LECTURE IV.<\/p>\n
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.<\/p>\n
In the discussion of this question, I will first state what is intended
\nby the foundation, or ground, of obligation.<\/p>\n
I shall use the terms ground and foundation as synonymous. Obligation
\nmust be founded on some good and sufficient reason. Be it remembered,
\nthat moral obligation respects moral action. That moral action is
\nvoluntary action. That properly speaking, obligation respects
\nintentions only. That still more strictly, obligation respects only the
\nultimate intention. That ultimate intention or choice, which terms I
\nuse as synonymous, consists in choosing an object for its own sake, i.
\ne. for what is intrinsic in the object, and for no reason that is not
\nintrinsic in that object. That every object of ultimate choice must,
\nand does, possess that in its own nature, the perception of which
\nnecessitates the rational affirmation, that it ought to be universally
\nchosen, by moral agents, for its own sake, or, which is the same thing,
\nbecause it is what it is, or, in other words still, because it is
\nintrinsically valuable and not on account of its relations.<\/p>\n
The ground of obligation, then, is that reason, or consideration,
\nintrinsic in, or belonging to, the nature of an object, which
\nnecessitates the rational affirmation, that it ought to be chosen for
\nits own sake. It is that reason, intrinsic in the object, which thus
\ncreates obligation by necessitating this affirmation. For example, such
\nis the nature of the good of being that it necessitates the
\naffirmation, that benevolence is a universal duty.<\/p>\n
I will next call attention to some points of general agreement, and
\nsome principles essentially self-evident.<\/p>\n
1. In the most strict and proper sense, moral obligation extends to
\nmoral actions only.<\/p>\n
2. Strictly speaking, involuntary states of mind are not moral actions.<\/p>\n
3. Intentions alone are, properly, moral actions.<\/p>\n
4. In the most strict and proper sense, ultimate intentions alone are
\nmoral actions, ultimate intention being the choice of an object for its
\nown sake, or for what is intrinsic in the object.<\/p>\n
5. While, in the strictest sense, obligation respects only the ultimate
\nintention, yet, in a less strict and proper sense, obligation extends
\nto the choice of the conditions and means of securing an intrinsically
\nvaluable end, and also to executive acts put forth with design to
\nsecure such end: Hence there are different forms of obligation; for
\nexample, obligation to put forth ultimate choice–to choose the known
\nnecessary conditions and means–to put forth executive volitions, etc.<\/p>\n
6. These different forms of obligation must have different conditions.
\nFor example, moral agency, including the possession of the requisite
\npowers, together with the development of the ideas of the intrinsically
\nvaluable, of obligation, of right and wrong, is a condition of
\nobligation in its universal form, namely, obligation to will the good
\nof being in general, for its own sake; while obligation to will the
\nexistence of the conditions and means to the end, or to put forth
\nexecutive efforts to secure the end, have not only the conditions above
\nnamed, but obligation in these forms must be conditional, also, upon
\nthe knowledge that there are conditions and means, and what they are,
\nand also that executive efforts are necessary, possible, and useful.<\/p>\n
7. The well-being of God, and of the universe of sentient existences,
\nand especially of moral agents, is intrinsically important, or
\nvaluable, and all moral agents are under obligation to choose it for
\nits own sake. Entire, universal, uninterrupted consecration to this
\nend, or disinterested benevolence is the duty of all moral agents.<\/p>\n
8. This consecration is really demanded by the law of God, as revealed
\nin the two great precepts laid down by Christ, and this benevolence,
\nwhen perfect, is in fact a compliance with the entire spirit of the
\nlaw. This is right in itself, and consequently is always duty and
\nalways right, and that in all possible circumstances; and, of course,
\nno obligation inconsistent with this can ever, in any case, exist.
\nReason and revelation agree in this; that the law of benevolence is the
\nlaw of right, the law of nature, and no moral law, inconsistent with
\nthis, can exist.<\/p>\n
9. Holiness, or obedience to moral law, or, in other words still,
\ndisinterested benevolence, is a natural, and of course necessary
\ncondition of the existence of that blessedness which is an ultimate or
\nintrinsic good to moral agents, and ought to be chosen for that reason,
\ni. e., that is a sufficient reason. Of course, the ground of obligation
\nto choose holiness, and to endeavor to promote it in others, as a
\ncondition of the highest well-being of the universe, is the intrinsic
\nnature of that good or well-being, and the relation of holiness to this
\nend is a condition of the obligation to choose it, as a means to this
\nend.<\/p>\n
10. Truth, and conformity of heart and life to all known and practical
\ntruths, are conditions and means of the highest good of being. Of
\ncourse, the obligation to conform to such truths is universal, because
\nof this relation of truth, and of conformity to truth, to the highest
\ngood. The intrinsic value of the good must be the ground, and the
\nrelation only a condition, of the obligation.<\/p>\n
11. God’s ultimate end, in all he does, or omits, is the highest
\nwell-being of himself, and of the universe, and in all his acts and
\ndispensations, his ultimate object is the promotion of this end. All
\nmoral agents should have the same end, and this comprises their whole
\nduty. This intention or consecration to this intrinsically and
\ninfinitely valuable end, is virtue, or holiness, in God and in all
\nmoral agents. God is infinitely and equally holy in all things, because
\nhe does all things for the same ultimate reason, namely, to promote the
\nhighest good of being.<\/p>\n
12. All God’s moral attributes are only so many attributes of love or
\nof disinterested benevolence; that is, they are only benevolence
\nexisting and contemplated in different relations. Creation and moral
\ngovernment, including both law and gospel, together with the infliction
\nof penal sanctions, are only efforts of benevolence to secure the
\nhighest good.<\/p>\n
13. He requires, both in his law and gospel, that all moral agents
\nshould choose the same end, and do whatever they do for its promotion;
\nthat is, this should be the ultimate reason for all they do.
