LECTURE VI.<\/p>\n
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.<\/p>\n
I now enter upon the discussion of the theory, that the goodness, or
\nmoral excellence of God is the foundation of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
To this philosophy I reply,<\/p>\n
1. That the reason of obligation, or that which imposes obligation, is
\nidentical with the end on which the intention ought to terminate. If,
\ntherefore, the goodness of God be the reason, or foundation of moral
\nobligation, then the goodness of God is the ultimate end to be
\nintended. But as this goodness consists in love or benevolence, it is
\nimpossible that it should be regarded or chosen, as an ultimate end;
\nand to choose it were to choose the divine choice, to intend the divine
\nintention as an ultimate end, instead of choosing what God chooses, and
\nintending what he intends. Or if the goodness or moral excellence of
\nGod is to be regarded not as identical with, but as an attribute or
\nmoral quality of benevolence, then, upon the theory under
\nconsideration, a moral agent ought to choose a quality or attribute of
\nthe divine choice or intention as an ultimate end, instead of the end
\nupon which the divine intention terminates. This is absurd.<\/p>\n
2. It is impossible that virtue should be the foundation of moral
\nobligation. Virtue consists in a compliance with moral obligation. But
\nobligation must exist before it can be complied with. Now, upon this
\ntheory, obligation cannot exist until virtue exists as its foundation.
\nThen this theory amounts to this: virtue is the foundation of moral
\nobligation; therefore virtue must exist before moral obligation can
\nexist. But as virtue consists in a conformity to moral obligation,
\nmoral obligation must exist before virtue can exist. Therefore neither
\nmoral obligation nor virtue, can ever by any possibility, exist. God’s
\nvirtue must have existed prior to his obligation, as its foundation.
\nBut as virtue consists in compliance with moral obligation, and as
\nobligation could not exist until virtue existed as its foundation; in
\nother words, as obligation could not exist without the previous
\nexistence of virtue as its foundation, and as virtue could not exist
\nwithout the previous existence of obligation, it follows, that neither
\nGod nor any other being could ever be virtuous, for the reason that he
\ncould never be the subject of moral obligation. Should it be said, that
\nGod’s holiness is the foundation of our obligation to love him, I ask
\nin what sense it can be so. What is the nature or form of that love,
\nwhich his virtue lays us under an obligation to exercise? It cannot be
\na mere emotion of complacency, for emotions being involuntary states of
\nmind and mere phenomena of the sensibility, are not strictly within the
\npale of legislation and morality. Is this love resolvable into
\nbenevolence or good-will? But why will good to God rather than evil?
\nWhy, surely, because good is valuable in itself. But if it is valuable
\nin itself, this must be the fundamental reason for willing it as a
\npossible good; and his virtue must be only a secondary reason or
\ncondition of the obligation to will his actual blessedness. But again,
\nthe foundation of moral obligation must be the same in all worlds, and
\nwith all moral agents, for the simple reason that moral law is one and
\nidentical in all worlds. If God’s virtue is not the foundation of moral
\nobligation in him, which it cannot be, it cannot be the foundation of
\nobligation in us, as moral law must require him to choose the same end
\nthat it requires us to choose. His virtue must be a secondary reason of
\nhis obligation to will his own actual blessedness, and the condition of
\nour obligation to will his actual and highest blessedness, but cannot
\nbe the fundamental reason, that always being the intrinsic value of his
\nwell-being.<\/p>\n
If this theory is true, disinterested benevolence is a sin. Undeniably
\nbenevolence consists in willing the highest well-being of God and the
\nuniverse for its own sake, in devoting the soul anal all to this end.
\nBut this theory teaches us, either to will the moral excellence of God,
\nfor its own sake, or as an ultimate end, or to will his good and the
\ngood of the universe, not for its own sake, but because he is morally
\nexcellent. The benevolence theory regards blessedness as the end, and
\nholiness or moral excellence only as a condition of the end. This
\ntheory regards moral excellence itself as the end. Does the moral
\nexcellence of God impose obligation to will his moral excellence for
\nits own sake? If not, it cannot be a ground of obligation. Does his
\nmoral excellence impose obligation to will his highest good, and that
\nof the universe, for its own sake? No, for this were a contradiction.
