LECTURE VII.<\/p>\n
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.<\/p>\n
I now come to consider the philosophy which teaches that moral order is
\nthe foundation of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
But what is moral order? The advocates of this theory define it to be
\nidentical with the fit, proper, suitable. It is, then, according to
\nthem, synonymous with the right. Moral order must be, in their view,
\neither identical with law or with virtue. It must be either an idea of
\nthe fit, the right, the proper, the suitable, which is the same as
\nobjective right; or it must consist in conformity of the will to this
\nidea or law, which is virtue. It has been repeatedly shown that right,
\nwhether objective or subjective, cannot by any possibility be the end
\nat which a moral agent ought to aim, and to which he ought to
\nconsecrate himself. If moral order be not synonymous with right in one
\nof these senses, I do not know what it is; and all that I can say is,
\nthat if it be not identical with the highest well-being of God and of
\nthe universe, it cannot be the end at which moral agents ought to aim,
\nand cannot be the foundation of moral obligation. But if by moral
\norder, as the phraseology of some would seem to indicate, be meant that
\nstate of the universe in which all law is universally obeyed, and, as a
\nconsequence, a state of universal well-being, this theory is only
\nanother name for the true one. It is the same as willing the highest
\nwell-being of the universe, with the conditions and means thereof.<\/p>\n
Or if it be meant, as other phraseology would seem to indicate, that
\nmoral order is a state of things in which either all law is obeyed, or
\nin which the disobedient are punished for the sake of promoting the
\npublic good;–if this be what is meant by moral order, it is only
\nanother name for the true theory. Willing moral order, is only willing
\nthe highest good of the universe for its own sake, with the condition
\nand means thereof.<\/p>\n
But if by moral order be meant the fit, suitable, in the sense of law,
\nphysical or moral, it is absurd to represent moral order as the
\nfoundation of moral obligation. If moral order is the ground of
\nobligation, it is identical with the object of ultimate choice. Does
\nGod require us to love moral order for its own sake? Is this identical
\nwith loving God and our neighbor? “Thou shalt will moral order with all
\nthy heart, and with all thy soul!” Is this the meaning of the moral
\nlaw? If this theory is right, benevolence is sin. It is not living to
\nthe right end.<\/p>\n
Again it is maintained that the nature and relations of moral beings
\nare the true foundation of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
The advocates of this theory confound the conditions of moral
\nobligation with the foundation of obligation. The nature and relations
\nof moral agents to each other, and to the universe, are conditions of
\ntheir obligation to will the good of being, but not the foundation of
\nthe obligation. What! the nature and relations of moral beings the
\nfoundation of their obligation to choose an ultimate end! Then this end
\nmust be their nature and relations. This is absurd. Their nature and
\nrelations being what they are, their highest well-being is known to
\nthem to be of infinite and intrinsic value. But it is and must be the
\nintrinsic value of the end, and not their nature and relations, that
\nimposes obligation to will the highest good of the universe as an
\nultimate end.<\/p>\n
If their nature and relations be the ground of obligation, then their
\nnature and relations are the great object of ultimate choice, and
\nshould be willed for their own sakes, and not for the sake of any good
\nresulting from their nature and relations. For, be it remembered, the
\nground of obligation to put forth ultimate choice must be identical
\nwith the object of this choice, which object imposes obligation by
\nvirtue of its own nature.<\/p>\n
The natures and relations of moral beings are a condition of obligation
\nto fulfil to each other certain duties. For example, the relation of
\nparent and child is a condition of obligation to endeavor to promote
\neach other’s particular well-being, to govern and provide for, on the
\npart of the parent, and to obey, etc., on the part of the child. But
\nthe intrinsic value of the good to be sought by both parent and child
\nmust be the ground, and their relation only the condition, of those
\nparticular forms of obligation. So in every possible case. Relations
\ncan never be a ground of obligation to choose, unless the relations be
\nthe object of the choice. The various duties of life are executive and
\nnot ultimate acts. Obligation to perform them is founded in the
\nintrinsic nature of the good resulting from their performance. The
\nvarious relations of life are only conditions of obligation to promote
\nparticular forms of good, and the good of particular individuals.<\/p>\n
Writers upon this subject are often falling into the mistake of
\nconfounding the conditions with the foundation of moral obligation.
\nMoral agency is a condition, but not the foundation of obligation.