\nConsequently, all obligation resolves itself into an obligation to
\nchoose the highest good of God, and of being in general, for its own
\nsake, and to choose all the known conditions and means of this end, for
\nthe sake of the end.<\/p>\n
14. The intrinsic value of this end is the ground of this obligation,
\nboth as it respects God and all moral agents in all worlds. The
\nintrinsic value of this end rendered it fit, or right, that God should
\nrequire moral agents to choose it for its own sake; and of course, its
\nintrinsic value, and not any arbitrary sovereignty, was, and is, his
\nreason for requiring moral agents to choose it for its own sake.<\/p>\n
15. Its known intrinsic value would, of itself, impose obligation on
\nmoral agents to choose it for its own sake, even had God never required
\nit; or, if such a supposition were possible, had he forbidden it. Thus,
\ndisinterested benevolence is a universal and an invariable duty. This
\nbenevolence consists in willing the highest good of being, in general,
\nfor its own sake, or, in other words, in entire consecration to this
\ngood as the end of life. The intrinsic value of this good does, of its
\nown nature, impose obligation upon all moral agents to will it for its
\nown sake, and consecrate the whole being, without intermission, to its
\npromotion.<\/p>\n
Thus it is self-evident that moral character belongs to the ultimate
\nintention, and that a man’s character is as the end for which he lives,
\nand moves, and has his being. Virtue consists in consecration to the
\nright end, the end to which God is consecrated. This end is, and must
\nbe, by virtue of its own nature, the ground of obligation. That is, the
\nnature of this end is such as to compel the reason of every moral agent
\nto affirm, that it ought to be chosen for its own sake. This end is the
\ngood of being, and therefore disinterested benevolence, or good will,
\nis a universal duty.<\/p>\n
Now, with these facts distinctly kept in mind, let us proceed to the
\nexamination of the various conflicting and inconsistent theories of the
\nground of obligation.<\/p>\n
Of the Will of God as the ground of obligation.<\/p>\n
I will first consider the theory of those who hold that the sovereign
\nwill of God is the ground, or ultimate reason, of obligation. They hold
\nthat God’s sovereign will creates, and not merely reveals and enforces,
\nobligation. To this I reply:<\/p>\n
1. That moral law legislates directly over voluntary action only–that
\nmoral obligation respects, primarily and strictly, the ultimate
\nintention–that ultimate intention consists in choosing its object, for
\nits own sake–that ultimate intention must find its reasons exclusively
\nin its object–that the intrinsic nature and value of the object must
\nimpose obligation to choose it for its own sake–that therefore this
\nintrinsic value is the ground, and the only possible ground, of
\nobligation to choose it for its own sake. It would be our duty to will
\nthe highest good of God and of the universe, even did God not will that
\nwe should, or were he to will that we should not. How utterly unfounded
\nthen, is the assertion, that the sovereign will of God is the ground of
\nobligation. Obligation to do what? Why to love God and our neighbor.
\nThat is to will their highest good. And does God’s will create this
\nobligation? Should we be under no such obligation, had he not commanded
\nit? Are we to will this good, not for its own value to God and our
\nneighbor, but because God commands it? The answer to these questions is
\ntoo obvious to need so much as to be named. But what consistency is
\nthere in holding that disinterested benevolence is a universal duty,
\nand at the same time that the sovereign will of God is the foundation
\nof obligation; How can men hold, as many do, that the highest good of
\nbeing ought to be chosen for its own sake — that to choose it for its
\nown sake is disinterested benevolence — that its intrinsic value
\nimposes obligation to choose it for its own sake, and that this
\nintrinsic value is therefore the ground of obligation, and yet that the
\nwill of God is the ground of obligation?<\/p>\n
Why, if the will of God be the ground of obligation, then disinterested
\nbenevolence is sin. If the will of God does of itself create, and not
\nmerely reveal obligation, then the will, and not the interest and
\nwell-being of God, ought to be chosen for its own sake, and to be the
\ngreat end of life. God ought to be consecrated to his own will, instead
\nof his own highest good. Benevolence in God, and in all beings, must be
\nsin, upon this hypothesis. A purely arbitrary will and sovereignty in
\nGod is, according to this theory, of more value than his highest
\nwell-being, and than that of the whole universe.<\/p>\n
But observe,<\/p>\n
Moral obligation respects ultimate intention, or the choice of an end.<\/p>\n
The foundation, or fundamental reason for choosing a thing, is that
\nwhich renders it obligatory to choose it.<\/p>\n
This reason is the thing on which the choice ought to terminate, or the
\ntrue end is not chosen.<\/p>\n
Therefore the reason and the end are identical.<\/p>\n
If, then, the will of God be the foundation of obligation, it must also
\nbe the ultimate end of choice.<\/p>\n
But it is impossible for us to will or choose the divine willing as an
\nultimate end. God’s willing reveals a law, a rule of choice, or of
\nintention. It requires something to be intended as an ultimate end, or
\nfor its own intrinsic value. This end cannot be the willing,
\ncommandment, law, itself. Does God will that I should choose his
\nwilling as an ultimate end? This is impossible. It is a plain
\ncontradiction to say that moral obligation respects, directly, ultimate
\nintention only, or the choice of an end, for its own intrinsic value,
\nand yet, that the will of God is the foundation, or reason of the
\nobligation. This is affirming at the same breath that the intrinsic
\nvalue of the end which God requires me to choose, is the reason, or
\nfoundation of the obligation to choose it, and yet that this is not the
\nreason, but that the will of God is the reason.<\/p>\n
Willing can never be an end. God cannot will our willing as an end. Nor
\ncan he will his willing as an end. Willing, choosing, always, and
\nnecessarily, implies an end willed entirely distinct from the willing,
\nor choice, itself. Willing, cannot be regarded, or willed, as an
\nultimate end, for two reasons:–<\/p>\n
(1.) Because that on which choice or willing terminates, and not the
\nchoice itself, must be regarded as the end.<\/p>\n
(2.) Because choice or willing is of no intrinsic value and of no
\nrelative value, aside from the end willed or chosen.<\/p>\n
2. The will of God cannot be the foundation of moral obligation in
\ncreated moral agents. God has moral character, and is virtuous. This
\nimplies that he is the subject of moral obligation, for virtue is
\nnothing else than compliance with obligation. If God is the subject of
\nmoral obligation, there is some reason, independent of his own will,
\nwhy he wills as he does; some reason, that imposes obligation upon him
\nto will as he does. His will, then, respecting the conduct of moral
\nagents, is not the fundamental reason of their obligation; but the
\nfoundation of their obligation must be the reason which induces God, or
\nmakes it obligatory on him, to will in respect to the conduct of moral
\nagents, just what he does.<\/p>\n
3. If the will of God were the foundation of moral obligation, he
\ncould, by willing it, change the nature of virtue and vice, which is
\nabsurd.<\/p>\n
4. If the will of God were the foundation of moral obligation, he not
\nonly can change the nature of virtue and vice, but has a right to do
\nso; for if there is nothing back of his will that is as binding upon
\nhim as upon his creatures, he has a right, at any time, to make
\nmalevolence a virtue, and benevolence a vice. For if his will is the
\nground of obligation, then his will creates right, and whatever he
\nwills, or might will, is right simply and only because so he wills.<\/p>\n
5. If the will of God be the foundation of moral obligation, we have no
\nstandard by which to judge of the moral character of his actions, and
\ncannot know whether he is worthy of praise or blame. Upon the
\nsupposition in question, were God a malevolent being, and did he
\nrequire all his creatures to be selfish, and not benevolent, he would
\nbe just ns virtuous and worthy of praise as now; for the supposition
\nis, that his sovereign will creates right, and of course, will as he
\nmight, that would be right, simply because he willed it.<\/p>\n
6. If the will of God is the foundation of moral obligation, he has no
\nstandard by which to judge of his own character, as he has no rule but
\nhis own will, with which to compare his own actions.<\/p>\n
7. If the will of God is the foundation of moral obligation, he is not
\nhimself a subject of moral obligation. But,<\/p>\n
8. If God is not a subject of moral obligation, he has no moral
\ncharacter; for virtue and vice are nothing else but conformity or
\nnon-conformity to moral obligation. The will of God, as expressed in
\nhis law, is the rule of duty to moral agents. It defines and marks out
\nthe path of duty, but the fundamental reason why moral agents ought to
\nact in conformity to the will of God, is plainly not the will of God
\nitself.<\/p>\n
9. The will of no being can be law. Moral law is an idea of the divine
\nreason, and not the willing of any being. If the will of any being were
\nlaw, that being could not, by natural possibility, will wrong; for
\nwhatever he willed would be right, simply and only because he willed
\nit.<\/p>\n
10. But let us bring this philosophy into the light of divine
\nrevelation. “To the law and to the testimony; if it agree not
\ntherewith, it is because it hath no light in it.”<\/p>\n
The law of God, or the moral law, requires that God shall be loved with
\nall the heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. Now it is manifest that
\nthe love required is not mere emotion, but that it consists in choice,
\nwilling, intention–i. e., in the choice of something on account of its
\nown intrinsic value, or in the choice of an ultimate end. Now what is
\nthis end? What is that which we are to choose for its own intrinsic
\nvalue? Is it the will or command of God? Are we to will as an ultimate
\nend, that God should will that we should thus will? What can be more
\nabsurd, self-contradictory, and ridiculous than this? But again, what
\nis this loving, willing, choosing, intending, required by the law? We
\nare commanded to love God and our neighbor. What is this, what can it
\nbe, but to will the highest good or well-being of God and our neighbor?
