects to develop the ideas just mentioned.<\/p>\n
Man, by a law of necessity, affirms himself to be under moral
\nobligation. He cannot doubt it. He affirms absolutely and necessarily,
\nthat he is praise-worthy or blame-worthy as he is benevolent or
\nselfish. Every man assumes this of himself, and of all other men of
\nsound mind. This assumption is irresistible, as well as universal.<\/p>\n
The truth assumed then is not to be called in question. But if it be
\ncalled in question in theory, it still remains, and must remain, while
\nreason remains, a truth of certain knowledge, from the presence of
\nwhich there is, and can be no escape. The spontaneous, universal, and
\nirresistible affirmation that men of sound mind are praise-worthy or
\nblame-worthy, as they are selfish or benevolent, shows beyond
\ncontradiction, that all men regard themselves, and others, as the
\nsubjects of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
Extent of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
By this is intended, to what acts and states of mind does moral
\nobligation extend? This certainly is a solemn and a fundamentally
\nimportant question. In the examination of this question, let us inquire
\nfirst, to what acts and states of mind moral obligation cannot directly
\nextend.<\/p>\n
1. Not to external or muscular action. These actions are connected with
\nthe actions of the will, by a law of necessity. If I will to move my
\nmuscles, they must move, unless the nerves of voluntary motion are
\nparalyzed, or some resistance is offered to muscular motion, that
\noverpowers the strength of my will, or, if you please, of my muscles.
\nIt is generally understood and agreed that moral obligation does not
\ndirectly extend to bodily or outward action.<\/p>\n
2. Not to the states of the sensibility. I have already remarked that
\nwe are conscious, that our feelings are not voluntary, but involuntary
\nstates of mind. Moral obligation cannot, therefore, directly extend to
\nthem.<\/p>\n
3. Not to states of the intellect. The phenomena of this faculty, we
\nalso know by consciousness, to be under the law of necessity. It is
\nimpossible that moral obligation should extend directly to any
\ninvoluntary act or state of mind.<\/p>\n
4. Not to unintelligent acts of will. There are many unintelligent
\nvolitions, or acts of will, to which moral obligation cannot extend,
\nfor example, the volitions of maniacs, or of infants, before the reason
\nis at all developed. They must at birth, be the subjects of volition,
\nas they have motion or muscular action. The volitions of somnambulists
\nare also of this character. Purely instinctive volitions must also come
\nunder the category of unintelligent actions of will. For example: a bee
\nlights on my hand, I instantly and instinctively shake him off. I tread
\non a hot iron, and instinctively move my foot. Indeed there are many
\nactions of will which are put forth under the influence of pure
\ninstinct, and before the intellect can affirm obligation to will or not
\nto will. These surely cannot have moral character, and of course moral
\nobligation cannot extend to them.<\/p>\n
We inquire in the second place, to what acts and states of mind moral
\nobligation must directly extend.<\/p>\n
1. To ultimate acts of will. These are and must be free. Intelligent
\nacts of will, as has been before observed, are of three classes. First,
\nthe choice of some object for its own sake, i. e., because of its own
\nnature, or for reasons found exclusively in itself, as, for example,
\nthe happiness of being. These are called ultimate choices, or
\nintentions. Second, the choice of the conditions and means of securing
\nthe object of ultimate choice, as for example, holiness, as the
\nconditions or means of happiness. Third, volitions, or executive
\nefforts to secure the object of ultimate choice. Obligation must extend
\nto these three classes of the actions of the will. In the most strict
\nand proper sense it may be said, that obligation extends directly only
\nto the ultimate intention.<\/p>\n
The choice of an end necessitates the choice of the known conditions
\nand means of securing this end. I am free to relinquish, at any moment,
\nmy choice of an end, but while I persevere in the choice, or ultimate
\nintention, I am not free to refuse the known necessary conditions and
