LECTURE VIII.<\/p>\n
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.<\/p>\n
THE PRACTICAL TENDENCY OF THE VARIOUS THEORIES.<\/p>\n
It has already been observed that this is a highly practical question,
\nand one of surpassing interest and importance. I have gone through the
\ndiscussion and examination of the several principal theories, for the
\npurpose of preparing the way to expose the practical results of those
\nvarious theories, and to show that they legitimately result in some of
\nthe most soul-destroying errors that cripple the church and curse the
\nworld.<\/p>\n
1. I will begin with the theory that regards the sovereign will of God
\nas the foundation of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
One legitimate and necessary result of this theory is, a totally
\nerroneous conception both of the character of God, and of the nature
\nand design of his government. If God’s will is the foundation of moral
\nobligation, it follows that he is an arbitrary sovereign. He is not
\nunder law himself, and he has no rule by which to regulate his conduct,
\nnor by which either himself or any other being can judge of his moral
\ncharacter. Indeed, unless he is subject to law, or is a subject of
\nmoral obligation, he has and can have, no moral character; for moral
\ncharacter always and necessarily implies moral law and moral
\nobligation. If God’s will is not itself under the law of his infinite
\nreason, or, in other words, it is not conformed to the law imposed upon
\nit by his intelligence, then his will is and must be arbitrary in the
\nworst sense; that is, in the sense of having no regard to reason, or to
\nthe nature and relations of moral agents. But if his will is under the
\nlaw of his reason, if he acts from principle, or has good and
\nbenevolent reasons for his conduct, then his will is not the foundation
\nof moral obligation, but those reasons that lie revealed in the divine
\nintelligence, in view of which it affirms moral obligation, or that he
\nought to will in conformity with those reasons. In other words, if the
\nintrinsic value of his own well-being and that of the universe be the
\nfoundation of moral obligation; if his reason affirms his obligation to
\nchoose this as his ultimate end, and to consecrate his infinite
\nenergies to the realization of it; and if his will is conformed to this
\nlaw it follows,–<\/p>\n
(1.) That his will is not the foundation of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
(2.) That he has infinitely good and wise reasons for what he wills,
\nsays, and does.<\/p>\n
(3.) That he is not arbitrary, but always acts in conformity with right
\nprinciples, and for reasons that will, when universally known, compel
\nthe respect and even admiration of every intelligent being in the
\nuniverse.<\/p>\n
(4.) That creation and providential and moral government, are the
\nnecessary means to an infinitely wise and good end, and that existing
\nevils are only unavoidably incidental to this infinitely wise and
\nbenevolent arrangement, and, although great, are indefinitely the less
\nof two evils. That is, they are an evil indefinitely less than no
\ncreation and no government would have been. It is conceivable, that a
\nplan of administration might have been adopted that would have
\nprevented the present evils; but if we admit that God has been governed
\nby reason in the selection of the end he has in view, and in the use of
\nmeans for its accomplishment, it will follow that the evils are less
\nthan would have existed under any other plan of administration; or at
\nleast, that the present system, with all its evils, is the best that
\ninfinite wisdom and love could adopt.<\/p>\n
(5.) These incidental evils, therefore, do not at all detract from the
\nevidence of the wisdom and goodness of God; for in all these things he
\nis not acting from caprice, or malice, or an arbitrary sovereignty, but
\nis acting in conformity with the law of his infinite intelligence, and
\nof course has infinitely good and weighty reasons for what he does and
\nsuffers to be done–reasons so good and so weighty, that he could not
\ndo otherwise without violating the law of his own intelligence, and
\ntherefore committing infinite sin.<\/p>\n
(6.) It follows also that there is ground for perfect confidence, love,
\nand submission to his divine will in all things. That is, if his will
\nis not arbitrary, but conformed to the law of his infinite
\nintelligence, then it is obligatory, as our rule of action, because it
\nreveals infallibly what is in accordance with infinite intelligence. We
\nmay always be entirely safe in obeying all the divine requirements, and
\nin submitting to all his dispensations, however mysterious, being
\nassured that they are perfectly wise and good. Not only are we safe in
\ndoing so, but we are under infinite obligation to do so; not because
\nhis arbitrary will imposes obligation, but because it reveals to us
\ninfallibly the end we ought to choose, and the indispensable means of
\nsecuring it. His will is law, not in the sense of its originating and
\nimposing obligation of its own arbitrary sovereignty, but in the sense
\nof its being a revelation of both the end we ought to seek, and the
\nmeans by which the end can be secured. Indeed this is the only proper
\nidea of law. It does not in any case of itself impose obligation, but
\nis only a revelation of obligation. Law is a condition, but not the
\nfoundation, of obligation. The will of God is a condition of
\nobligation, only so far as it is indispensable to our knowledge of the
\nend we ought to seek, and the means by which this end is to be secured.