\nThis is intrinsically and infinitely valuable. This must be the end,
\nand nothing can possibly be law that requires the choice of any other
\nultimate end. Nor can that, by any possibility, be true philosophy,
\nthat makes anything else the reason or foundation of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
But it is said that we are conscious of affirming our obligation to
\nobey the will of God, without reference to any other reason than his
\nwill; and this, it is said, proves that his will is the foundation of
\nobligation.<\/p>\n
To this I reply, the reason does indeed affirm that we ought to will
\nthat which God commands, but it does not and cannot assign his will as
\nthe foundation of the obligation. His whole will respecting our duty,
\nis summed up in the two precepts of the law. These, as we have seen,
\nrequire universal good-will to being, or the supreme love of God and
\nthe equal love of our neighbor–that we should will the highest
\nwell-being of God and of the universe, for its own sake, or for its own
\nintrinsic value. Reason affirms that we ought thus to will. And can it
\nbe so self-contradictory as to affirm that we ought to will the good of
\nGod and of the universe, for its own intrinsic value; yet not for this
\nreason, but because God wills that we should will it? Impossible! But
\nin this assertion, the objector has reference to some outward act, some
\ncondition or means of the end to be chosen, and not to the end itself.
\nBut even in respect to any act whatever, his objection does not hold
\ngood. For example, God requires me to labor and pray for the salvation
\nof souls, or to do anything else. Now his command is necessarily
\nregarded by me as obligatory, not as an arbitrary requirement, but as
\nrevealing infallibly the true means or conditions of securing the great
\nand ultimate end, which I am to will for its intrinsic value. I
\nnecessarily regard his commandment as wise and benevolent, and it is
\nonly because I so regard it, that I affirm, or can affirm, my
\nobligation to obey him. Should he command me to choose, as an ultimate
\nend, or for its own intrinsic value, that which my reason affirmed to
\nbe of no intrinsic value, I could not possibly affirm my obligation to
\nobey him. Should he command me to do that which my reason affirmed to
\nbe unwise and malevolent, it were impossible for me to affirm my
\nobligation to obey him. This proves, beyond controversy, that reason
\ndoes not regard his command as the foundation of the obligation, but
\nonly as infallible proof that that which he commands is wise and
\nbenevolent in itself, and commanded by him for that reason.<\/p>\n
If the will of God were the foundation of moral obligation, he might
\ncommand me to violate and trample down all the laws of my being, and to
\nbe the enemy of all good, and I should not only be under obligation,
\nbut affirm my obligation to obey him. But this is absurd. This brings
\nus to the conclusion that he who asserts that moral obligation respects
\nthe choice of an end for its intrinsic value, and still affirms the
\nwill of God to be the foundation of moral obligation, contradicts his
\nown admissions, the plainest intuitions of reason and divine
\nrevelation. His theory is grossly inconsistent and nonsensical. It
\noverlooks the very nature of moral law as an idea of reason, and makes
\nit to consist in arbitrary willing.<\/p>\n
Paley’s theory of Self-interest.<\/p>\n
This theory, as every reader of Paley knows, makes self-interest the
\nground of moral obligation. Upon this theory I remark–<\/p>\n
1. That if self-interest be the ground of moral obligation, then
\nself-interest is the end to be chosen for its own sake. To be virtuous
\nI must in every instance intend my own interest as the supreme good.
\nThen, according to this theory, disinterested benevolence is sin. To
\nlive to God and the universe, is not right. It is not devotion to the
\nright end. This theory affirms self-interest to be the end for which we
\nought to live. Then selfishness is virtue, and benevolence is vice.
\nThese are directly opposite theories. It cannot be a trifle to embrace
\nthe wrong view of this subject. If Dr. Paley was right, all are
\nfundamentally wrong who hold the benevolence theory.<\/p>\n
2. Upon this hypothesis, I am to treat my own interest as supremely
\nvaluable, when it is infinitely less valuable than the interests of
\nGod. Thus I am under a moral obligation to prefer an infinitely less
\ngood, because it is my own, to one of infinitely greater value that
\nbelongs to another. This is precisely what every sinner in earth and
\nhell does.<\/p>\n
3. But let us examine this theory in the light of the revealed law. If
\nthis philosophy be correct, the law should read, “Thou shalt love
\nthyself supremely, and God and thy neighbor not at all.” For Dr. Paley
\nholds the only reason of the obligation to be self-interest. If this is
\nso, then I am under an obligation to love myself alone, and never do my
\nduty when I at all love God or my neighbor. He says, it is the utility
\nof any rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it. (Paley’s
\nMoral Philos., book ii. chap. 6.) Again he says, “And let it be asked
\nwhy I am obliged (obligated) to keep my word? and the answer will be,
\nBecause I am urged to do so by a violent motive, namely, the
\nexpectation of being after this life rewarded if I do so, or punished
\nif I do not.”–(Paley’s Moral Philos., book ii. chap. 3.) Thus it would
\nseem, that it is the utility of a rule to myself only, that constitutes
\nthe ground of obligation to obey it.<\/p>\n
But should this be denied, still it cannot be denied that Dr. Paley
\nmaintains that self-interest is the ground of moral obligation. If this
\nis so, i. e. if this be the foundation of moral obligation, whether
\nPaley or any one else holds it to be true, then, undeniably, the moral
\nlaw should read, “Thou shalt love thyself supremely, and God and thy
\nneighbor subordinately;” or, more strictly, “Thou shalt love thyself as
\nan end, and God and thy neighbor, only as a means of promoting thine
\nown interest.”<\/p>\n
If this theory be true, all the precepts in the Bible need to be
\naltered. Instead of the injunction, “Whatever you do, do it heartily
\nunto the Lord,” it should read, “Whatever you do, do it heartily unto
\nyourself.” Instead of the injunction, “Whether, therefore, ye eat or
\ndrink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God,” it should
\nread, “Do all to secure your own interest.” Should it be said that this
\nschool would say, that the meaning of these precepts is, Do all to the
\nglory of God to secure your own interest thereby, I answer; This is a
\ncontradiction. To do it to or for the glory of God is one thing; to do
\nit to secure my own interest is an entirely different and opposite
\nthing. To do it for the glory of God, is to make his glory my end. But
\nto do it to secure my own interest, is to make my own interest the end.<\/p>\n
4. But let us look at this theory in the light of the revealed
\nconditions of salvation. “Except a man forsake all that he hath he
\ncannot be my disciple.” If the theory under consideration be true, it
\nshould read: “Except a man make his own interest the supreme end of
\npursuit, he cannot be my disciple.” Again, “If any man will come after
\nme, let him deny himself and take up his cross,” etc. This, in
\nconformity with the theory in question, should read: “If any man will
\ncome after me, let him not deny himself, but cherish and supremely seek
\nhis own interest.” A multitude of such passages might be quoted, as
\nevery reader of the Bible knows.<\/p>\n
5. But let us examine this theory in the light of other scripture
\ndeclarations. “It is more blessed to give than to receive.” This,
\naccording to the theory we are opposing, should read, “It is more
\nblessed to receive than to give.” “Charity (love) seeketh not her own.”