\nmeans. If I reject the known conditions and means, I, in this act,
\nrelinquish the choice of the end. The desire of the end may remain, but
\nthe actual choice of it cannot, when the will knowingly rejects the
\nknown necessary conditions and means. In this case, the will prefers to
\nlet go the end, rather than to choose and use the necessary conditions
\nand means. In the strictest sense the choice of known conditions and
\nmeans, together with executive volitions, is implied in the ultimate
\nintention or in the choice of an end.<\/p>\n
When the good or valuable per se, is perceived by a moral agent, he
\ninstantly and necessarily, and without condition, affirms his
\nobligation to choose it. This affirmation is direct and universal,
\nabsolute, or without condition. Whether he will affirm himself to be
\nunder obligation to put forth efforts to secure the good, must depend
\nupon his regarding such acts as necessary, possible, and useful. The
\nobligation, therefore, to put forth ultimate choice, is in the
\nstrictest sense direct, absolute and universal.<\/p>\n
Obligation to choose holiness, (as the holiness of God,) as the means
\nof happiness, is indirect in the sense that it is conditioned, first,
\nupon the obligation to choose happiness as a good per se; and, second,
\nupon the knowledge that holiness is the necessary means of happiness.<\/p>\n
Obligation to put forth executive volitions is also indirect in the
\nsense that it is conditioned; first, upon obligation to choose an
\nobject as an end; and, second, upon the necessity, possibility, and
\nutility of such acts.<\/p>\n
It should here be observed, that obligation to choose an object for its
\nown sake, implies, of course, obligation to reject its opposite; and
\nobligation to choose the conditions of an intrinsically valuable object
\nfor its own sake, implies obligation to reject the conditions or means
\nof the opposite of this object. Also, obligation to use means to secure
\nan intrinsically valuable object, implies obligation to use means, if
\nnecessary and possible, to prevent the opposite of this end. For
\nexample: Obligation to will happiness, for its intrinsic value, implies
\nobligation to reject misery, as an intrinsic evil. Obligation to will
\nthe conditions of the happiness of being, implies obligation to reject
\nthe conditions of misery. Obligation to use means to promote the
\nhappiness of being, implies obligation to use means, if necessary and
\npracticable, to prevent the misery of being.<\/p>\n
Again, the choice of any object, either as an end, or a means, implies
\nthe refusal of its opposite. In other words, choice implies preference,
\nrefusing is properly only choice in an opposite direction. For this
\nreason, in speaking of the actions of the will, it has been common to
\nomit the mention of pilling, or refusing, since such acts are properly
\nincluded in the categories of choices and volitions. It should also be
\nobserved that choice, or willing, necessarily implies an object chosen,
\nand that this object should be such that the mind can regard it as
\nbeing either intrinsically, or relatively valuable, or important. As
\nchoice must consist in an act, an intelligent act, the mind must have
\nreason for choice. It cannot choose without a reason, for this is the
\nsame as to choose without an object of choice. A mere abstraction
\nwithout any perceived or assumed, intrinsic, or relative importance, to
\nany being in existence, cannot be an object of choice, either ultimate
\nor executive. The ultimate reason which the mind has for choosing is in
\nfact the object of choice; and where there is no reason there is no
\nobject of choice.<\/p>\n
2. I have said, that moral obligation respects in the strictest sense
\nand directly the intention only. I am now prepared to say still
\nfurther, that this is a first truth of reason. It is a truth
\nuniversally and necessarily assumed by all moral agents, their
\nspeculations to the contrary, in any wise, notwithstanding. This is
\nevident from the following considerations:<\/p>\n
(1.) Very young children know and assume this truth universally. They
\nalways deem it a sufficient vindication of themselves, when accused of
\nany delinquency to say, ?I did not mean to,? or if accused of short
\ncoming, to say, ?I meant or intended to have done it–I designed it.?