\nWhere these are known, there is obligation, whether God has revealed
\nhis will or not.<\/p>\n
The foregoing, and many other important truths, little less important
\nthan those already mentioned, and too numerous to be now distinctly
\nnoticed, follow from the fact that the good of being, and not the
\narbitrary will of God, is the foundation of moral obligation. But no
\none of them is or can be true, if his will be the foundation of
\nobligation. Nor can any one, who consistently holds or believes that
\nhis will is the foundation of obligation, hold or believe any of the
\nforegoing truths, nor indeed hold or believe any truth of the law or
\ngospel. Nay, he cannot, if he be at all consistent, have even a correct
\nconception of one truth of God’s moral government. Let us see if he
\ncan.<\/p>\n
(1.) Can he believe that God’s will is wise and good, unless he admits
\nand believes that it is subject to the law of his intelligence? If he
\nconsistently holds that the divine will is the foundation of moral
\nobligation, he must either deny that his will is any evidence of what
\nis wise and good, or maintain the absurdity, that whatever God wills is
\nwise and good, simply for the reason that God wills it, and that if he
\nwilled the directly opposite of what he does, it would be equally wise
\nand good. But this is an absurdity palpable enough to confound any one
\nwho has reason and moral agency.<\/p>\n
(2.) If he consistently holds and believes that God’s sovereign will is
\nthe foundation of moral obligation, he cannot regard him as having any
\nmoral character, for the reason, that there is no standard by which to
\njudge of his willing and acting; for, by the supposition, he has no
\nintelligent rule of action, and, therefore, can have no moral
\ncharacter, as he is not a moral agent, and can himself have no idea of
\nthe moral character of his own actions; for, in fact, upon the
\nsupposition in question, they have none. Any one, therefore, who holds
\nthat God is not a subject of moral law, imposed on him by his own
\nreason, but, on the contrary, that his sovereign will is the foundation
\nof moral obligation, must, if consistent, deny that he has moral
\ncharacter; and he must deny that God is an intelligent being, or else
\nadmit that he is infinitely wicked for not conforming his will to the
\nlaw of his intelligence; and for not being guided by his infinite
\nreason, instead of setting up an arbitrary sovereignty of will.<\/p>\n
(3.) He who holds that God’s sovereign will is the foundation of moral
\nobligation, instead of being a revelation of obligation, if he be at
\nall consistent, can neither have nor assign any good reason either for
\nconfidence in him, or submission to him. If God has no good and wise
\nreasons for what he commands, why should we obey him? If he has no good
\nand wise reasons for what he does, why should we submit to him?<\/p>\n
Will it be answered, that if we refuse, we do it at our peril, and,
\ntherefore, it is wise to do so, even if he has no good reasons for what
\nhe does and requires? To this I answer that it is impossible, upon the
\nsupposition in question, either to obey or submit to God with the
\nheart. If we can see no good reasons, but, on the other hand, are
\nassured there are no good and wise reasons for the divine commands and
\nconduct, it is rendered forever naturally impossible, from the laws of
\nour nature, to render anything more than feigned obedience and
\nsubmission. Whenever we do not understand the reason for a divine
\nrequirement, or of a dispensation of divine Providence, the condition
\nof heart-obedience to the one and submission to the other, is the
\nassumption that he has good and wise reasons for both. But assume the
\ncontrary, to wit, that he has no good and wise reasons for either, and
\nyou render heart-obedience, confidence, and submission impossible. It
\nis perfectly plain, therefore, that he who consistently holds the
\ntheory in question, can neither conceive rightly of God, nor of
\nanything respecting his law, gospel, or government, moral or
\nprovidential. It is impossible for him to have an intelligent piety.