\nThis should read, “Charity seeketh her own.” “No man (that is, no
\nrighteous man) liveth to himself.” This should read, “Every (righteous)
\nman liveth to himself.”<\/p>\n
6. Let this theory be examined in the light of the spirit and example
\nof Christ. “Even Christ pleased not himself.” This should read, if
\nChrist was holy and did his duty, “Even Christ pleased himself, or
\nwhich is the same thing, sought his own interest.” “I seek not mine own
\nglory, but the glory of him who sent me.” This should read, “I seek not
\nthe glory of him who sent me, but mine own glory.”<\/p>\n
But enough; we cannot fail to see that this is a selfish philosophy,
\nand the exact opposite of the truth of God.<\/p>\n
The Utilitarian philosophy.<\/p>\n
This maintains that the utility of an act or choice renders it
\nobligatory. That is, utility is the foundation of moral obligation;
\nthat the tendency of an act, choice, or intention, to secure a good or
\nvaluable end, is the foundation of the obligation to put forth that
\nchoice or intention. Upon this theory I remark–<\/p>\n
1. That utilitarians must hold, in common with others, that it is our
\nduty to will the good of God and our neighbor for its own sake; and
\nthat the intrinsic value of this good creates obligation to will it,
\nand to endeavor to promote it; that the tendency of choosing it, would
\nbe neither useful nor obligatory, but for its intrinsic value. How,
\nthen, can they hold that the tendency of choosing to secure its object,
\ninstead of the intrinsic value of the object, should be a ground of
\nobligation. It is absurd to say that the foundation of the obligation
\nto choose a certain end, is to be found, not in the value of the end
\nitself, but in the tendency of the intention to secure the end. The
\ntendency is valuable or otherwise, as the end is valuable or otherwise.
\nIt is, and must be, the value of the end, and not the tendency of an
\nintention to secure the end, that constitutes the foundation of the
\nobligation to intend.<\/p>\n
2. We have seen that the foundation of obligation to will or choose any
\nend as such, that is, on its own account, must consist in the intrinsic
\nvalue of the end, and that nothing else whatever can impose obligation
\nto choose anything as an ultimate end, but its intrinsic value. To
\naffirm the contrary is to affirm a contradiction. It is the same as to
\nsay, that I ought to choose a thing as an end, and not yet as an end,
\nthat is, for its own sake, but for some other reason, to wit, the
\ntendency of my choice to secure that end. Here I affirm at the same
\nbreath, that the thing intended is to be an end, that is, chosen for
\nits own intrinsic value, and yet not as an end or for its intrinsic
\nvalue, but for an entirely different reason, to wit, the tendency of
\nthe choice to secure it.<\/p>\n
3. But the very announcement of this theory implies its absurdity. A
\nchoice is obligatory, because it tends to secure good. But why secure
\ngood rather than evil? The answer is, because good is valuable. Alt!
\nhere then we have another reason, and one which must be the true
\nreason, to wit, the value of the good which the choice tends to secure.
\nObligation to use means to do good may, and must, be conditioned upon
\nthe tendency of those means to secure the end, but the obligation to
\nuse them is founded solely in the value of the end.<\/p>\n
4. Does the law require us to love God and our neighbor, because loving
\nGod and our neighbor tends to the well-being either of God, our
\nneighbor, or ourselves? Is it the tendency or utility of love that
\nmakes it obligatory upon us to exercise it? What! will good, not from
\nregard to its value, but because willing good will do good! But why do
\ngood? What is this love? Here let it be distinctly remembered that the
\nlove required by the law of God is not a mere emotion or feeling, but
\nwilling, choosing, intending, in a word, that this love is nothing else
\nthan ultimate intention. What, then, is to be intended as an end, or
\nfor its own sake? Is it the tendency of love, or the utility of
\nultimate intention, that is the end to be intended? It must be, if
\nutilitarianism is true.<\/p>\n
According to this theory, when the law requires supreme love to God,
\nand equal love to our neighbor, the meaning is, not that we are to
\nwill, choose, intend the well-being of God and our neighbor for its own
\nsake, or because of its intrinsic value, but because of the tendency of
\nthe intention to promote the good of God, our neighbor and ourselves.
\nBut let the tendency of love or intention be what it may, the utility
\nof it depends upon the intrinsic value of that which it tends to
\npromote. Suppose love or intention tends to promote its end, this is a
\nuseful tendency only because the end is valuable in itself. It is
\nnonsense then to say that love to God and man, or an intention to
\npromote their good, is required, not because of the value of their
\nwell-being, but because love tends to promote their well-being. This
\nrepresents the law as requiring love, not to God and our neighbor as an
\nend, but to tendency as an end. The law in this case should read thus:
\n“Thou shalt love the utility or tendency of love with all thy heart,”
\netc.<\/p>\n
If the theory under consideration is true, this is the spirit and
\nmeaning of the law: “Thou shalt love the Lord and thy neighbor, that
\nis, thou shalt choose their good, not for its own sake or as an end,
\nbut because choosing it tends to promote it.” This is absurd; for, I
\nask again, why promote it but for its own value? If the law of God
\nrequires ultimate intention, it is a contradiction to affirm that the
\nintention ought to terminate on its own tendency as an end.<\/p>\n
5. But it is said that we are conscious of affirming obligation to do
\nmany things, on the ground, that those things are useful, or tend to
\npromote good.<\/p>\n
I answer, that we are conscious of affirming obligation to do many
\nthings upon condition of their tendency to promote good, but that we
\nnever affirm obligation to be founded on this tendency. I am under an
\nobligation to use the means to promote good, not for the sake of its
\nintrinsic value, but for the sake of the tendency of the means to
\npromote it! This is absurd.<\/p>\n
I say again, the obligation to use means may and must be conditionated
\nupon perceived tendency, but never founded in this tendency. Ultimate
\nintention has no such condition. The perceived intrinsic value imposes
\nobligation without any reference to the tendency of the intention.<\/p>\n
6. But suppose any utilitarian should deny that moral obligation
\nrespects ultimate intention only, and maintain that it also respects
\nthose volitions and actions that sustain to the ultimate end the
\nrelation of means, and therefore assert that the foundation of moral
\nobligation in respect to all those volitions and actions, is their
\ntendency to secure a valuable end. This would not at all relieve the
\ndifficulty of utilitarianism; for in this case tendency could only be a
\ncondition of the obligation, while the fundamental reason of the
\nobligation would and must be, the intrinsic value of the end, which
\nthese may have a tendency to promote. Tendency to promote an end can
\nimpose no obligation. The end must be intrinsically valuable, and this
\nalone imposes obligation to choose the end, and to use the means to
\npromote it. Upon condition that anything is perceived to sustain to
\nthis end the relation of a necessary means, we are, for the sake of the
\nend alone, under obligation to use the means.