\nLight, or the knowledge of the intrinsically valuable to being, is a
\ncondition, but not the foundation of moral obligation. The
\nintrinsically valuable is the foundation of the obligation; and light,
\nor the perception of the intrinsically valuable, is only a condition of
\nthe obligation. So the nature and relations of moral beings are a
\ncondition of their obligation to will each other’s good, and so is
\nlight, or a knowledge of the intrinsic value of their blessedness; but
\nthe intrinsic value is alone the foundation of the obligation. It is,
\ntherefore, a great mistake to affirm “that the known nature and
\nrelations of moral agents are the true foundation of moral obligation.”<\/p>\n
The next theory that demands attention is that which teaches that moral
\nobligation is founded in the idea of duty.<\/p>\n
According to this philosophy, the end at which a moral agent ought to
\naim, is duty. He must in all things “aim at doing his duty.” Or, in
\nother words, he must always have respect to his obligation, and aim at
\ndischarging it.<\/p>\n
It is plain that this theory is only another form of stating the
\nrightarian theory. By aiming, intending, to do duty, we must understand
\nthe advocates of this theory to mean the adoption of a resolution or
\nmaxim, by which to regulate their lives–the formation of a resolve to
\nobey God–to serve God–to do at all times what appears to be right–to
\nmeet the demands of conscience–to obey the law–to discharge
\nobligation, etc. I have expressed the thing intended in all these ways
\nbecause it is common to hear this theory expressed in all these terms,
\nand in others like them. Especially in giving instruction to inquiring
\nsinners, nothing is more common than for those who profess to be
\nspiritual guides to assume the truth of this philosophy, and give
\ninstructions accordingly. These philosophers, or theologians, will say
\nto sinners: Make up your mind to serve the Lord; resolve to do your
\nwhole duty, and do it at all times; resolve to obey God in all
\nthings–to keep all his commandments; resolve to deny yourselves–to
\nforsake all sin–to love the Lord with all your heart and your neighbor
\nas yourself. They often represent regeneration as consisting in this
\nresolution or purpose.<\/p>\n
Such-like phraseology, which is very common and almost universal among
\nrightarian philosophers, demonstrates that they regard virtue or
\nobedience to God as consisting in the adoption of a maxim of life. With
\nthem, duty is the great idea to be realized. All these modes of
\nexpression mean the same thing, and amount to just Kant’s morality,
\nwhich he admits does not necessarily imply religion, namely: “act upon
\na maxim at all times fit for law universal,” and to Cousin’s, which is
\nthe same thing, namely, “will the right for the sake of the right.” Now
\nI cannot but regard this philosophy on the one hand, and utilitarianism
\non the other, as equally wide from the truth, and as lying at the
\nfoundation of much of the spurious religion with which the church and
\nthe world are cursed. Utilitarianism begets one type of selfishness,
\nwhich it calls religion, and this philosophy begets another, in some
\nrespects more specious, but not a whit the less selfish,
\nGod-dishonoring and soul-destroying. The nearest that this philosophy
\ncan be said to approach either to true morality or religion, is, that
\nif the one who forms the resolution understood himself he would resolve
\nto become truly moral instead of really becoming so. But this is in
\nfact an absurdity and an impossibility, and the resolution-maker does
\nnot understand what he is about, when he supposes himself to be forming
\nor cherishing a resolution to do his duty. Observe, he intends to do
\nhis duty. But to do his duty is to form and cherish an ultimate
\nintention. To intend to do his duty is merely to intend to intend. But
\nthis is not doing his duty, as will be shown. He intends to serve God,
\nbut this is not serving God, as will also be shown. Whatever he
\nintends, he is neither truly moral nor religious, until he really
\nintends the same end that God does; and this is not to do his duty, nor
\nto do right, nor to comply with obligation, nor to keep a conscience
\nvoid of offence, nor to deny himself, nor any such like things. God
\naims at, and intends, the highest well-being of himself and the
\nuniverse, as an ultimate end, and this is doing his duty. It is not
\nresolving or intending to do his duty, but is doing it. It is not
\nresolving to do right for the sake of the right, but it is doing right.
\nIt is not resolving to serve himself and the universe, but is actually
\nrendering that service. It is not resolving to obey the moral law, but
\nis actually obeying it. It is not resolving to love, but actually
\nloving his neighbor as himself. It is not, in other words, resolving to
\nbe benevolent, but is being so. It is not resolving to deny self, but
\nis actually denying self.<\/p>\n
A man may resolve to serve God without any just idea of what it is to
\nserve him. If he had the idea of what the law of God requires him to
\nchoose, clearly before his mind–if he perceived that to serve God, was
\nnothing less than to consecrate himself to the same end to which God
\nconsecrates himself, to love God with all his heart and his neighbor as
\nhimself, that is, to will or choose the highest well-being of God and
\nof the universe, as an ultimate end–to devote all his being,
\nsubstance, time, and influence to this end;–I say, if this idea were
\nclearly before his mind, he would not talk of resolving to consecrate
\nhimself to God–resolving to do his duty, to do right, to serve God, to
\nkeep a conscience void of offence, and such like things. He would see
\nthat such resolutions were totally absurd and a mere evasion of the
\nclaims of God. It has been repeatedly shown, that all virtue resolves
\nitself into the intending of an ultimate end, or of the highest
\nwell-being of God and the universe. This is true morality, and nothing
\nelse is. This is identical with that love to God and man which the law
\nof God requires. This then is duty. This is serving God. This is
\nkeeping a conscience void of offence. This is right, and nothing else
\nis. But to intend or resolve to do this is only to intend to intend,
\ninstead of at once intending what God requires. It is resolving to love
\nGod and his neighbor, instead of really loving him; choosing to choose
\nthe highest well-being of God and of the universe, instead of really
\nchoosing it.<\/p>\n
It is one thing for a man who actually loves God with all his heart and
\nhis neighbor as himself, to resolve to regulate all his outward life by
\nthe law of God, and a totally different thing to intend to love God or
\nto intend his highest glory and well-being. Resolutions may respect
\noutward action, but it is totally absurd to intend or resolve to form
\nan ultimate intention. But be it remembered, that morality and religion
\ndo not belong to outward action, but to ultimate intentions. It is
\namazing and afflicting to witness the alarming extent to which a
\nspurious philosophy has corrupted and is corrupting the church of God.