\nFor, be it remembered, no one thing can be a ground of obligation to
\nchoose any other thing, for its own sake. That which creates obligation
\nto choose, by reason of its own nature, must itself be the identical
\nobject of choice; the obligation is to choose that object for its own
\nsake.<\/p>\n
If the divine moral excellence is the ground of obligation to choose,
\nthen this excellence must be the object of this choice, and
\ndisinterested benevolence is never right, but always wrong.<\/p>\n
2. But for the sake of a somewhat systematic examination of this
\nsubject, I will–<\/p>\n
(1.) Show what virtue, or moral excellence is.<\/p>\n
(2.) That it cannot be the foundation of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
(3.) Show what moral worth or good desert is.<\/p>\n
(4.) That it cannot be the foundation of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
(5.) Show what relation virtue, merit, and moral worth sustain to moral
\nobligation.<\/p>\n
(6.) Answer objections.<\/p>\n
(1.) Show what virtue, or moral excellence is.<\/p>\n
Virtue, or moral excellence, consists in conformity of will to moral
\nlaw. It must either be identical with love or good-will, or it must be
\nthe moral attribute or element of good-will or benevolence.<\/p>\n
(2.) It cannot be the foundation of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
It is agreed, that the moral law requires love; and that, this term
\nexpresses all that it requires. It is also agreed that this love is
\ngood-will, or that it resolves itself into choice, or ultimate
\nintention. It must, then, consist in the choice of an ultimate end. Or,
\nin more common language, this love consists in the supreme devotion of
\nheart and soul to God and to the highest good of being. But since
\nvirtue either consists in choice, or is an attribute of choice, or
\nbenevolence, it is impossible to will it as an ultimate end. For this
\nwould involve the absurdity of choosing choice, or intending intention,
\nas an end, instead of choosing that as an end upon which virtuous
\nchoice terminates. Or, if virtue be regarded as the moral attribute of
\nlove or benevolence, to make it an ultimate end would be to make an
\nattribute of choice an ultimate end, instead of that on which choice
\nterminates, or ought to terminate. This is absurd.<\/p>\n
(3.) Show what moral worth, or good desert is.<\/p>\n
Moral worth, or good desert, is not identical with virtue, or obedience
\nto moral law, but is an attribute of character, resulting from
\nobedience. Virtue, or holiness, is a state of mind. It is an active and
\nbenevolent state of the will. Moral worth is not a state of mind, but
\nis the result of a state of mind. We say that a man’s obedience to
\nmoral law is valuable in such a sense that a holy being is worthy, or
\ndeserving of good, because of his virtue, or holiness. But this
\nworthiness, this good desert, is not a state of mind, but, as I said,
\nit is a result of benevolence. It is an attribute or quality of
\ncharacter, and not a state of mind.<\/p>\n
(4.) Moral worth or good desert cannot be the foundation of moral
\nobligation.<\/p>\n
(a.) It is admitted, that good, or the intrinsically valuable to being,
\nmust be the foundation of moral obligation. The law of God requires the
\nchoice of an ultimate end. This end must be intrinsically valuable, for
\nit is its intrinsic value that imposes obligation to will it. Nothing,
\nthen, can be the foundation of moral obligation but that which is a
\ngood, or intrinsically valuable in itself.<\/p>\n
(b.) Ultimate good, or the intrinsically valuable, must belong to, and
\nbe inseparable from, sentient existences. A block of marble cannot
\nenjoy, or be the subject of, good. That which is intrinsically good to
\nmoral agents, must consist in a state of mind. It must be something
\nthat is found within the field of consciousness. Nothing can be to them
\nan intrinsic good, but that of which they can be conscious. By this it
\nis not intended that everything of which they are conscious, is to them
\nan ultimate good, or a good in any sense; but it is intended, that that
\ncannot be to them an ultimate, or intrinsic good, of which they are not
\nconscious. Ultimate good must consist in a conscious state of mind.
\nWhatever conduces to the state of mind that is necessarily regarded by
\nus as intrinsically good or valuable, is to us a relative good. But the
\nstate of mind alone is the ultimate good. From this it is plain, that
\nmoral worth, or good desert, cannot be the foundation of moral
\nobligation, because it is not a state of mind, and cannot be an
\nultimate good. The consciousness of good desert, that is, the
\nconsciousness of affirming of ourselves good desert, is an ultimate
\ngood. Or, more strictly, the satisfaction which the mind experiences,
\nupon occasion of affirming its good desert, is an ultimate good. But
\nneither the conscious affirmation of good desert, nor the satisfaction
\noccasioned by the affirmation, is identical with moral worth or good
\ndesert. Merit, moral worth, good desert, is the condition, or occasion,
\nof the affirmation, and of the resulting conscious satisfaction, and is
\ntherefore a good, but it is not, and cannot be an ultimate, or
\nintrinsic good. It is valuable; but not intrinsically valuable. Were it
\nnot that moral beings are so constituted, that it meets a demand of the
\nintelligence, and therefore produces satisfaction in its contemplation,
\nit would not be, and could not reasonably be regarded as a good in any
\nsense. But since it meets a demand of the intelligence, it is a
\nrelative good, and results in ultimate good.<\/p>\n
(5.) Show what relation moral excellence, worth, merit, desert, sustain
\nto moral obligation.<\/p>\n
(a.) We have seen, that neither of them can be the foundation of moral
\nobligation; that neither of them has in it the element of the
\nintrinsic, or ultimate good, or valuable; and that, therefore, a moral
\nagent can never be under obligation to will or choose them as an
\nultimate end.<\/p>\n
(b.) Worth, merit, good desert, cannot be a distinct ground, or
\nfoundation, of moral obligation, in such a sense as to impose
\nobligation, irrespective of the intrinsic value of good. All obligation
\nmust respect, strictly, the choice of an object for its own sake, with
\nthe necessary conditions and means. The intrinsic value of the end is
\nthe foundation of the obligation to choose both it and the necessary
\nconditions and means of securing it. But for the intrinsic value of the
\nend there could be no obligation to will the conditions and means.