\nHis religion, if he have any, must be sheer superstition, inasmuch as
\nhe neither knows the true God, nor the true reason why he should love,
\nbelieve, obey, or submit to him. In short, he neither knows, nor, if
\nconsistent, can know, anything of the nature of true religion, and has
\nnot so much as a right conception of what constitutes virtue.<\/p>\n
But do not understand me as affirming, that none who profess to hold
\nthe theory in question have any true knowledge of God, or any true
\nreligion. No, they are happily so purely theorists on this subject, and
\nso happily inconsistent with themselves, as to have, after all, a
\npractical judgment in favor of the truth. They do not see the logical
\nconsequences of their theory, and of course do not embrace them, and
\nthis happy inconsistency is an indispensable condition of their
\nsalvation.<\/p>\n
(4.) Another pernicious consequence of this theory is that those who
\nhold it will of course give false directions to inquiring sinners.
\nIndeed, if they be ministers, the whole strain of their instructions
\nmust be false. They must, if consistent, not only represent God to
\ntheir hearers as an absolute and arbitrary sovereign, but they must
\nrepresent religion as consisting in submission to arbitrary
\nsovereignty. If sinners inquire what they must do to be saved, such
\nteachers must answer in substance, that they must cast themselves on
\nthe sovereignty of a God whose law is solely an expression of his
\narbitrary will, and whose every requirement and purpose is founded in
\nhis arbitrary sovereignty. This is the God whom they must love, in whom
\nthey must believe, and whom they must serve with a willing mind. How
\ninfinitely different such instructions are from those that would be
\ngiven by one who knew the truth. Such an one would represent God to an
\ninquirer as infinitely reasonable in all his requirements, and in all
\nhis ways. He would represent the sovereignty of God as consisting, not
\nin arbitrary will, but in benevolence or love, directed by infinite
\nknowledge in the promotion of the highest good of being. He would
\nrepresent his law, not as the expression of his arbitrary will, but as
\nhaving its foundation in the self-existent nature of God, and in the
\nnature of moral agents; as being the very rule which is agreeable to
\nthe nature and relations of moral agents; that its requisitions are not
\narbitrary, hut that the very thing, and only that, is required which is
\nin the nature of things indispensable to the highest well-being of
\nmoral agents; that God’s will does not originate obligation by any
\narbitrary fiat, but on the contrary, that he requires what he does,
\nbecause it is obligatory in the nature of things; that his requirement
\ndoes not create right, but that he requires only that which is
\nnaturally and of necessity right. These and many such like things would
\nirresistibly commend the character of God to the human intelligence, as
\nworthy to be trusted, and as a being to whom submission is infallibly
\nsafe and infinitely reasonable.<\/p>\n
The fact is, the idea of arbitrary sovereignty is shocking and
\nrevolting, not only to the human heart, whether unregenerate or
\nregenerate, but also to the human intelligence. Religion, based upon
\nsuch a view of God’s character and government, must be sheer
\nsuperstition or gross fanaticism.<\/p>\n
2. I will next glance at the legitimate results of the theory of the
\nselfish school.<\/p>\n
This theory teaches that our own interest is the foundation of moral
\nobligation. In conversing with a distinguished defender of this
\nphilosophy, I requested the theorist to define moral obligation, and
\nthis was the definition given: “It is the obligation of a moral agent
\nto seek his own happiness.” Upon the practical bearing of this theory I
\nremark,–<\/p>\n
(1.) It tends directly and inevitably to the confirmation and despotism
\nof sin in the soul. All sin, as we shall hereafter see, resolves itself
\ninto a spirit of self-seeking, or into a disposition to seek good to
\nself, and upon condition of its relations to self, and not impartially
\nand disinterestedly. This philosophy represents this spirit of
\nself-seeking as virtue, and only requires that in our efforts to secure
\nour own happiness, we should not interfere with the rights of others in
\nseeking theirs. But here it may be asked, when these philosophers
\ninsist that virtue consists in willing our own happiness, and that, in