\nKant and Cousin and Coleridge have adopted a phraseology, and
\nmanifestly have conceived in idea a philosophy subversive of all true
\nlove to God and man, and teach a religion of maxims and resolutions
\ninstead of a religion of love. It is a philosophy, as we shall see in a
\nfuture lecture, which teaches that the moral law or law of right, is
\nentirely distinct from and may be opposite to the law of benevolence or
\nlove. The fact is, this philosophy conceives of duty and right as
\nbelonging to mere outward action. This must be, for it cannot be
\nconfused enough to talk of resolving or intending to form an ultimate
\nintention. Let but the truth of this philosophy be assumed, in giving
\ninstructions to the anxious sinner, and it will immediately dry off his
\ntears, and in all probability lead him to settle down in a religion of
\nresolutions instead of a religion of love. Indeed this philosophy will
\nimmediately dry off, (if I may be allowed the expression,) the most
\ngenuine and powerful revival of religion, and run it down into a mere
\nrevival of a heartless, Christless, loveless philosophy. It is much
\neasier to persuade anxious sinners to resolve to do their duty, to
\nresolve to love God, than it is to persuade them really to do their
\nduty, and really to love God with all their heart and with all their
\nsoul, and their neighbor as themselves.<\/p>\n
We now come to the consideration of that philosophy which teaches the
\ncomplexity of the foundation of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
This theory maintains that there are several distinct grounds of moral
\nobligation; that the highest good of being is only one of the grounds
\nof moral obligation, while right, moral order, the nature and relations
\nof moral agents, merit and demerit, truth, duty, and many such like
\nthings, are distinct grounds of moral obligation, but that each one of
\nthem can by itself impose moral obligation. The advocates of this
\ntheory, perceiving its inconsistency with the doctrine that moral
\nobligation respects the ultimate choice or intention only, seem
\ndisposed to relinquish the position that obligation respects strictly
\nonly the choice of an ultimate end, and to maintain that moral
\nobligation respects the ultimate action of the will. By ultimate action
\nof the will they mean, if I understand them, the will’s treatment of
\neverything according to its intrinsic nature and character; that is
\ntreating every thing, or taking that attitude in respect to every thing
\nknown to the mind, that is exactly suited to what it is in and of
\nitself. For example, right ought to be regarded and treated by the will
\nas right because it is right. Truth ought to be regarded and treated as
\ntruth for its own sake, virtue as virtue, merit as merit, demerit as
\ndemerit, the useful as useful, the beautiful as beautiful, the good or
\nvaluable as valuable, each for its own sake; that in each case the
\naction of the will is ultimate, in the sense that its action terminates
\non these objects as ultimates; in other words, that all those actions
\nof the will are ultimate that treat things according to their nature
\nand character, or according to what they are in and of themselves.<\/p>\n
Now in respect to this theory I would inquire:–What is intended by the
\nwill’s treating a thing, or taking that attitude in respect to it that
\nis suited to its nature and character? Are there any other actions of
\nwill than volitions, choice, preference, intention? Are not all the
\nactions of the will comprehended in these? If there are any other
\nactions than these, are they intelligent actions? If so, what are those
\nactions of will that consist neither in the choice of ends nor means,
\nnor in volitions or efforts to secure an end? Can there be intelligent
\nacts of will that neither respect ends nor means? Can there be moral
\nacts of will when there is no choice or intention? If there is choice
\nor intention, must not these respect an end or means? What then can be
\nmeant by ultimate action of will as distinguished from ultimate choice
\nor intention? Can there be choice without an object of choice? If there
\nis an object of choice, must not this object be chosen either as an end
\nor as a means? If as an ultimate end, how does this differ from
\nultimate intention? If as a means, how can this be regarded as an
\nultimate action of the will? What can be intended by actions of will
\nthat are not acts of choice nor volition? I can conceive of no other.
\nBut if all acts of will must of necessity consist in willing or
\nnilling, that is in choosing or refusing, which is the same as willing
\none way or another, in respect to all objects of choice apprehended by
\nthe mind, how can there be any intelligent act of the will that does
\nnot consist in, or that may not and must not, in its last analysis, be
\nresolvable into, and be properly considered as the choice of an end, or
\nof means, or in executive efforts to secure an end? Can moral law
\nrequire any other action of will than choice and volition? What other
\nactions of will are possible to us? Whatever moral law does require, it
\nmust and can only require choices and volitions. It can only require us
\nto choose ends or means. It cannot require us to choose as an ultimate
\nend anything that is not intrinsically worthy of choice–nor as a means
\nany thing that does not sustain that relation.<\/p>\n
Secondly, let us examine this theory in the light of the revealed law
\nof God. The whole law is fulfilled in one word–love. Now we have seen
\nthat the will of God cannot be the foundation of moral obligation.