\n__________________________________________________________________<\/p>\n
LECTURE V.<\/p>\n
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.<\/p>\n
The theory of Right as the foundation of obligation.<\/p>\n
In the examination of this philosophy I must begin by defining terms.
\nWhat is right? The primary signification of the term is straight. When
\nused in a moral sense it means fit, suitable, agreeable to the nature
\nand relations of moral agents. Right, in a moral sense, belongs to
\nchoice, intention, and is an intention straight with, or conformed to,
\nmoral law. The inquiry before us is, what is the ground of obligation
\nto put forth choice or intention. Rightarians say that right is the
\nground of such obligation. This is the answer given to this question by
\na large school of philosophers and theologians. But what does this
\nassertion mean? It is generally held by this school, that right, in a
\nmoral sense, pertains primarily and strictly to intentions only. They
\nmaintain, as I do, that obligation pertains primarily and strictly to
\nultimate choice or intentions, and less strictly to executive
\nvolitions, and to choice of the conditions and means of securing the
\nobject of ultimate choice. Now in what sense of the term right do they
\nregard it as the ground of obligation?<\/p>\n
Right is objective and subjective. Right in the objective sense of the
\nterm, has been recently defined to consist in the relation of intrinsic
\nfitness existing between ultimate choice and its object. [1] For
\nexample, the nature or intrinsic value of the highest well-being of God
\nand of the universe, creates the relation of intrinsic fitness between
\nit and choice, and this relation, it is insisted, creates, or is the
\nground of, obligation.<\/p>\n
Subjective right is synonymous with righteousness, uprightness, virtue.
\nIt consists in, or is an attribute of, that state of the will which is
\nconformed to objective right or to moral law. It is a term that
\nexpresses the moral quality, element, or attribute of that ultimate
\nintention which the law of God requires. In other words still, it is
\nconformity of heart to the law of objective right; or, as I just said,
\nit is more strictly the term that designates the moral character of
\nthat state of heart. Some choose to regard subjective right as
\nconsisting in this state of heart, and others insist that it is only an
\nelement, attribute, or quality of this state of heart, or of this
\nultimate intention. I shall not contend about words, but shall show
\nthat it matters not, so far as the question we are about to examine is
\nconcerned, in which of these lights subjective right is regarded,
\nwhether as consisting in ultimate intention conformed to law, or, as
\nbeing an attribute, element, or quality of this intention.<\/p>\n
The theory under consideration was held by the ancient Greek and Roman
\nphilosophers. It was the theory of Kant, and is now the theory of the
\ntranscendental school in Europe and America. Cousin, in manifest
\naccordance with the views of Kant, states the theory in these words:
\n“Do right for the sake of the right, or rather, will the right for the
\nsake of the right. Morality has to do with the
\nintentions.”–(Enunciation of Moral Law–Elements of Psychology, p.
\n162.) Those who follow Kant, Cousin, and Coleridge state the theory
\neither in the same words, or in words that amount to the same thing.
\nThey regard right as the foundation of moral obligation. “Will the
\nright for the sake of the right.” This must mean, will the right as an
\nultimate end, that is, for its own sake. Let us examine this very
\npopular philosophy, first, in the light of its own principles, and
\nsecondly in the light of revelation.<\/p>\n
The writer first above alluded to, has professedly given a critical
\ndefinition of the exact position and teaching of rightarians. They
\nhold, according to him, and I suppose he has rightly defined the
\nposition of that school, that subjective right is the ground of
\nobligation. We shall see, hereafter, that subjective right, or
\nrighteousness, can never be a ground of moral obligation. We will here
\nattend to the critically defined position of the rightarian who holds
\nthat the relation of intrinsic fitness existing between choice and an
\nintrinsically valuable object, is the ground of obligation to choose
\nthat object.<\/p>\n
Now observe, this writer strenuously maintains, that the reason for
\nultimate choice must be found exclusively in the object of such choice,
\nin other words, that ultimate choice, is the choice of its object for
\nits own sake, or for what is intrinsic in the object itself. He also
\naffirms repeatedly, that the ground of obligation is, and must be,
\nfound exclusively in the object of ultimate choice, and also that the
\nground of obligation is the consideration, intrinsic in the object of
\nchoice, which compels the reason to affirm the obligation to choose it
\nfor its own sake. But all this as flatly as possible contradicts his
\nrightarian theory, as above stated. If the ground of obligation to put
\nforth ultimate choice is to be found, as it certainly must be, in the
\nnature of the object of choice, and in nothing extrinsic to it, how can
\nit consist in the relation of intrinsic fitness existing between the
\nchoice and its object? Plainly it cannot. This relation is not
\nintrinsic in the object of choice.<\/p>\n
Observe, the obligation is to choose the object of ultimate choice, not
\nfor the sake of the relation existing between the choice and its
\nobject, but exclusively for the sake of what is intrinsic in the object
\nitself. The relation is not the object of choice, but the relation is
\ncreated by the object of choice. Choice being what it is, the intrinsic
\nnature or value of the object, as the good of being for example,
\ncreates both the relation of rightness and the obligation to choose the
\nobject for its own sake. That which creates the relation of objective
\nrightness must, for the same reason, create the obligation, for it is
\nabsurd to say that the intrinsic value of the object creates the
\nrelation of rightness between itself and choice, and yet that it does
\nnot impose or create obligation to choose itself for its own sake.<\/p>\n
It is self-evident then, that since the object ought to be chosen for
\nthe sake of its own nature, or for what is intrinsic in it, and not for
\nthe sake of the relation in question, the nature of the object, and not
\nthe relation, is, and must be, the ground of obligation.<\/p>\n
But, the writer who has given the above defined position of the
\nrightarians, says that “the intelligence, in judging an act to be right
\nor wrong, does not take into the account the object nor the act by
\nitself, but both together, in their intrinsic relations, as the ground
\nof its affirmation.”<\/p>\n
But the nature of ultimate choice, and the nature of its object, the
\ngood of being, for example, with their intrinsic relations to each
\nother, form a ground of obligation to choose–what? the choice, the
\nobject, and their intrinsic relations? No, but simply and only to
\nchoose the good for its own sake, or solely for the sake of what is
\nintrinsic in it. Observe, it is often affirmed by this writer, that
\nultimate choice is the choice of an object for its own sake, or for
\nwhat is intrinsic in the object itself. That the ground of obligation
\nto put forth ultimate choice, must in every case, be intrinsic in the
\nobject of choice. But the object of choice in this case is the good of
\nbeing, and not the nature of the choice and of the good of being,
\ntogether with the intrinsic relation of rightness existing between
\nthem. The form of the obligation discloses the ground of it. The form
\nof the obligation is to choose the good of being, i. e. the object of
\nchoice, for what is intrinsic in it. Then, the ground of the obligation
\nmust be, the intrinsic nature of the good, i. e. of the object of
\nchoice. The nature of choice, and the intrinsic relations of the
\nchoice, and the good, are conditions, but not the ground, of the
\nobligation. Had this writer only kept in mind his own most critical
\ndefinition of ultimate intention, his often repeated assertions that
\nthe ground of obligation must be, in every case, found intrinsically in
\nthe object of ultimate choice, and in nothing extraneous to it, he
\nnever could have made the statement we have just examined.<\/p>\n
The duty of universal disinterested benevolence is universally and
\nnecessarily affirmed and admitted. But if the rightarian be the true
\ntheory, then disinterested benevolence is sin. According to this
\nscheme, the right, and not the good of being, is the end to, and for
\nwhich, God and all moral agents ought to live. According to this
\ntheory, disinterested benevolence can never be duty, can never be
\nright, but always and necessarily wrong. I do not mean that the
\nadvocates of this theory see and avow this conclusion. But it is