\nseeking it, we are bound to have respect to the rights and happiness of
\nothers, do they mean that we are to have a positive, or merely a
\nnegative regard to the rights and happiness of others? If they mean
\nthat we are to have a positive regard to others’ rights and happiness,
\nwhat is that but giving up their theory, and holding the true one, to
\nwit, that the happiness of each one shall be esteemed according to its
\nintrinsic value, for its own sake? That is, that we should be
\ndisinterestedly benevolent? But if they mean that we are to regard our
\nneighbor’s happiness negatively, that is, merely in not hindering it,
\nwhat is this but the most absurd thing conceivable? What! I need not
\ncare positively for my neighbor’s happiness, I need not will it as a
\ngood in itself, and for its own value, and yet I must take care not to
\nhinder it. But why? Why, because it is intrinsically as valuable as my
\nown. Now, if this is assigning any good reason why I ought not to
\nhinder it, it is just because it is assigning a good reason why I ought
\npositively and disinterestedly to will it; which is the same thing as
\nthe true theory. But if this is not a sufficient reason to impose
\nobligation, positively and disinterestedly, to will it, it can never
\nimpose obligation to avoid hindering it, and I may then pursue my own
\nhappiness in my own way without the slightest regard to that of any
\nother.<\/p>\n
(2.) If this theory be true, sinful and holy beings are precisely
\nalike, so far as ultimate intention is concerned, in which we have seen
\nall moral character consists. They have precisely the same end in view,
\nand the difference lies exclusively in the means they make use of to
\npromote their own happiness. That sinners are seeking their own
\nhappiness, is a truth of consciousness to them. If moral agents are
\nunder obligation to seek their own happiness as the supreme end of
\nlife, it follows, that holy beings do so. So that holy and sinful
\nbeings are precisely alike, so far as the end for which they live is
\nconcerned; the only difference being, as has been observed, in the
\ndifferent means they make use of to promote this end. But observe, no
\nreason can be assigned, in accordance with this philosophy, why they
\nuse different means, only that they differ in judgment in respect to
\nthem; for, let it be remembered, that this philosophy denies that we
\nare bound to have a positive and disinterested regard to our neighbor’s
\ninterest; and, of course, no benevolent considerations prevent the holy
\nfrom using the same means as do the wicked. Where, therefore, is the
\ndifference in their character, although they do use this diversity of
\nmeans? I say again, there is none. If this difference be not ascribed
\nto disinterested benevolence in one, and to selfishness in the other,
\nthere really is and can be no difference in character between them.
\nAccording to this theory nothing is right in itself, but the intention
\nto promote my own happiness; and anything is right or wrong as it is
\nintended to promote this result or otherwise. For let it be borne in
\nmind that, if moral obligation respects strictly the ultimate intention
\nonly, it follows that ultimate intention alone is right or wrong in
\nitself, and all other things are right or wrong as they proceed from a
\nright or wrong ultimate intention. This must be true.<\/p>\n
Further, if my own happiness be the foundation of my moral obligation,
\nit follows that this is the ultimate end at which I ought to aim, and
\nthat nothing is right or wrong in itself, in me, but this intention or
\nits opposite; and furthermore, that everything else must be right or
\nwrong in me as it proceeds from this, or from an opposite intention. I
\nmay do, and upon the supposition of the truth of this theory, I am
\nbound to do, whatever will, in my estimation, promote my own happiness,
\nand that, not because of its intrinsic value as a part of universal
\ngood, but because it is my own. To seek it as a part of universal
\nhappiness, and not because it is my own, would be to act on the true
\ntheory, or the theory of disinterested benevolence; which this theory
\ndenies.<\/p>\n
(3.) Upon this theory I am not to love God supremely, and my neighbor
\nas myself. If I love God and my neighbor, it is to be only as a means
\nof promoting my own happiness, which is not loving them, but loving
\nmyself supremely.<\/p>\n