\nMoral obligation must be founded in the nature of that which moral law
\nrequires us to choose. Unless there be something in the nature of that
\nwhich moral law requires us to will that renders it worthy or deserving
\nof choice, we can be under no obligation to will or choose it. It is
\nadmitted that the love required by the law of God must consist in an
\nact of the will, and not in mere emotions. Now, does this love,
\nwilling, choice, embrace several distinct ultimates? If so, how can
\nthey all be expressed in one word–love? Observe, the law requires only
\nlove to God and our neighbor as an ultimate. This love or willing must
\nrespect and terminate on God and our neighbor. The law says nothing
\nabout willing right for the sake of the right, or truth for the sake of
\nthe truth, or beauty for the sake of beauty, or virtue for the sake of
\nvirtue, or moral order for its own sake, or the nature and relations of
\nmoral agents for their own sake; nor can any such thing be implied in
\nthe command to love God and our neighbor. All these and innumerable
\nother things are, and must be, conditions and means of the highest
\nwell-being of God and our neighbor. As such, the law may, and doubtless
\ndoes, in requiring us to will the highest well-being of God and our
\nneighbor as an ultimate end, require us to will all these as the
\nnecessary conditions and means. The end which the revealed law requires
\nus to will is undeniably simple as opposed to complex. It requires only
\nlove to God and our neighbor. One word expresses the whole of moral
\nobligation. Now certainly this word cannot have a complex signification
\nin such a sense as to include several distinct and ultimate objects of
\nlove, or of choice. This love is to terminate on God and our neighbor,
\nand not on abstractions, nor on inanimate and insentient existences. I
\nprotest against any philosophy that contradicts the revealed law of
\nGod, and that teaches that anything else than God and our neighbor is
\nto be loved for its own sake, or that anything else is to be chosen as
\nan ultimate end than the highest well-being of God and our neighbor. In
\nother words, I utterly object to any philosophy that makes anything
\nobligatory upon a moral agent that is not expressed or implied in
\nperfect good will to God, and to the universe of sentient existences.
\nTo the word and to the testimony; if any philosophy agree not
\ntherewith, it is because there is no light in it. The revealed law of
\nGod knows but one ground or foundation of moral obligation. It requires
\nbut one thing; and that is just that attitude of the will toward God
\nand our neighbor that accords with the intrinsic value of their highest
\nwell-being; that God’s moral worth shall be willed as of infinite
\nvalue, as a condition of his own well-being, and that his actual and
\nperfect blessedness shall be willed for its own sake, and because, or
\nupon condition that he is worthy; that our neighbor’s moral worth shall
\nbe willed as an indispensable condition of his blessedness, and that if
\nour neighbor is worthy of happiness, his actual and highest happiness
\nshall be willed. This law knows but one end which moral agents are
\nunder obligation to seek, and sets at nought all so-called ultimate
\nactions of will that do not terminate on the good of God and our
\nneighbor. The ultimate choice, with the choice of all the conditions
\nand means of the highest well-being of God and the universe, is all
\nthat the revealed law recognizes as coming within the pale of its
\nlegislation. It requires nothing more and nothing less.<\/p>\n
But there is another form of the complex theory of moral obligation
\nthat I must notice before I dismiss this subject.<\/p>\n
This view admits and maintains that the good, that is, the valuable to
\nbeing, is the only ground of moral obligation, and that in every
\npossible case the valuable to being, or the good, must be intended as
\nan end, as a condition of the intention being virtuous. In this respect
\nit maintains that the foundation of moral obligation is simple, a unit.
\nBut it also maintains that there are several ultimate goods or several
\nultimates or things which are intrinsically good or valuable in
\nthemselves, and are therefore to be chosen for their own sake, or as an
\nultimate end; that to choose either of these as an ultimate end, or for
\nits own sake, is virtue.<\/p>\n
It admits that happiness or blessedness is a good, and should be willed
\nfor its own sake, or as an ultimate end, but it maintains that virtue
\nis an ultimate good; that right is an ultimate good; that the just and
\nthe true are ultimate goods; in short, that the realization of the
\nideas of the reason, or the carrying out into concrete existence any
\nidea of the reason, is an ultimate good. For instance: there were in
\nthe Divine Mind from eternity certain ideas of the good or valuable,
\nthe right, the just, the beautiful, the true, the useful, the holy. The
\nrealization of these ideas of the divine reason, according to this
\ntheory, was the end which God aimed at or intended in creation; he
\naimed at their realization as ultimates or for their own sake, and
\nregarded the concrete realization of every one of these ideas as a
\nseparate and ultimate good: and so certain as God is virtuous, so
\ncertain it is, says this theory, that an intention on our part to
\nrealize these ideas for the sake of the realization is virtue. Then the
\nfoundation of moral obligation is complex in the sense that to will
\neither the good or valuable, the right, the true, the just, the
\nvirtuous, the beautiful, the useful, etc., for its own sake, or as an
\nultimate end, is virtue; and there is more than one virtuous ultimate
\nchoice or intention. Thus any one of several distinct things may be
\nintended as an ultimate end with equal propriety and with equal
\nvirtuousness. The soul may at one moment be wholly consecrated to one
\nend, that is, to one ultimate good, and again to another; that is,
\nsometimes it may will one good, and sometimes another good, as an
\nultimate end, and still be equally virtuous.<\/p>\n
In the discussion of this subject I will inquire: In what does the
\nsupreme and ultimate good consist?<\/p>\n
1. Good may be natural or moral. Natural good is synonymous with
\nvaluable. Moral good is synonymous with virtue. Moral good is in a
\ncertain sense a natural good, that is, it is valuable as a means of
\nnatural good; but the advocates of this theory affirm that moral good
\nis valuable in itself.<\/p>\n
2. Good may be absolute and relative. Absolute good is that which is
\nintrinsically valuable. Relative good is that which is valuable as a
\nmeans. It is not valuable in itself, but valuable because it sustains
\nto absolute good the relation of a means to an end. Absolute good may
\nalso be a relative good, that is, it may tend to perpetuate and augment
\nitself. Absolute good is also ultimate. Ultimate good is that good in
\nwhich all relative good terminates–that good to which all relative
\ngood sustains the relation of a means or condition. Relative good is
\nnot intrinsically valuable, but only valuable on account of its
\nrelations.<\/p>\n
The point upon which issue is taken, is, that enjoyment, blessedness,
\nor mental satisfaction, is the only ultimate good.<\/p>\n
It has been before remarked, and should be repeated here, that the
\nintrinsically valuable must not only belong to, and be inseparable
\nfrom, sentient beings, but that the ultimate or intrinsic absolute good
\nmust consist in a state of mind. It must be something to be found in
\nthe field of consciousness. Take away mind, and what can be a good per
\nse; or what can be a good in any sense?<\/p>\n
Again, it should be said that the ultimate and absolute good can not
\nconsist in a choice or in a voluntary state of mind. The thing chosen
\nis, and must be the ultimate of the choice. Choice can never be chosen
\nas an ultimate end. Benevolence then, or the love required by the law,
\ncan never be the ultimate and absolute good. It is admitted that
\nblessedness, enjoyment, mental satisfaction, is a good, an absolute and
\nultimate good. All men assume it. All men seek enjoyment. That it is
\nthe only absolute and ultimate good, is a first truth. But for this
\nthere could be no activity–no motive to action–no object of choice.