\nThis, if true, they assume to be an all-sufficient vindication of
\nthemselves. They know that this, if believed, must be regarded as a
\nsufficient excuse to justify them in every case.<\/p>\n
(2.) Every moral agent necessarily regards such an excuse as a perfect
\njustification, in case it be sincerely and truly made.<\/p>\n
(3.) It is a saying as common as men are, and as true as common, that
\nmen are to be judged by their motives, that is, by their designs,
\nintentions. It is impossible for us not to assent to this truth. If a
\nman intend evil, though, perchance, he may do us good, we do not excuse
\nhim, but hold him guilty of the crime which he intended. So if he
\nintend to do us good, and, perchance, do us evil, we do not, and cannot
\ncondemn him. For this intention and endeavor to do us good, we cannot
\nblame him, although it has resulted in evil to us. He may be to blame
\nfor other things connected with the affair. He may have come to our
\nhelp too late, and have been to blame for not coming when a different
\nresult would have followed; or he may have been blamable for not being
\nbetter qualified for doing us good. He may have been to blame for many
\nthings connected with the transaction, but for a sincere, and of course
\nhearty endeavor to do us good, he is not culpable, nor can he be,
\nhowever it may result. If he honestly intended to do us good, it is
\nimpossible that he should not have used the best means in his power, at
\nthe time. This is implied in honesty of intention. And if he did this,
\nreason cannot pronounce him guilty, for it must judge him by his
\nintentions.<\/p>\n
(4.) Courts of criminal law have always in every enlightened country
\nassumed this as a first truth. They always inquire into the quo animo,
\nthat is, the intention, and judge accordingly.<\/p>\n
(5.) The universally acknowledged truth that lunatics are not moral
\nagents and responsible for their conduct, is but an illustration of the
\nfact that the truth we are considering is regarded, and assumed, as a
\nfirst truth of reason.<\/p>\n
(6.) The Bible everywhere either expressly or impliedly recognizes this
\ntruth. ?If there be a willing mind,? that is, a right willing or
\nintention, ?it is accepted,? etc. Again, ?All the law is fulfilled in
\none word,? ?love.? Now this cannot be true, if the spirit of the whole
\nlaw does not directly respect intentions only. If it extends directly
\nto thoughts, emotions, and outward actions, it cannot be truly said
\nthat love is the fulfilling of the law. This love must be good will,
\nfor how could involuntary love be obligatory? The spirit of the Bible
\neverywhere respects the intention. If the intention is right, or if
\nthere be a willing mind, it is accepted as obedience. But if there be
\nnot a willing mind, that is, right intention, no outward act is
\nregarded as obedience. The willing is always regarded by the scriptures
\nas the doing. ?If a man look on a woman, to lust after her,? that is,
\nwith licentious intention, or willing, ?he hath committed adultery with
\nher already,? etc. So on the other hand, if one intends to perform a
\nservice for God, which, after all, he is unable to perform, he is
\nregarded as having virtually done it, and is rewarded accordingly. This
\nis too obviously the doctrine of the Bible to need further elucidation.<\/p>\n
3. We have seen that the choice of an end implies, and, while the
\nchoice continues, necessitates the choice of the known conditions and
\nmeans of the end, and also the putting forth of volition to secure the
\nend. If this is true, it follows that the choice of the conditions and
\nmeans of securing an end, and also the volitions put forth as executive
\nefforts to secure it, must derive their character from the ultimate
\nchoice or intention which gives them existence. This shows that moral
\nobligation extends, primarily and directly, only to the ultimate
\nintention or choice of an end, though really, but less directly, to the
\nchoice of the conditions and means, and also to executive volitions.<\/p>\n
But I must distinguish more clearly between ultimate and proximate
\nintentions, which discrimination will show, that in the most strict and
\nproper sense, obligation belongs to the former, and only in a less
\nstrict and proper sense, to the latter.<\/p>\n
An ultimate end, be it remembered, is an object chosen for its own
\nsake.<\/p>\n
A proximate end is an object chosen as a condition or means of securing
\nan ultimate end.<\/p>\n
An ultimate end is an object chosen because of its intrinsic nature and
\nvalue.<\/p>\n
A proximate end is an object chosen for the sake of the end, and upon
\ncondition of its relation as a condition or means of the end.<\/p>\n
Example:–A student labors to get wages, to purchase books, to obtain
\nan education, to preach the gospel, to save souls, and to please God.
\nAnother labors to get wages, to purchase books, to get an education, to
\npreach the gospel, to secure a salary, and his own ease and popularity.