\nWhenever a thing is seen to be a necessary condition or means of
\nsecuring an intrinsically valuable end, this perceived relation is the
\ncondition of our obligation to will it. The obligation is, and must be,
\nfounded in the intrinsic value of the end, and conditionated upon the
\nperceived relation of the object to the end. The intelligence of every
\nmoral agent, from its nature and laws, affirms, that the ultimate good
\nand blessedness of moral beings is, and ought to be, conditionated upon
\ntheir holiness and good desert. This being a demand of reason, reason
\ncan never affirm moral obligation to will the actual blessedness of
\nmoral agents, but upon condition of their virtue, and consequent good
\ndesert, or merit. The intelligence affirms that it is fit, suitable,
\nproper, that virtue, good desert, merit, holiness, should be rewarded
\nwith blessedness. Blessedness is a good in itself, and ought to be
\nwilled for that reason, and moral agents are under obligation to will
\nthat all beings capable of good may be worthy to enjoy, and may,
\ntherefore, actually enjoy blessedness. But they are not under
\nobligation to will that every moral being should actually enjoy
\nblessedness, but upon condition of holiness and good desert. The
\nrelation that holiness, merit, good desert, etc., sustain to moral
\nobligation, is this: they supply the condition of the obligation to
\nwill the actual blessedness of the being or beings who are holy. The
\nobligation must be founded in the intrinsic value of the good we are to
\nwill to them. For it is absurd to say, that we are, or can be, under
\nobligation to will good to them for its own sake, or as an ultimate
\nend, and yet that the obligation should not be founded in the intrinsic
\nvalue of the good. Were it not for the intrinsic value of their good,
\nwe should no sooner affirm obligation to will good to them than evil.
\nThe good or blessedness is the thing, or end, we are under obligation
\nto will. But obligation to will an ultimate end cannot possibly be
\nfounded in anything else than the intrinsic value of the end. Suppose
\nit should be said, that in the case of merit, or good desert, the
\nobligation is founded in merit, and only conditioned on the intrinsic
\nvalue of the good I am to will. This would be to make desert the end
\nwilled, and good only the condition, or means. This were absurd.<\/p>\n
(c.) But again, to make merit the ground of the obligation, and the
\ngood willed only a condition, amounts to this: I perceive merit,
\nwhereupon I affirm my obligation to will–what? Not good to the
\ndeserving because of its value to him, nor from any disposition to see
\nhim enjoy blessedness for its own sake, but because of his merit. But
\nwhat does he merit? Why, good, or blessedness. It is good, or
\nblessedness, that I am to will to him, and this is the end I am bound
\nto will; that is, I am to will his good, or blessedness, for its own
\nintrinsic value. The obligation, then, must be founded in the intrinsic
\nvalue of the end, that is, his well-being, or blessedness, and only
\nconditioned upon merit.<\/p>\n
(6.) I am to answer objections.<\/p>\n
(a.) It is objected, that, if virtue is meritorious, if it merits,
\ndeserves anything, this implies corresponding obligation, and that
\nmerit, or desert, must impose, or be the ground of, the obligation to
\ngive that which is merited. But this objection is either a mere begging
\nof the question, or it is sheer logomachy. It assumes that the words,
\ndesert and merit, mean what they cannot mean. Let the objector
\nremember, that he holds that obligation respects ultimate intention.
\nThat ultimate intention must find the grounds of its obligation
\nexclusively in its object. Now, if desert or merit is a ground of
\nobligation, then merit or desert must be the object of the intention.
\nDesert, merit, must be willed for its own sake. But is this the thing
\nthat is deserved, merited? Does a meritorious being deserve that his
\nmerit or desert should be willed for its own sake? Indeed, is this what
\nhe deserves? We understandingly speak of good desert, the desert of
\ngood and of evil; can a being deserve that his desert shall be chosen
\nfor its own sake? If not, then it is impossible that desert or merit
\nshould be a ground of obligation; for be it remembered, that whatever
\nis a ground of obligation ought to be chosen for its own sake. But if
\ngood desert deserves good, it is self-evident that the intrinsic value
\nof the good is the ground, and merit only a condition, of obligation to
\nwill the actual and particular enjoyment of the good by the meritorious
\nindividual. Thus merit changes merely the form of obligation. If an
\nindividual is wicked, I ought to will his good as valuable in itself,
\nand that he should comply with the necessary conditions of happiness,
\nand thereupon actually enjoy happiness. If he is virtuous, I am to will
\nhis good still for its intrinsic value; and, since he has complied with
\nthe conditions of enjoyment, that he actually enjoy happiness. In both
\ncases, I am bound to will his good, and for the same fundamental
\nreason, namely, its intrinsic value. Neither the fact nor the ground of
\nobligation to will his good is changed by his virtue; the form only of
\nthe obligation is changed. I may be under obligation to will evil to a
\nparticular being, but in this case I am not bound to will the evil for
\nits own sake, and therefore, not as an end or ultimate. I ought
\nsometimes to will the punishment of the guilty, not for its own sake,
\nbut for the sake of the public good; and the intrinsic value of the
\ngood to be promoted is the ground of the obligation, and guilt or
\ndemerit is only a condition of the obligation in that form. If merit or