\nEnjoyment is in fact the ultimate good. It is in fact the result of
\nexistence and of action. It results to God from his existence, his
\nattributes, his activity, and his virtue, by a law of necessity. His
\npowers are so correlated that blessedness cannot but be the state of
\nhis mind, as resulting from the exercise of his attributes and the
\nright activity of his will. Happiness, or enjoyment, results, both
\nnaturally and governmentally, from obedience to law both physical and
\nmoral. It also shows that government is not an end, but a means. It
\nalso shows that the end is blessedness, and the means obedience to law.<\/p>\n
The ultimate and absolute good, in the sense of the intrinsically
\nvaluable, cannot be identical with moral law. Moral law, as we have
\nseen, is an idea of the reason. Moral law and moral government must
\npropose some end to be secured by means of law. Law cannot be its own
\nend. It cannot require the subject to seek itself as an ultimate end.
\nThis were absurd. The moral law is nothing else than the reason’s idea,
\nor conception of that course of willing and acting that is fit, proper,
\nsuitable to, and demanded by the nature, relations, necessities, and
\ncircumstances of moral agents. Their nature, relations, circumstances,
\nand wants being perceived, the reason necessarily affirms that they
\nought to propose to themselves a certain end, and to concentrate
\nthemselves to the promotion of this end, for its own sake, or for its
\nown intrinsic value. This end cannot be law itself. The law is a simple
\nand pure idea of the reason, and can never be in itself the supreme,
\nintrinsic, absolute, and ultimate good.<\/p>\n
Nor can obedience, or the course of acting or willing required by the
\nlaw, be the ultimate end aimed at by the law or the lawgiver. The law
\nrequires action in reference to an end, or that an end should be
\nwilled; but the willing, and the end to be willed, cannot be identical.
\nThe action required, and the end to which it is to be directed, cannot
\nbe the same. Obedience to law cannot be the ultimate end proposed by
\nlaw or government. The obedience is one thing, the end to be secured by
\nobedience is and must be another. Obedience must be a means or
\ncondition; and that which law and obedience are intended to secure, is
\nand must be the ultimate end of obedience. The law, or the law-giver,
\naims to promote the highest good, or blessedness of the universe. This
\nmust be the end of moral law and moral government. Law and obedience
\nmust be the means or conditions of this end. To deny this is to deny
\nthe very nature of moral law, and to lose sight of the true and only
\nend of moral government. Nothing can be moral law, and nothing can be
\nmoral government, that does not propose the highest good of moral
\nbeings as its ultimate end. But if this is the end of law, and the end
\nof government, it must be the end to be aimed at, or intended, by the
\nruler and the subject. And this end must be the foundation of moral
\nobligation. The end must be good or valuable per se, or there can be no
\nmoral law requiring it to be sought or chosen as an ultimate end, nor
\nany obligation to choose it as an ultimate end.<\/p>\n
But what is intended by the right, the just, the true, etc., being
\nultimate goods and ends to be chosen for their own sake? These may be
\nobjective or subjective. Objective right, truth, justice, etc., are
\nmere ideas, and cannot be good or valuable in themselves. Subjective
\nright, truth, justice, etc., are synonymous with righteousness,
\ntruthfulness, and justness. These are virtue. They consist in an active
\nstate of the will, and resolve themselves into choice, intention. But
\nwe have repeatedly seen that intention can neither be an end nor a good
\nin itself, in the sense of intrinsically valuable.<\/p>\n
Again, constituted as moral agents are, it is a matter of consciousness
\nthat the concrete realization of the ideas of right, and truth, and
\njustice, of beauty, of fitness, of moral order, and, in short, of all
\nthat class of ideas, is indispensable as the condition and means of
\ntheir highest well-being, and that enjoyment or mental satisfaction is
\nthe result of realizing in the concrete those ideas. This enjoyment or
\nsatisfaction then is and must be the end or ultimate upon which the
\nintention of God must have terminated, and upon which ours must
\nterminate as an end or ultimate.<\/p>\n
Again, the enjoyment resulting to God from the concrete realization of
\nhis own ideas must be infinite. He must therefore have intended it as
\nthe supreme good. It is in fact the ultimate good. It is in fact the
\nsupremely valuable.<\/p>\n
Again, if there is more than one ultimate good, the mind must regard
\nthem all as one, or sometimes be consecrated to one and sometimes to
\nanother–sometimes wholly consecrated to the beautiful, sometimes to
\nthe just, and then again to the right, then to the useful, to the true,
\netc. But it may be asked, of what value is the beautiful, aside from
\nthe enjoyment it affords to sentient existences? It meets a demand of
\nour being, and hence affords satisfaction. But for this in what sense
\ncould it be regarded as good? The idea of the useful, again, cannot be
\nan idea of an ultimate end, for utility implies that something is
\nvaluable in itself to which the useful sustains the relation of a
\nmeans, and is useful only for that reason.<\/p>\n
Of what value is the true, the right, the just, etc., aside from the
\npleasure or mental satisfaction resulting from them to sentient
\nexistences? Of what value were all the rest of the universe, were there
\nno sentient existences to enjoy it?<\/p>\n