\nwonderful that they do not, for nothing is more self-evident. If moral
\nagents ought to will the right for the sake of the right, or will good,
\nnot for the sake of the good, but for the sake of the relation of
\nrightness existing between the choice and the good, then to will the
\ngood for its own sake is sin. It is not willing the right end. It is
\nwilling the good and not the right as an ultimate end. These are
\nopposing theories. Both cannot be true. Which is the right to will, the
\ngood for its own sake, or the right? Let universal reason answer.<\/p>\n
But let us examine this philosophy in the light of the oracles of God.<\/p>\n
1. In the light of the moral law. The whole law is expressed by the
\ngreat Teacher thus: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy
\nheart, and with all thy soul, with all thy might, and with all thy
\nstrength; and thy neighbor as thyself.” Paul says: “All the law is
\nfulfilled in one word–love: therefore love is the fulfilling of the
\nlaw.” Now it is admitted by this philosophy, that the love required by
\nthe law is not a mere emotion, but that it consists in willing, choice,
\nintention; that it consists in the choice of an ultimate end, or in the
\nchoice of something for its own sake, or, which is the same thing, for
\nits intrinsic value. What is this which the law requires us to will to
\nGod and our neighbor? Is it to will something to, or respecting, God
\nand our neighbor, not for the sake of the intrinsic value of that
\nsomething, but for the sake of the relation of rightness existing
\nbetween choice and that something? This were absurd. Besides, what has
\nthis to do with loving God and our neighbor? To will the something, the
\ngood, for example, of God, and our neighbor, for the sake of the
\nrelation in question, is not the same as to love God and our neighbor,
\nas it is not willing their good for its own sake. It is not willing
\ntheir good, out of any regard to them, but solely out of regard to the
\nrelation of fitness existing between the willing and the object willed.
\nSuppose it be said, that the law requires us to will the good, or
\nhighest blessedness of God and our neighbor, because it is right. This
\nis a contradiction and an impossibility. To will the blessedness of God
\nand our neighbor, in any proper sense, is to will it for its own sake,
\nor as an ultimate end. But this is not to will it because it is right.
\nTo will the good of God and our neighbor for its own sake, or its
\nintrinsic value, is right. But to will it, not for the sake of its
\nintrinsic value to them, but for the sake of the relations in question,
\nis not right. To will the good because it is good, or the valuable
\nbecause it is valuable, is right, because it is willing it for the
\nright reason. But to will it, not for its value, but for the sake of
\nthe relation of fitness between the willing and the object, is not
\nright, because it is not willing it for the right reason. The law of
\nGod does not, cannot, require us to love right more than God and our
\nneighbor. What! right of greater value than the highest well being of
\nGod and of the universe? Impossible! It is impossible that the moral
\nlaw should require anything else than to will the highest good of
\nuniversal being as an ultimate end, i. e. for its own sake. It is a
\nfirst truth of reason, that this is the most valuable thing possible or
\nconceivable; and that could by no possibility be law, which should
\nrequire anything else to be chosen as an ultimate end. According to
\nthis philosophy, the revealed law should read: “Thou shalt love the
\nright for its own sake, with all thy heart and with all thy soul.” The
\nfact is, the law requires the supreme love of God, and the equal love
\nof our neighbor. It says nothing, and implies nothing, about doing
\nright for the sake of the right. Rightarianism is a rejection of the
\ndivine revealed law, and a substituting in its stead an entirely
\ndifferent rule of moral obligation: a rule that deifies right, that
\nrejects the claim of God, and exalts right to the throne.<\/p>\n
2. “Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to
\nthe glory of God.” Does this precept require us to will the glory of
\nGod for its intrinsic or relative value, or for the sake of intrinsic
\nfitness between the willing and its object? The glory and renown of God
\nis of infinite value to him, and to the universe, and for this reason
\nit should be promoted. The thing required here is doing, an executive
\nact. The spirit of the requisition is this: Aim to spread abroad the
\nrenown or glory of God, as the means of securing the highest well-being
\nof the universe. Why? I answer: for the sake of the intrinsic value of
\nthis well-being, and not for the sake of the relation of fitness
\nexisting between the willing and the object.<\/p>\n
3. “Do good unto all men, as ye have opportunity.” Here again, are we
\nrequired to do the good, for the sake of the good, or for the sake of
\nthe relation of rightness, between the doing and the good? I answer: we
\nare to do the good for the sake of the good.<\/p>\n
4. Take the commands to pray and labor for the salvation of souls. Do
\nsuch commandments require us to go forth to will or do the right for
\nthe sake of the right, or to will the salvation of souls for the
\nintrinsic value of their salvation? When we pray and preach and
\nconverse, must we aim at right, must the love of right, and not the
\nlove of God and of souls influence us? When I am engaged in prayer, and
\ntravail night and day for souls, and have an eye so single to the good
\nof souls and to the glory of God, and am so swallowed up with my
\nsubject as not so much as to think of the right, am I all wrong? Must I
\npray because it is right, and do all I do, and suffer all I suffer, not
\nfrom good-will to God and man, but because it is right? Who does not
\nknow, that to intend the right for the sake of the right in all these
\nthings, instead of having an eye single to the good of being, would and
\nmust be anything rather than true religion?<\/p>\n
5. Examine this philosophy in the light of the scripture declaration:
\n“God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that
\nwhosoever believeth in him might not perish, but have everlasting
\nlife.” Now, are we to understand that God gave his Son, not from any
\nregard to the good of souls for its own sake, but for the sake of the
\nright? Did he will the right for the sake of the right? Did he give his
\nSon to die for the right, for the sake of the right, or to die to
\nrender the salvation of souls possible, for the sake of the souls? Did
\nChrist give himself to labor and die for the right, for the sake of the
\nright, or for souls, from love to souls? Did prophets, and apostles,
\nand martyrs, and have the saints in all ages, willed the right for the
\nsake of the right, or have they labored and suffered and died for God
\nand souls, from love to them?<\/p>\n
6. But take another passage which is quoted in support of this
\nphilosophy: “Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is
\nright.” Now what is the spirit of this requirement? What is it to obey
\nparents? Why, if as this philosophy holds, it must resolve itself into
\nultimate intention, what must the child intend for its own sake? Must
\nhe will good to God and his parents, and obey his parents as the means
\nof securing the highest good, or must he will the right as an end, for
\nthe sake of the right, regardless of the good of God or of the
\nuniverse? Would it be right to will the right for the sake of the
\nright, rather than to will the good of the universe for the sake of the
\ngood, and obey his parents as a means of securing the highest good?<\/p>\n
It is right to will the highest good of God and of the universe, and to
\nuse all the necessary means, and fulfil all the necessary conditions of
\nthis highest well-being. For children to obey their parents, is one of
\nthe means, and for this reason it is right, and upon no other condition
\ncan it be required. But it is said that children affirm their
\nobligation to obey their parents, entirely irrespective of the
\nobedience having any reference, or sustaining any relation, to the good
\nof being. This is a mistake. The child, if he is a moral agent, and
\ndoes really affirm moral obligation, not only does, but must perceive
\nthe end upon which his choice or intention ought to terminate. If he
\nreally makes an intelligent affirmation, it is and must be, that he
\nought to will an end; that this end is not, and cannot be the right, as
\nhas been shown. He knows that he ought to will his parents’ happiness,
\nand his own happiness, and the happiness of the world, and of God; and
\nhe knows that obedience to his parents sustains the relation of a means
\nto this end; The fact is, it is a first truth of reason, that he ought
\nto will the good of his parents, and the good of everybody. He also
\nknows that obedience to his parents is a necessary means to this end.