\ndesert be a ground of obligation, then merit or desert ought to be
\nchosen for its own sake. It would follow from this, that ill desert
\nought to be chosen for its own sake, as well as good desert. But who
\nwill pretend that ill desert ought to be willed for its own sake? But
\nif this is not, cannot be so, then it follows, that desert is not a
\nground of obligation, and that is not an object of ultimate choice, or
\nof choice at all, only as a means to an end.<\/p>\n
(b.) It is asserted, in support of the theory we are examining, that
\nthe Bible represents the goodness of God as a reason for loving him, or
\nas a foundation of the obligation to love him.<\/p>\n
To this I answer, the Bible may assign, and does assign the goodness of
\nGod as a reason for loving him, but it does not follow, that it
\naffirms, or assumes, that this reason is the foundation, or a
\nfoundation of the obligation. The inquiry is, in what sense does the
\nBible assign the goodness of God as a reason for loving him? Is it that
\nthe goodness of God is the foundation of the obligation, or only a
\ncondition of the obligation to will his actual blessedness in
\nparticular? Is his goodness a distinct ground of obligation to love
\nhim? But what is this love that his goodness lays us under an
\nobligation exercise to him? It is agreed, that it cannot be an emotion,
\nthat it must consist in willing something to him. It is said by some,
\nthat the obligation is to treat him as worthy. But I ask, worthy of
\nwhat? Is he worthy of anything? If so, what is it? For this is the
\nthing that I ought to will to him. Is he merely worthy that I should
\nwill his worthiness for its own sake? This must be, if his worthiness
\nis the ground of obligation; for that which is the ground of obligation
\nto choose must be the object of choice. Why, he is worthy of blessing,
\nand honor, and praise. But these must all be embraced in the single
\nword, love. The law has forever decided the point, that our whole duty
\nto God is expressed by this one term. It has been common to make
\nassertions upon the subject, that involve a contradiction of the Bible.
\nThe law of God, as revealed in the two precepts, “Thou shalt love the
\nLord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbor as thyself,” covers
\nthe whole ground of moral obligation. It is expressly and repeatedly
\ntaught in the Bible, that love to God and our neighbor is the
\nfulfilling of the law. It is, and must be admitted, that this love
\nconsists in willing something to God and our neighbor. What, then, is
\nto be willed to them? The command is, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
\nthyself.” This says nothing about the character of my neighbor. It is
\nthe value of his interests, of his well-being, that the law requires me
\nto regard. It does not require me to love my righteous neighbor merely,
\nnor to love my righteous neighbor better than I do my wicked neighbor.
\nIt is my neighbor that I am to love. That is, I am to will his
\nwell-being, or his good, with the conditions and means thereof,
\naccording to its value. If the law contemplated the virtue of any being
\nas a distinct ground of obligation, it could not read as it does. It
\nmust, in that case, have read as follows: If thou art righteous, and
\nthy neighbor is as righteous as thou art, thou shalt love him as
\nthyself. But if he is righteous and thou art not, thou shalt love him
\nand not thyself. If thou art righteous, and he is not, thou shalt love
\nthyself, and not thy neighbor.” How far would this be from the gloss of
\nthe Jewish rabbies so fully rebuked by Christ, namely, “Ye have heard
\nthat it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt love thy
\nneighbor, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies;
\nbless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you; and pray for
\nthem that despitefully use and persecute you. For if ye love them that
\nlove you, what thank have ye? Do not even the publicans the same?” The
\nfact is, the law knows but one ground of moral obligation. It requires
\nus to love God and our neighbor. This love is good will. What else
\nought we to will, or can we possibly will to God and our neighbor, but
\ntheir highest good, or well-being, with all the conditions and means
\nthereof? This is all that can be of any value to them, and all that we
\ncan or ought to, will to them under any circumstances whatever. When we
\nhave willed this to them, we have done our whole duty to them. “Love is
\nthe fulfilling of the law.” We owe them nothing more, absolutely. They
\ncan have nothing more. But this the law requires us to will to God and
\nour neighbor, on account of the intrinsic value of their good, whatever
\ntheir character may be; that is, this is to be willed to God and our
\nneighbor, as a possible good, whether they are holy or unholy, simply
\nbecause of its intrinsic value.<\/p>\n
But while the law requires that this should be willed to all, as a
\npossible and intrinsic good, irrespective of character; it cannot, and
\ndoes not require us to will that God, or any moral agent in particular,
\nshall be actually blessed, but upon condition that he be holy. Our
\nobligation to the unholy, is to will that they might be holy, and
\nperfectly blessed. Our obligation to the holy, is to will that they be
\nperfectly blessed. As has been said, virtue only modifies the form, but
\ndoes not change the ground of obligation. The Bible represents love to
\nenemies as one of the highest forms of virtue: “God commendeth his love
\ntoward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.” But
\nif love to enemies be a high and a valuable form of virtue, it must be
\nonly because the true spirit of the law requires the same love to them
\nas to others, and because of the strong inducements not to love them.