Suppose, again, that everything else in the universe existed just as it
\ndoes, except mental satisfaction or enjoyment, and that there were
\nabsolutely no enjoyment of any kind in anything any more than there is
\nin a block of granite, of what value would it all be? and to what, or
\nto whom, would it be valuable? Mind, without susceptibility of
\nenjoyment, can neither know nor be the subject of good or evil, any
\nmore than a slab of marble. Truth in that case could no more be a good
\nto mind than mind could be a good to truth; light would no more be a
\ngood to the eye, than the eye a good to light. Nothing in the universe
\ncould give or receive the least satisfaction or dissatisfaction.
\nNeither natural nor moral fitness nor unfitness could excite the least
\nemotion or mental satisfaction. A block of marble might just as well be
\nthe subject of good as anything else, upon such a supposition.<\/p>\n
Again, it is obvious that all creation, where law is obeyed, tends to
\none end, and that end is happiness or enjoyment. This demonstrates that
\nenjoyment was the end at which God aimed in creation.<\/p>\n
Again, it is evident that God is endeavoring to realize all the other
\nideas of his reason for the sake of, and as a means of, realizing that
\nof the valuable to being. This, as a matter of fact, is the result of
\nrealizing in the concrete all those ideas. This must then have been the
\nend intended.<\/p>\n
It is nonsense to object that, if enjoyment or mental satisfaction be
\nthe only ground of moral obligation, we should be indifferent as to the
\nmeans. This objection assumes that in seeking an end for its intrinsic
\nvalue, we must be indifferent as to the way in which we obtain that
\nend; that is, whether it be obtained in a manner possible or
\nimpossible, right or wrong. It overlooks the fact that from the laws of
\nour own being it is impossible for us to will the end without willing
\nalso the indispensable, and therefore the appropriate, means; and also
\nthat we cannot possibly regard any other conditions or means of the
\nhappiness of moral agents as possible, and therefore as appropriate or
\nright, but holiness and universal conformity to the law of our being.
\nEnjoyment or mental satisfaction results from having the different
\ndemands of our being met. One demand of the reason and conscience of a
\nmoral agent is that happiness should be conditionated upon holiness. It
\nis therefore naturally impossible for a moral agent to be satisfied
\nwith the happiness or enjoyment of moral agents, except upon the
\ncondition of their holiness.<\/p>\n
But this class of philosophers insist that all the archetypes of the
\nideas of the reason are necessarily regarded by us as good in
\nthemselves. For example: I have the idea of beauty. I behold a rose.
\nThe perception of this archetype of the idea of beauty gives me
\ninstantaneous pleasure. Now it is said, that this archetype is
\nnecessarily regarded by me as a good. I have pleasure in the presence
\nand perception of it, and as often as I call it to remembrance. This
\npleasure, it is said, demonstrates that it is a good to me; and this
\ngood is in the very nature of the object, and must be regarded as a
\ngood in itself. To this I answer, that the presence of the rose is a
\ngood to me, but not an ultimate good. It is only a means or source of
\npleasure or happiness to me. The rose is not a good in itself. If there
\nwere no eyes to see it, and no olfactories to smell it, to whom could
\nit be a good? But in what sense can it be a good, except in the sense
\nthat it gives satisfaction to the beholder? The satisfaction, and not
\nthe rose, is and must be the ultimate good. But it is inquired, Do not
\nI desire the rose for its own sake? I answer, Yes; you desire it for
\nits own sake, but you do not, cannot choose it for its own sake, but to
\ngratify the desire. The desires all terminate on their respective
\nobjects. The desire for food terminates on food; thirst terminates on
\ndrink, etc. These things are so correlated to these appetites that they
\nare desired for their own sakes. But they are not and cannot be chosen
\nfor their own sakes or as an ultimate end. They are, and must be,
\nregarded and chosen as the means of gratifying their respective
\ndesires. To choose them simply in obedience to the desire were
\nselfishness. But the gratification is a good, and a part of universal
\ngood. The reason, therefore, urges and demands that they should be
\nchosen as a means of good to myself. When thus chosen in obedience to
\nthe law of the intelligence, and no more stress is laid upon the
\ngratification than in proportion to its relative value, and when no
\nstress is laid upon it simply because it is my own gratification, the
\nchoice is holy. The perception of the archetypes of the various ideas
\nof the reason will, in most instances, produce enjoyment. These
\narchetypes, or, which is the same thing, the concrete realization of
\nthese ideas, is regarded by the mind as a good, but not as an ultimate
\ngood. The ultimate good is the satisfaction derived from the perception
\nof them.<\/p>\n
The perception of moral or physical beauty gives me satisfaction. Now
\nmoral and physical beauty are regarded by me as good, but not as
\nultimate good. They are relative good only. Were it not for the
\npleasure they give me, I could not in any way connect with them the
\nidea of good. The mental eye might perceive order, beauty, physical and
\nmoral, or anything else; but these things would no more be good to the
\nintellect that perceived them than their opposites. The idea of good or
\nof the valuable could not in such a case exist, consequently virtue or
\nmoral beauty, could not exist. The idea of the good, or of the