\nIf he does not know these things, it is impossible for him to be a
\nmoral agent, to make any intelligent affirmation at all; and if he has
\nany idea of obedience, it is, and must be, only such as animals have
\nwho are actuated wholly by hope, fear and instinct. As well might we
\nsay, that an ox or a dog, who gives indication of knowing, in some
\nsense, that he ought to obey us, affirms moral obligation of himself,
\nas to say this of a child in whose mind the idea of the good, or
\nvaluable to being is not developed. What! does moral obligation respect
\nultimate intention only; and does ultimate intention consist in the
\nchoice of something for its own intrinsic value, and yet is it true
\nthat children affirm moral obligation before the idea of the
\nintrinsically valuable is at all developed? Impossible! But this
\nobjection assumes that children have the idea of right developed before
\nthe idea of the valuable. This cannot be. The end to be chosen must be
\napprehended by the mind, before the mind can have the idea of moral
\nobligation to choose an end, or of the right or wrong of choosing or
\nnot choosing it. The development of the idea of the good or valuable,
\nmust precede the development of the ideas of right and of moral
\nobligation.<\/p>\n
Take this philosophy on its own ground, and suppose the relation of
\nrightness existing between choice and its object to be the ground of
\nobligation, it is plain that the intrinsically valuable object must be
\nperceived, before this relation can be perceived. So that the idea of
\nthe intrinsically valuable must be developed, as a condition of the
\nexistence of the idea of the relation in question. The law of God,
\nthen, is not, and cannot be, developed in the mind of a child who has
\nno knowledge or idea of the valuable, and who has, and can have, no
\nreference to the good of any being, in obedience to his parents.<\/p>\n
It is one thing to intend that, the intending of which is right, and
\nquite another to intend the right as an end. For example, to choose my
\nown gratification as an end, is wrong. But this is not choosing the
\nwrong as an end. A drunkard chooses to gratify his appetite for strong
\ndrink as an end, that is, for its own sake. This is wrong. But the
\nchoice does not terminate on the wrong, but on the gratification. The
\nthing intended is not the wrong. The liquor is not chosen, the
\ngratification is not intended, because it is wrong, but notwithstanding
\nit is wrong. To love God is right, but to suppose that God is loved
\nbecause it is right, is absurd. It is to suppose that God is loved, not
\nfrom any regard to God, but from a regard to right. This is an
\nabsurdity and a contradiction. To love or will the good of my neighbor,
\nis right. But to will the right, instead of the good of my neighbor, is
\nnot right. It is loving right instead of my neighbor; but this is not
\nright.<\/p>\n
1. But it is objected, that I am conscious of affirming to myself that
\nI ought to will the right. This is a mistake. I am conscious of
\naffirming to myself, that I ought to will that, the willing of which is
\nright, to wit, to will the good of God and of being. This is right. But
\nthis is not choosing the right as an end.<\/p>\n
But it is still insisted, that we are conscious of affirming obligation
\nto will, and do, many things, simply and only because it is right thus
\nto will, and do, and in view of this rightness.<\/p>\n
To this I reply, that the immediate reason for the act, thought of at
\nthe time, and immediately present to the mind, may be the rightness of
\nthe act, but in such cases the rightness is only regarded by the mind
\nas a condition and never as the ground of obligation. The act must be
\nultimate choice, or the choice of conditions and means. In ultimate
\nchoice, surely, the mind can never affirm, or think of the relation of
\nrightness between the choice and its object, instead of the intrinsic
\nvalue of the object, as the ground of obligation. Nor can the mind
\nthink of the relation of rightness between the choice of conditions and
\nmeans, and its object, as the ground of the obligation to choose them.
\nIt does, and must, assume, the value of the end, as creating both the
\nobligation to choose, and the relation in question. The fact is, the
\nmind necessarily assumes, without always thinking of this assumption,
\nits obligation to will the good, for its own sake, together with all
\nthe known conditions and means. Whenever therefore it perceives a
\ncondition, or a means of good, it instantly and necessarily affirms
\nobligation to choose it, or, which is the same thing, it affirms the
\nrightness of such choice. The rightness of the choice may be, and often
\nis the thing immediately thought of, but the assumption is, and must
\nbe, in the mind, that this obligation, and hence the rightness is
\ncreated by the nature of the object to which this thing sustains the
\nrelation of a condition or a means.<\/p>\n
2. But it is said again, “I am conscious of affirming to myself that I
\nought to will the good of being, because it is right.” That is, to will
\nthe good of being, as a means, and the right as an end! which is making
\nright the supreme good, and the good of being a means to that end. This
\nis absurd. But to say, that I am conscious of affirming to myself my
\nobligation to love or will the good of God and my neighbor, because it
\nis right, is a contradiction. It is the same as to say, I ought to
\nlove, or intend the good of God and my neighbor, as an ultimate end,
\nand yet not to intend the good of God and my neighbor, but intend the
\nright.<\/p>\n
3. But it is said, that “I ought to love God in compliance with, and
\nout of respect to my obligation; that I ought to will it, because and
\nfor the reason that I am bound to will it.” That is, that in loving God
\nand my neighbor, I must intend to discharge or comply with my
\nobligation; and this, it is said, is identical with intending the
\nright. But ought my supreme object to be to discharge my duty–to meet
\nobligation, instead of willing the well-being of God and my neighbor
\nfor its own sake? If my end is to do my duty, I do not do it. For what
\nis my obligation? Why, to love, or will the good of God and my
\nneighbor, that is, as an end, or for its own value. To discharge my
\nobligation, then, I must intend the good of God and my neighbor, as an
\nend. That is, I must intend that which I am under an obligation to
\nintend. But I am not under an obligation to intend the right, because
\nit is right, nor do my duty because it is my duty, but to intend the
\ngood of God and of my neighbor, because it is good. Therefore, to
\ndischarge my obligation, I must intend the good, and not the right–the
\ngood of God and my neighbor and not to do my duty. I say again, to
\nintend the good, or valuable, is right but to intend the right is not
\nright.<\/p>\n
4. But it is said, that in very many instances, at least, I am
\nconscious of affirming my moral obligation to do the right, without any
\nreference to the good of being, when I can assign no other reason for
\nthe affirmation of obligation than the right. For example, I behold
\nvirtue; I affirm spontaneously and necessarily, that I ought to love
\nthat virtue. And this, it is said, has no reference to the good of
\nbeing. Is willing the right for the sake of the right, and loving
\nvirtue, the same thing? But what is it to love virtue? Not a mere
\nfeeling of delight or complacency in it. It is agreed that moral
\nobligation, strictly speaking, respects the ultimate intention only.