\nWho does not regard the virtue of the atonement as being as great as if
\nit had been made for the friends, instead of the enemies of God? And
\nsuppose God were supremely selfish and unreasonably our enemy, who
\nwould not regard good-will exercised toward him as being as
\npraiseworthy as it now is. Now if he were unjustly our enemy, would not
\na hearty good-will to him in such a case be a striking and valuable
\ninstance of virtue? In such a case we could not, might not, will his
\nactual blessedness, but we might and should be under infinite
\nobligation to will that he might become holy, and thereupon be
\nperfectly blessed. We should be under obligation to will his good in
\nsuch a sense, that should he become holy, we should will his actual
\nblessedness, without any change in our ultimate choice or intention,
\nand without any change in us that would imply an increase of virtue.<\/p>\n
So of our neighbor: we are bound to will his good, even if he is
\nwicked, in such a sense as to need no new intention or ultimate choice,
\nto will his actual blessedness, should he become holy. We may be as
\nholy in loving a sinner, and in seeking his salvation while he is a
\nsinner, as in willing his good after he is converted and becomes a
\nsaint. God was as virtuous in loving the world, and seeking to save it
\nwhile in sin, as he is in loving those in it who are holy. The fact is,
\nif we are truly benevolent, and will the highest well-being of all,
\nwith the conditions and means of their blessedness, it follows of
\ncourse, and of necessity, that when one becomes holy we shall love him
\nwith the love of complacency; that we shall, of course, will his actual
\nblessedness, seeing that he has fulfilled the necessary conditions, and
\nrendered himself worthy of blessedness. It implies no increase of
\nvirtue in God, when a sinner repents, to exercise complacency toward
\nhim. Complacency, as a state of will or heart, is only benevolence
\nmodified by the consideration or relation of right character in the
\nobject of it. God, prophets, apostles, martyrs, and saints, in all
\nages, are as virtuous in their self-denying and untiring labors to save
\nthe wicked, as they are in their complacent love to the saints.<\/p>\n
This is the universal doctrine of the Bible. It is in exact accordance
\nwith the spirit and letter of the law. “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
\nthyself;” that is, whatever his character may be. This is the doctrine
\nof reason, and accords with the convictions of all men. But if this is
\nso, it follows that virtue is not a distinct ground of moral
\nobligation, but only modifies the form of obligation. We are under
\nobligation to will the actual blessedness of a moral being, upon
\ncondition of his holiness. We ought to will good or blessedness for its
\nown value, irrespective of character; but we ought to will the
\nenjoyment of it, by an individual, in particular, only upon condition
\nof his holiness. Its intrinsic value is the foundation of the
\nobligation, and his holiness changes not the fact, but form, of the
\nobligation, and is the condition of the obligation to will his actual
\nenjoyment of perfect blessedness in particular. When, therefore, the
\nBible calls on us to love God for his goodness, it does not and cannot
\nmean to assign the fundamental reason, or foundation of the obligation
\nto will his good; for it were absurd to suppose, that his good is to be
\nwilled, not for its intrinsic value, but because he is good. Were it
\nnot for its intrinsic value, we should as soon affirm our obligation to
\nwill evil as good to him. The Bible assumes the first truths of reason.
\nIt is a first truth of reason, that God’s well-being is of infinite
\nvalue, and ought to be willed as a possible good whatever his character
\nmay be; and that it ought to be willed as an actual reality upon
\ncondition of his holiness. Now the Bible does just as in this case
\nmight be expected. It asserts his actual and infinite holiness, and
\ncalls on us to love him, or to will his good, for that reason. But this
\nis not asserting nor implying that his holiness is the foundation of
\nthe obligation to will his good in any such sense as that we should not
\nbe under obligation to will it with all our heart, and soul, and mind,
\nand strength, as a possible good, whether he were holy or not. It is
\nplain that the law contemplates only the intrinsic value of the end to
\nbe willed. It would require us to will the well-being of God with all
\nour heart, etc., or as the supreme good, whatever his character might
\nbe. Were not this so, it could not be moral law. His interest would be
\nthe supreme and the infinite good, in the sense of the intrinsically
\nand infinitely valuable, and we should, for that reason, be under
\ninfinite obligation to will that it might be, whether he were holy or
\nsinful, and upon condition of his holiness, to will the actual
\nexistence of his perfect and infinite blessedness. Upon our coming to
\nthe knowledge of his holiness, the obligation is instantly imposed, not
\nmerely to will his highest well-being as a possible, but as an actually
\nexisting, good.<\/p>\n
Again, it is impossible that goodness, virtue, good desert, merit,
\nshould be a distinct ground or foundation of moral obligation, in such
\na sense as to impose or properly to increase obligation. It has been
\nshown that neither of these can be an ultimate good and impose
\nobligation to choose itself as an ultimate end, or for its intrinsic
\nvalue.<\/p>\n
But if goodness or merit can impose moral obligation to will, it must
\nbe an obligation to will itself as an ultimate end. But this we have
\nseen cannot be; therefore these things cannot be a distinct ground or
\nfoundation of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
But again, the law does not make virtue, good desert, or merit, the
\nground of obligation, and require us to love them and to will them as
\nan ultimate end; but to love God and our neighbor as an ultimate good.