\nvaluable, must exist before virtue can exist. It is and must be the
\ndevelopment of the idea of the valuable, that develops the idea of
\nmoral obligation, of right and wrong, and consequently that makes
\nvirtue possible. The mind must perceive an object of choice that is
\nregarded as intrinsically valuable, before it can have the idea of
\nmoral obligation to choose it as an end. This object of choice cannot
\nbe virtue or moral beauty, for this would be to have the idea of virtue
\nor of moral beauty before the idea of moral obligation, or of right and
\nwrong. This were a contradiction. The mind must have the idea of some
\nultimate good, the choice of which would be virtue, or concerning which
\nthe reason affirms moral obligation, before the idea of virtue, or of
\nright or wrong, can exist. The development of the idea of the valuable,
\nor of an ultimate good, must precede the possibility of virtue, or of
\nthe idea of virtue, of moral obligation, or of right and wrong. It is
\nabsurd to say that virtue is regarded as an ultimate good, when in fact
\nthe very idea of virtue does not and cannot exist until a good is
\npresented, in view of which, the mind affirms moral obligation to will
\nit for its own sake, and also affirms that the choice of it for that
\nreason would be virtue.<\/p>\n
So virtue or holiness is morally beautiful. Moral worth or excellence
\nis morally beautiful. Beauty is an attribute or element of holiness,
\nvirtue, and of moral worth, or right character. But the beauty is not
\nidentical with holiness or moral worth, any more than the beauty of a
\nrose, and the rose are identical. The rose is beautiful. Beauty is one
\nof its attributes. So virtue is morally beautiful. Beauty is one of its
\nattributes. But in neither case is the beauty a state of mind, and,
\ntherefore, it cannot be an ultimate good.<\/p>\n
We are apt to say, that moral worth is an ultimate good; but it is only
\na relative good. It meets a demand of our being, and thus produces
\nsatisfaction. This satisfaction is the ultimate good of being. At the
\nvery moment we pronounce it a good in itself, it is only because we
\nexperience such a satisfaction in contemplating it. At the very time we
\nerroneously say, that we consider it a good in itself, wholly
\nindependent of its results, we only say so, the more positively,
\nbecause we are so gratified at the time, by thinking of it. It is its
\nexperienced results, that is the ground of the affirmation.<\/p>\n
Thus we see:<\/p>\n
1. That the utility of ultimate choice cannot be a foundation of
\nobligation to choose, for this would be to transfer the ground of
\nobligation from what is intrinsic in the object chosen to the useful
\ntendency of the choice itself. As I have said, utility is a condition
\nof obligation to put forth an executive act, but can never be a
\nfoundation of obligation; for the utility of the choice is not a reason
\nfound exclusively, or at all, in the object of choice.<\/p>\n
2. The moral character of the choice cannot be a foundation of
\nobligation to choose, for this reason is not intrinsic in the object of
\nchoice. To affirm that the character of choice is the ground of
\nobligation to choose, is to transfer the ground of obligation to choose
\nfrom the object chosen to the character of the choice itself; but this
\nis a contradiction of the premises.<\/p>\n
3. The relation of one being to another cannot be the ground of
\nobligation of the one to will good to the other, for the ground of
\nobligation to will good to another must be the intrinsic nature of the
\ngood, and not the relations of one being to another. Relations may be
\nconditions of obligation to seek to promote the good of particular
\nindividuals; but in every case the nature of the good is the ground of
\nthe obligation.<\/p>\n
4. Neither the relation of utility, nor that of moral fitness or right,
\nas existing between choice and its object, can be a ground of
\nobligation, for both these relations depend, for their very existence,
\nupon the intrinsic importance of the object of choice; and besides,
\nneither of these relations is intrinsic in the object of choice, as it
\nmust be to be a ground of obligation.<\/p>\n
5. The relative importance or value of an object of choice can never be
\na ground of obligation to choose that object, for its relative
\nimportance is not intrinsic in the object. But the relative importance,
\nor value, of an object may be a condition of obligation to choose it,
\nas a condition of securing an intrinsically valuable object, to which
\nit sustains the relation of a means.<\/p>\n
6. The idea of duty cannot be a ground of obligation; this idea is a
\ncondition, but never a foundation, of obligation, for this idea is not
\nintrinsic in the object which we affirm it our duty to choose.<\/p>\n
7. The perception of certain relations existing between individuals
\ncannot be a ground, although it is a condition of obligation, to fulfil
\nto them certain duties. Neither the relation itself, nor the perception
\nof the relation, is intrinsic in that which we affirm ourselves to be
\nunder obligation to will or do to them; of course, neither of them can
\nbe a ground of obligation.<\/p>\n
8. The affirmation of obligation by the reason, cannot be a ground,
\nthough it is a condition of obligation. The obligation is affirmed,
\nupon the ground of the intrinsic importance of the object, and not in
\nview of the affirmation itself.<\/p>\n
9. The sovereign will of God is never the foundation, though it often
\nis a condition of certain forms, of obligation. Did we know the
\nintrinsic or relative value of an object, we should be under obligation
\nto choose it, whether God required it or not.<\/p>\n