\nIn the first supposition he loves God and souls, and seeks, as his
\nultimate end, the happiness of souls, and the glory and gratification
\nof God. In the last case supposed, he loves himself supremely, and his
\nultimate end is his own gratification. Now the proximate ends, or
\nimmediate objects of pursuit, in these two cases, are precisely alike,
\nwhile their ultimate ends are entirely opposite. Their first, or
\nnearest, end is to get wages. Their next end is, to obtain books; and
\nso we follow them, until we ascertain their ultimate end, before we
\nlearn the moral character of what they are doing. The means they are
\nusing, i. e. their immediate objects or proximate ends of pursuit, are
\nthe same, but the ultimate ends at which they aim are entirely
\ndifferent, and every moral agent, from a necessary law of his
\nintellect, must, as soon as he understands the ultimate end of each,
\npronounce the one virtuous, and the other sinful, in his pursuits. One
\nis selfish and the other benevolent. From this illustration it is
\nplain, that strictly speaking, moral character, and, of course, moral
\nobligation, respect directly the ultimate intention only. We shall see,
\nin the proper place, that obligation also extends, but less directly,
\nto the use of means to obtain the end.<\/p>\n
Our next inquiry is, to what acts and mental states moral obligation
\nindirectly extends.<\/p>\n
1. The muscles of the body are, directly, under the control of the
\nwill. I will to move, and my muscles must move, unless there be
\ninterposed some physical obstruction of sufficient magnitude to
\novercome the strength of my will.<\/p>\n
2. The intellect is also directly under the control of the will. I am
\nconscious that I can control and direct my attention as I please, and
\nthink upon one subject or another.<\/p>\n
3. The sensibility, I am conscious, is only indirectly controlled by
\nthe will. Feeling can be produced only by directing the attention and
\nthoughts to those subjects that excite feeling, by a law of necessity.<\/p>\n
The way is now prepared to say–<\/p>\n
1. That obligation extends indirectly to all intelligent acts of will,
\nin the sense already explained.<\/p>\n
2. That moral obligation extends indirectly, to outward or bodily
\nactions. These are often required, in the word of God. The reason is,
\nthat, being connected with the actions of the will, by a law of
\nnecessity, if the will is right, the outward action must follow, except
\nupon the contingencies just named; and therefore such actions may
\nreasonably be required. But if the contingencies just named intervene,
\nso that outward action does not follow the choice or intention, the
\nBible accepts the will for the deed, invariably. ?If there be a willing
\nmind, it is accepted according,? etc.<\/p>\n
3. Moral obligation extends, but less directly, to the states of the
\nsensibility, so that certain emotions or feelings are required as
\noutward actions are, and for the same reason, namely, the states of the
\nsensibility are connected with the actions of the will, by a law of
\nnecessity. But when the sensibility is exhausted, or when, for any
\nreason, the right action of the will does not produce the required
\nfeelings, it is accepted upon the principle just named.<\/p>\n
4. Moral obligation indirectly extends also to the states of the
\nintellect; consequently the Bible, to a certain extent, and in a
\ncertain sense, holds men responsible for their thoughts and opinions.
\nIt everywhere assumes that if the heart be constantly right, the
\nthoughts and opinions will correspond with the state of the heart, or
\nwill; ?If any man will do his will, he shall know the doctrine whether
\nit be of God.? ?If thine eye be single thy whole body shall be full of
\nlight.? It is, however manifest, that the word of God everywhere
\nassumes that, strictly speaking, all virtue and vice belong to the
\nheart or intention. Where this is right, all is regarded as right; and
\nwhere this is wrong, all is regarded as wrong. It is upon this
\nassumption that the doctrine of total depravity rests. It is undeniable
\nthat the veriest sinners do many things outwardly which the law of God
\nrequires. Now unless the intention decides the character of these acts,
\nthey must be regarded as really virtuous. But when the intention is
\nfound to be selfish, then it is ascertained that they are sinful
\nnotwithstanding their conformity to the letter of the law of God.<\/p>\n
The fact is, that moral agents are so constituted that it is impossible
\nfor them not to judge themselves, and others, by their subjective
\nmotives or intentions. They cannot but assume it as a first truth, that
\na man’s character is as his intention is, and consequently, that moral
\nobligation respects, directly, intention only.<\/p>\n
5. Moral obligation then indirectly extends to everything about us,
\nover which the will has direct or indirect control. The moral law,
\nwhile, strictly, it legislates over intention only, yet in fact, in a
\nsense less direct, legislates over the whole being, inasmuch as all our
\npowers are directly or indirectly connected with intention, by a law of
\nnecessity. Strictly speaking, however, moral character belongs alone to
\nthe intention. In strict propriety of speech, it cannot be said that
\neither outward action, or any state of the intellect, or sensibility,
\nhas a moral element or quality belonging to it. Yet in common language,
\nwhich is sufficiently accurate for most practical purposes, we speak of
\nthought, feeling, and outward action as holy or unholy. By this,
\nhowever, all men really mean, that the agent is holy or unholy, is
\npraise-worthy or blame-worthy in his exercises and actions, because
\nthey regard them as proceeding from the state or attitude of the will.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
LECTURE II. MORAL GOVERNMENT. THE primary idea of government, is that of direction, guidance, control by, or in accordance with, rule or law. All government is, and must be, either moral or physical; that is, all guidance and control must be exercised in accordance with either moral or physical law; for there can be no…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"twitterCardType":"","cardImageID":0,"cardImage":"","cardTitle":"","cardDesc":"","cardImageAlt":"","cardPlayer":"","cardPlayerWidth":0,"cardPlayerHeight":0,"cardPlayerStream":"","cardPlayerCodec":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5274","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5274","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5274"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5274\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5274"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5274"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5274"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}