\nIt does, no doubt, require us to will God’s goodness, good desert,
\nworthiness, merit, as a condition and means of his highest well-being,
\nand of the well-being of the universe; but it is absurd to say that it
\nrequires us to will either of these things as an ultimate end, instead
\nof his perfect blessedness, to which these sustain only the relation of
\na condition. Let it be distinctly understood that nothing can impose
\nmoral obligation but that which is an ultimate and an intrinsic good;
\nfor if it impose obligation, it must be an obligation to choose itself
\nfor what it is, in and of itself. All obligation must respect the
\nchoice either of an end or of means. Obligation to choose means is
\nfounded in the value of the end. Whatever, then, imposes obligation
\nmust be an ultimate end. It must possess that, in and of itself, that
\nis worthy or deserving of choice as an intrinsic and ultimate good.
\nThis we have seen, virtue, merit, etc. cannot be; therefore they cannot
\nbe a foundation of moral obligation. But it is said they can increase
\nobligation to love God and holy beings. But we are under infinite
\nobligation to love God and to will his good with all our power, because
\nof the intrinsic value of his well-being, whether he is holy or sinful.
\nUpon condition that he is holy, we are under obligation to will his
\nactual blessedness, but certainly we are under obligation to will it
\nwith no more than all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strength. But
\nthis we are required to do because of the intrinsic value of his
\nblessedness, whatever his character might be. The fact is, we can do no
\nmore, and can be under obligation to do no more, than to will his good
\nwith all our power, and this we are bound to do for its own sake; and
\nno more than this can we be under obligation to do, for any reason
\nwhatever. Our obligation is to will his good with all our strength, by
\nvirtue of its infinite value, and it cannot be increased by any other
\nconsideration than our increased knowledge of its value, which
\nincreases our ability.<\/p>\n
(c.) But it is said that favors received impose obligation to exercise
\ngratitude; that the relation of benefactor itself imposes obligation to
\ntreat the benefactor according to this relation.<\/p>\n
Answer: I suppose this objection contemplates this relation as a
\nvirtuous relation, that is, that the benefactor is truly virtuous and
\nnot selfish in his benefaction. If not, then the relation cannot at all
\nmodify obligation.<\/p>\n
If the benefactor has in the benefaction obeyed the law of love, if he
\nhas done his duty in sustaining this relation, I am under obligation to
\nexercise gratitude toward him. But what is gratitude? It is not a mere
\nemotion or feeling; for this is a phenomenon of the sensibility, and,
\nstrictly speaking, without the pale both of legislation and morality.
\nGratitude, when spoken of as a virtue and as that of which moral
\nobligation can be affirmed, must be an act of will. An obligation to
\ngratitude must be an obligation to will something to the benefactor.
\nBut what am I under obligation to will to a benefactor, but his actual
\nhighest well-being? If it be God, I am under obligation to will his
\nactual and infinite blessedness with all my heart and with all my soul.
\nIf it be my neighbor, I am bound to love him as myself, that is, to
\nwill his actual well-being as I do my own. What else can either God or
\nman possess or enjoy, and what else can I be under obligation to will
\nto them? I answer, nothing else. To the law and to the testimony; if
\nany philosophy agree not herewith, it is because there is no light in
\nit. The virtuous relation of benefactor modifies obligation, just as
\nany other and every other form of virtue does, and in no other way.
\nWhenever we perceive virtue in any being, this supplies the condition
\nupon which we are bound to will his actual highest well-being. He has
\ndone his duty. He has complied with obligation in the relation he
\nsustains. He is truthful, upright, benevolent, just, merciful, no
\nmatter what the particular form may be in which the individual presents
\nto me the evidence of his holy character. It is all precisely the same
\nso far as my obligation extends. I any, independently of my knowledge
\nof his character, under obligation to will his highest well-being for
\nits own sake. That is, to will that he may fulfil all the conditions,
\nand thereupon enjoy perfect blessedness. But I am not under obligation
\nto will his actual enjoyment of blessedness until I have evidence of
\nhis virtue. This evidence, however I obtain it, by whatever
\nmanifestations of virtue in him or by whatever means, supplies the
\ncondition upon which I am under obligation to will his actual enjoyment
\nor highest well-being. This is my whole obligation. It is all he can
\nhave, and all I can will to him. All objections of this kind, and
\nindeed all possible objections to the true theory, and in support of
\nthe one I am examining, are founded in an erroneous view of the subject
\nof moral obligation, or in a false and anti-scriptural philosophy that
\ncontradicts the law of God, and sets up another rule of moral
\nobligation.<\/p>\n
Again, if gratitude is a moral act, according to this objector, it is
\nan ultimate intention, and as such must terminate on its object, and
\nfind its reasons or ground of obligation exclusively in its object. If
\nthis is so, then if the relation of benefactor is the ground of
\nobligation to exercise gratitude, gratitude must consist in willing
\nthis relation for its own sake, and not at all in willing anything to
\nthe benefactor. This is absurd. It is certain that gratitude must
\nconsist in willing good to the benefactor, and not in willing the
\nrelation for its own sake, and that the ground of the obligation must
\nbe the intrinsic value of the good, and the relation only a condition
\nof the obligation in the particular form of willing his enjoyment of
\ngood in particular. It is now said, in reply to this, that the “inquiry
\nis not, what is gratitude? but, why ought we to exercise it?” But the
\ninquiry is after the ground of the obligation; this, it is agreed, must
\nbe intrinsic in its object; and is it impertinent to inquire what the
\nobject is? Who can tell what is the ground of the obligation to
\nexercise gratitude until he knows what the object of gratitude is, and
\nconsequently what gratitude is? The objector affirms that the relation
\nof benefactor is a ground of obligation to put forth ultimate choice.