The revealed will of God is always a condition of obligation, whenever
\nsuch revelation is indispensable to our understanding the intrinsic or
\nrelative importance of any object of choice. The will of God is not
\nintrinsic in the object which he commands us to will, and of course
\ncannot be a ground of obligation.<\/p>\n
10. The moral excellence of a being can never be a foundation of
\nobligation to will his good; for his character is not intrinsic in the
\ngood we ought to will to him. The intrinsic value of that good must be
\nthe ground of the obligation, and his good character only a condition
\nof obligation to will his enjoyment of good in particular.<\/p>\n
Good character can never be a ground of obligation to choose anything
\nwhich is not itself; for the reasons of ultimate choice must be found
\nexclusively in the object of choice. Therefore, if character is a
\nground of obligation to put forth an ultimate choice, it must be the
\nobject of that choice.<\/p>\n
11. Right can never be a ground of obligation, unless right be itself
\nthe object which we are under obligation to choose for its own sake.<\/p>\n
12. Susceptibility for good can never be a ground, though it is a
\ncondition, of obligation to will good to a being. The susceptibility is
\nnot intrinsic in the good which we ought to will, and therefore cannot
\nbe a ground of obligation.<\/p>\n
13. No one thing can be a ground of obligation to choose any other
\nthing, as an ultimate; for the reasons for choosing anything, as an
\nultimate, must be found in itself, and in nothing extraneous to itself.<\/p>\n
14. From the admitted fact, that none but ultimate choice or intention
\nis right or wrong per se, and that all executive volitions, or acts,
\nderive their character from the ultimate intention to which they owe
\ntheir existence, it follows:–<\/p>\n
(a.) That if executive volitions are put forth with the intention to
\nsecure an intrinsically valuable end, they are right; otherwise they
\nare wrong.<\/p>\n
(b.) It also follows, that obligation to put forth executive acts is
\nconditioned, not founded, upon the assumed utility of such acts.
\nAgain–<\/p>\n
(c.) It also follows, that all outward acts are right or wrong, as they
\nproceed from a right or wrong intention.<\/p>\n
(d.) It also follows that the rightness of any executive volition or
\noutward act depends upon the supposed and intended utility of that
\nvolition, or act. Their utility must he assumed as a condition of
\nobligation to put them forth, and, of course, their intended utility is
\na condition of their being right.<\/p>\n
(e.) It also follows that, whenever we decide it to be duty to put
\nforth any outward act whatever, irrespective of its supposed utility,
\nand because we think it right, we deceive ourselves; for it is
\nimpossible that outward acts or volitions, which from their nature are
\nalways executive, should be either obligatory or right, irrespective of
\ntheir assumed utility, or tendency to promote an intrinsically valuable
\nend.<\/p>\n
(f.) It follows also that it is a gross error to affirm the rightness
\nof an executive act, as a reason for putting it forth, even assuming
\nthat its tendency is to do evil rather than good. With this assumption
\nno executive act can possibly be right. When God has required certain
\nexecutive acts, we know that they do tend to secure the highest good,
\nand that, if put forth to secure that good, they are right. But in no
\ncase, where God has not revealed the path of duty, as it respects
\nexecutive acts, or courses of life, are we to decide upon such
\nquestions in view of the rightness, irrespective of the good tendency
\nof such acts or courses of life; for their rightness depends upon their
\nassumed good tendency.<\/p>\n
But it is said that a moral agent may sometimes be under obligation to
\nwill evil instead of good to others. I answer:–<\/p>\n
It can never be the duty of a moral agent to will evil to any being for
\nits own sake, or as an ultimate end. The character and governmental
\nrelations of a being may be such that it may be duty to will his
\npunishment to promote the public good. But in this case good is the end
\nwilled, and misery only a means. So it may be the duty of a moral agent
\nto will the temporal misery of even a holy being to promote the public
\ninterests. Such was the case with the sufferings of Christ. The Father
\nwilled his temporary misery to promote the public good. But in all
\ncases when it is duty to will misery, it is only as a means or
\ncondition of good to the public, or to the individual, and not as an
\nultimate end.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
LECTURE VII. FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. I now come to consider the philosophy which teaches that moral order is the foundation of moral obligation. But what is moral order? The advocates of this theory define it to be identical with the fit, proper, suitable. It is, then, according to them, synonymous with the right. Moral…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"twitterCardType":"","cardImageID":0,"cardImage":"","cardTitle":"","cardDesc":"","cardImageAlt":"","cardPlayer":"","cardPlayerWidth":0,"cardPlayerHeight":0,"cardPlayerStream":"","cardPlayerCodec":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5317","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5317","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5317"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5317\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5317"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5317"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5317"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}