\nWhat, then, do I mean by the affirmation that I ought to love virtue?
\nWhat is virtue? It is ultimate intention, or an attribute of ultimate
\nintention. But what is loving virtue? It consists in willing its
\nexistence. But it is said that I affirm my obligation to love virtue as
\nan end, or for its own sake, and not from any regard to the good of
\nbeing. This is absurd, and a contradiction. To love virtue, it is said,
\nis to will its existence as an end. But virtue consists in intending an
\nend. Now, to love virtue, it is said, is to will, intend its existence
\nas an end, for its own sake. Then, according to this theory, I affirm
\nmy obligation to intend the intention of a virtuous being as an end,
\ninstead of intending the same end that he does. This is absurd; his
\nintention is of no value, is neither naturally good nor morally good,
\nirrespective of the end intended. It is neither right nor wrong,
\nirrespective of the end chosen. It is therefore impossible to will,
\nchoose, intend the intention as an end, without reference to the end
\nintended. To love virtue, then, is to love or will the end upon which
\nvirtuous intention terminates, namely, the good of being; or, in other
\nwords, to love virtue is to will its existence for the sake of the end
\nit has in view, which is the same thing as to will the same end. Virtue
\nis intending, choosing an end. Loving virtue is willing that the
\nvirtuous intention should exist for the sake of its end. Take away the
\nend, and who would or could will the intention? Without the end, the
\nvirtue, or intention, would not and could not exist. It is not true,
\ntherefore, that in the case supposed, I affirm my obligation to will,
\nor intend, without any reference to the good of being.<\/p>\n
5. But again, it is said, that when I contemplate the moral excellence
\nof God, I affirm my obligation to love him solely for his goodness,
\nwithout any reference to the good of being, and for no other reason
\nthan because it is right. But to love God because of his moral
\nexcellence, and because it is right, are not the same thing. It is a
\ngross contradiction to talk of loving God for his moral excellence,
\nbecause it is right. It is the same as to say, I love God for the
\nreason that he is morally excellent, or worthy, yet not at all for this
\nreason, but for the reason that it is right. To love God for his moral
\nworth, is to will good to him for its own sake upon condition that he
\ndeserves it. But to will his moral worth because it is right, is to
\nwill the right as an ultimate end, to have supreme regard to right,
\ninstead of the moral worth, or the well-being of God.<\/p>\n
But it may reasonably be asked, why should rightarians bring forward
\nthese objections? They all assume that moral obligation may respect
\nsomething else than ultimate intention. Why, I repeat it, should
\nrightarians affirm that the moral excellence of God is the foundation
\nof moral obligation, since they hold that right is the foundation of
\nmoral obligation? Why should the advocates of the theory that the moral
\nexcellence of God is the foundation of moral obligation, affirm that
\nright is the foundation, or that we are bound to love God for his moral
\nexcellence, because this is right? These are gross contradictions.
\nRightarians hold that disinterested benevolence is a universal duty;
\nthat this benevolence consists in willing the highest good of being in
\ngeneral, for its own sake; that this good, by virtue of its own nature,
\nimposes obligation to choose it, for its own sake, and therefore, and
\nfor this reason, it is right thus to choose it. But notwithstanding all
\nthis, they most inconsistently affirm that right is universally the
\nground of obligation. Consistency must compel them to deny that
\ndisinterested benevolence ever is, or can be, duty and right, or to
\nabandon the nonsensical dogma, that right is the ground of obligation.
\nThere is no end to the absurdities in which error involves its
\nadvocates, and it is singular to see the advocates of the different
\ntheories, each in his turn, abandon his own and affirm some other, as
\nan objection to the true theory. It has also been, and still is, common
\nfor writers to confound different theories with each other, and to
\naffirm, in the compass of a few pages, several different theories. At
\nleast this has been done in some instances.<\/p>\n
Consistent rightarianism is a godless, Christless, loveless philosophy.
\nThis Kant saw and acknowledged. He calls it pure legality, that is, he
\nunderstands the law as imposing obligation by virtue of its own nature,
\ninstead of the intrinsic value of the end, which the law requires moral
\nagents to choose. He loses sight of the end, and does not recognize any
\nend whatever. He makes a broad distinction between morality and
\nreligion. Morality consists, according to him, in the adoption of the
\nmaxim, “Do right for the sake of the right,” or, “Act at all times upon
\na maxim fit for law universal.” The adoption of this maxim is morality.
\nBut now, having adopted this maxim, the mind goes abroad to carry its
\nmaxim into practice. It finds God and being to exist, and sees it to be
\nright to intend their good. This intending the good is religion,
\naccording to him. Thus, he says, ethics lead to or result in
\nreligion.–(See Kant, on Religion.) But we feel prompted to inquire
\nwhether, when we apprehend God and being, we are to will their
\nwell-being as an end, or for its own sake, or because it is right? If
\nfor its own sake, where then is the maxim, “Will the right for the sake
\nof the right?” For if we are to will the good, not as an ultimate end,
\nbut for the sake of the right, then right is the end that is preferred
\nto the highest well-being of God and of the universe. It is impossible
\nthat this should be religion. Indeed Kant himself admits that this is
\nnot religion.<\/p>\n
But enough of this cold and loveless philosophy. As it exalts right
\nabove all that is called God, and subverts all the teachings of the
\nBible, it cannot be a light thing to be deluded by it. But it is
\nremarkable and interesting to see Christian rightarians, without being
\nsensible of their inconsistency, so often confound this philosophy with
\nthat which teaches that good-will to being constitutes virtue. Numerous
\nexamples of it occur everywhere in their writings, which demonstrate
\nthat rightarianism is with them only a theory that plays round the head
\nbut comes not near the heart.”
\n__________________________________________________________________<\/p>\n
[1] Mahan’s Moral Philosophy.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
LECTURE IV. FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. In the discussion of this question, I will first state what is intended by the foundation, or ground, of obligation. I shall use the terms ground and foundation as synonymous. Obligation must be founded on some good and sufficient reason. Be it remembered, that moral obligation respects moral action….<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"twitterCardType":"","cardImageID":0,"cardImage":"","cardTitle":"","cardDesc":"","cardImageAlt":"","cardPlayer":"","cardPlayerWidth":0,"cardPlayerHeight":0,"cardPlayerStream":"","cardPlayerCodec":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5277","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5277","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5277"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5277\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5277"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5277"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5277"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}