\nOf course, according to him, and in fact, if this relation is the
\nground of the obligation, it is, and must be, the object chosen for its
\nown sake. To exercise gratitude to a benefactor, then, according to
\nthis teaching is, not to will any good to him, nor to myself, nor to
\nany being in existence, but simply to will the relation of benefactor
\nfor its own sake. Not for his sake, as a good to him. Not for my sake
\nas a good to me, but for its own sake. Is not this a sublime
\nphilosophy?<\/p>\n
(d.) But it is also insisted that when men attempt to assign a reason
\nwhy they are under moral obligation of any kind, as to love God, they
\nall agree in this, in assigning the divine moral excellence as the
\nreason of that obligation.<\/p>\n
I answer:–The only reason why any man supposes himself to assign the
\ngoodness of God as the foundation of the obligation to will good to him
\nis, that he loosely confounds the conditions of the obligation to will
\nhis actual blessedness, with the foundation of the obligation to will
\nit for its own sake, or as a possible good. Were it not for the known
\nintrinsic value of God’s highest well-being, we should as soon affirm
\nour obligation to will evil as good to him, as has been said. But if
\nthe divine moral excellence were the foundation of moral obligation, if
\nGod were not holy and good, moral obligation could not exist in any
\ncase.<\/p>\n
That every moral agent ought to will the highest well-being of God and
\nof all the universe for its own sake, as a possible good, whatever
\ntheir characters may be, is a truth of reason. Reason assigns and can
\nassign no other reason for willing their good as an ultimate end than
\nits intrinsic value; and to assign any other reason as imposing
\nobligation to will it as an end, or for its own sake, were absurd and
\nself-contradictory. Obligation to will it as an end and for its own
\nsake, implies the obligation to will its actual existence in all cases,
\nand to all persons, when the indispensable conditions are fulfilled.
\nThese conditions are seen to be fulfilled in God, and therefore upon
\nthis condition reason affirms obligation to will his actual and highest
\nblessedness for its own sake, the intrinsic value being the fundamental
\nreason of the obligation to will it as an end, and the divine goodness
\nthe condition of the obligation to will his highest blessedness in
\nparticular. Suppose that I existed and had the idea of blessedness and
\nits intrinsic value duly developed, together with an idea of all the
\nnecessary conditions of it; but that I did not know that any other
\nbeing than myself existed, and yet I knew their existence and
\nblessedness possible; in this case I should be under obligation to will
\nor wish that beings might exist and be blessed. Now suppose that I
\ncomplied with this obligation, my virtue is just as real and as great
\nas if I knew their existence, and willed their actual blessedness,
\nprovided my idea of its intrinsic value were as clear and just as if I
\nknew their existence. And now suppose I came to the knowledge of the
\nactual existence and holiness of all holy beings, I should make no new
\nultimate choice in willing their actual blessedness. This I should do
\nof course, and, remaining benevolent, of necessity; and if this
\nknowledge did not give me a higher idea of the value of that which I
\nbefore willed for its own sake, the willing of the real existence of
\ntheir blessedness would not make me a whit more virtuous than when I
\nwilled it as a possible good, without knowing that the conditions of
\nits actual existence would ever, in any case, be fulfilled.<\/p>\n
The Bible reads just as it might be expected to read, and just as we
\nshould speak in common life. It being a truth of reason that the
\nwell-being of God is of infinite value, and therefore ought to be
\nwilled for its own sake, it also being a truth that virtue is an
\nindispensable condition of fulfilling the demands of his own reason and
\nconscience, and of course of his actual blessedness, and of course also
\na condition of the obligation to will it, we might expect the Bible to
\nexhort and require us to love God or will his actual blessedness, and
\nmention his virtue as the reason or fulfilled condition of the
\nobligation, rather than the intrinsic value of his blessedness as the
\nfoundation of the obligation. The foundation of the obligation, being a
\ntruth of reason, needs not to be a matter of revelation. Nor needs the
\nfact that virtue is the condition of his blessedness, nor the fact that
\nwe are under no obligation to will his actual blessedness but upon
\ncondition of his holiness. But that in him this condition is fulfilled,
\nneeds to be impressed upon us, and therefore the Bible announces it as
\na reason or condition of the obligation to love him, that is, to will
\nhis actual blessedness.<\/p>\n
God’s moral excellence is naturally, and rightly, assigned by us as a
\ncondition, not the ground of obligation to receive his revealed will as
\nour law. Did we not assume the rectitude of the divine will, we could
\nnot affirm our obligation to receive it as a rule of duty. This
\nassumption is a condition of the obligation, and is naturally thought
\nof when obligation to obey God is affirmed. But the intrinsic value and
\nimportance of the interest he requires us to seek, is the ground of the
\nobligation.<\/p>\n
(e.) Again: it is asserted that when men would awaken a sense of moral
\nobligation they universally contemplate the moral excellence of God as
\nconstituting the reason of their obligation, and if this contemplation
\ndoes not awaken their sense of obligation nothing else can or will.<\/p>\n
I answer: — The only possible reason why men ever do or can take this
\ncourse, is that they loosely consider religion to consist in feelings
\nof complacency in God, and are endeavoring to awaken these complacent
\nemotions. If they conceive of religion as consisting in these emotions,
\nthey will of course conceive themselves to be under obligation to
\nexercise them, and to be sure they take the only possible course to
\nawaken both these and a sense of obligation to exercise them. But they
\nare mistaken both in regard to their obligation and the nature of
\nreligion. Did they conceive of religion as consisting in good-will, or
\nin willing the highest well-being of God and of the universe for its
\nown sake, would they, could they, resort to the process in question,
\nthat is, the contemplation of the divine moral excellence, as the only
\nreason for willing good to him, instead of considering the infinite
\nvalue of those interests to the realization of which they ought to
\nconsecrate themselves?<\/p>\n
If men often do resort to the process in question, it is because they
\nlove to feel and have a self-righteous satisfaction in feelings of
\ncomplacency in God, and take more pains to awaken these feelings than
\nto quicken and enlarge their benevolence. A purely selfish being may be
\ngreatly affected by the great goodness and kindness of God to him. I
\nknow a man who is a very niggard so far as all benevolent giving and
\ndoing for God and the world are concerned, who, I fear, resorts to the
\nvery process in question, and is often much affected with the goodness
\nof God. He can bluster and denounce. all who do not feel as he does.
\nBut ask him for a dollar to forward any benevolent enterprise, and he
\nwill evade your request, and ask you how you feel, whether you are
\nengaged in religion, etc.<\/p>\n
But it may well be asked, why does the Bible and why do we, so often
\npresent the character of God and of Christ as a means of awakening a
\nsense of moral obligation and of inducing virtue? Answer:–<\/p>\n
It is to lead men to contemplate the infinite value of those interests
\nwhich we ought to will. Presenting the example of God and of Christ, is
\nthe highest moral means that can be used. God’s example and man’s
\nexample is the most impressive and efficient way in which he can
\ndeclare his views, and hold forth to public gaze the infinite value of
\nthose interests upon which all hearts ought to be set. For example,
\nnothing can set the infinite value of the soul in a stronger light than
\nthe example of God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost has done.<\/p>\n
Nothing can beget a higher sense of obligation to will the glory of the
\nFather and the salvation of souls, than the example of Christ. His
\nexample is his loudest preaching, his clearest, most impressive
\nexhibition, not merely of his own goodness, but of the intrinsic and
\ninfinite value of the interest he sought and which we ought to seek. It
\nis the love, the care, the self-denial, and the example of God, in his
\nefforts to secure the great ends of benevolence, that hold those
\ninterests forth in the strongest light, and thus beget a sense of
\nobligation to seek the same end. But let it be observed, it is not a
\ncontemplation of the goodness of God that awakens this sense of
\nobligation, but the contemplation of the value of those interests which
\nhe seeks, in the light of his pains-taking and example; this quickens
\nand gives efficiency to the sense of obligation to will what he wills.
\nSuppose, for example, that I manifest the greatest concern and zeal for
\nthe salvation of souls; it would not be the contemplation of my
\ngoodness that would quicken in a bystander a sense of obligation to
\nsave souls, but my zeal, and life, and spirit would have the strongest
\ntendency to arouse in him a sense of the infinite and intrinsic value
\nof the soul, and thus quicken a sense of obligation. Should I behold
\nmultitudes rushing to extinguish a flaming house, it would not be a
\ncontemplation of their goodness, but the contemplation of the interests
\nat stake, to the consideration of which their zeal would lead me, that
\nwould quicken a sense of obligation in me to hasten to lend my aid.<\/p>\n
Revelation is concerned to impress the fact that God is holy, and of
\ncourse calls on us, in view of his holiness, to love and worship him.
\nBut in doing this, it does not, cannot mean that his holiness is the
\nfoundation of the obligation to will his good as an ultimate end.<\/p>\n
Our obligation, when viewed apart from his character, is to will or
\nwish that God might fulfil all the conditions of perfect blessedness,
\nand upon that condition, that he might actually enjoy perfect and
\ninfinite satisfaction. But seeing that he meets the demands of his own
\nintelligence and the intelligence of the universe, and that he
\nvoluntarily fulfils all the necessary conditions of his highest
\nwell-being, our obligation is to will his actual and most perfect and
\neternal blessedness.<\/p>\n
I am obliged to repeat much to follow the objector, because all his
\nobjections resolve themselves into one, and require to be answered much
\nin the same way.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
LECTURE VI. FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. I now enter upon the discussion of the theory, that the goodness, or moral excellence of God is the foundation of moral obligation. To this philosophy I reply, 1. That the reason of obligation, or that which imposes obligation, is identical with the end on which the intention ought…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"twitterCardType":"","cardImageID":0,"cardImage":"","cardTitle":"","cardDesc":"","cardImageAlt":"","cardPlayer":"","cardPlayerWidth":0,"cardPlayerHeight":0,"cardPlayerStream":"","cardPlayerCodec":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5307","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5307","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5307"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5307\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5307"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5307"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5307"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}