(4.) This theory teaches radical error in respect both to the character
\nand government of God; and the consistent defenders of it cannot but
\nhold fundamentally false views in respect to what constitutes holiness
\nor virtue, either in God or man. They do not and cannot know the
\ndifference between virtue and vice.<\/p>\n
(5.) The teachers of this theory must fatally mislead all who
\nconsistently follow out their instructions. In preaching, they must, if
\nconsistent, appeal wholly to hope and fear. All their instructions must
\ntend to confirm selfishness. All the motives they present, if
\nconsistent, tend only to stir up a zeal within them to secure their own
\nhappiness. If they pray, it will only be to implore the help of God to
\naccomplish their selfish ends.<\/p>\n
Indeed, it is impossible that this theory should not blind its
\nadvocates to the fundamental truths of morality and religion, and it is
\nhardly conceivable that one could more efficiently serve the devil than
\nby the inculcation of such a philosophy as this.<\/p>\n
3. Let us in the next place look into the natural and, if its advocates
\nare consistent, necessary results of utilitarianism.<\/p>\n
This theory, you know, teaches that the utility of an action or of a
\nchoice, renders it obligatory. That is, I am bound to will good, not
\nfor the intrinsic value of the good; but because willing good tends to
\nproduce good–to choose an end, not because of the intrinsic value of
\nthe end, but because the willing of it tends to secure it. The
\nabsurdity of this theory has been sufficiently exposed. It only remains
\nto notice its legitimate practical results.<\/p>\n
(1.) It naturally, and I may say, necessarily diverts the attention
\nfrom that in which all morality consists, namely, the ultimate
\nintention. Indeed, it seems that the abettors of this scheme must have
\nin mind only outward action, or at most executive volitions, when they
\nassert that the tendency of an action is the reason of the obligation
\nto put it forth. It seems impossible that they should assert that the
\nreason for choosing an ultimate end should or could be the tendency of
\nchoice to secure it. This is so palpable a contradiction, that it is
\ndifficult to believe that they have ultimate intention in mind when
\nthey make the assertion. An ultimate end is ever chosen for its
\nintrinsic value, and not because choice tends to secure it. How, then,
\nis it possible for them to hold that the tendency of choice to secure
\nan ultimate end is the reason of an obligation to make that choice? But
\nif they have not their eye upon ultimate intention, when they speak of
\nmoral obligation, they are discoursing of that which is, strictly
\nwithout the pale of morality. A consistent utilitarian, therefore,
\ncannot conceive rightly of the nature of morality or virtue. He cannot
\nconsistently hold that virtue consists in willing the highest
\nwell-being of God and of the universe as an ultimate end, or for its
\nown sake, but must, on the contrary, confine his ideas of moral
\nobligation to volitions and outward actions, in which there is strictly
\nno morality, and withal assign an entirely false reason for these, to
\nwit, their tendency to secure an end, rather than the value of the end
\nwhich they tend to secure.<\/p>\n
This is the proper place to speak of the doctrine of expediency, a
\ndoctrine strenuously maintained by utilitarians, and as strenuously
\nopposed by rightarians. It is this, that whatever is expedient is
\nright, for the reason, that the expediency of an action or measure is
\nthe foundation of the obligation to put forth that action, or adopt
\nthat measure. It is easy to see that this is just equivalent to saying,
\nthat the utility of an action or measure is the reason of the
\nobligation to put forth that action or to adopt that measure. But, as
\nwe have seen, utility, tendency, expediency, is only a condition of the
\nobligation, to put forth outward action or executive volition, but
\nnever the foundation of the obligation–that always being the intrinsic
\nvalue of the end to which the volition, action, or measure, sustains
\nthe relation of a means. I do not wonder that rightarians object to
\nthis, although I do wonder at the reason which, if consistent, they
\nmust assign for this obligation, to wit, that any action or volition,
\n(ultimate intention excepted), can be right or wrong in itself,
\nirrespective of its expediency or utility. This is absurd enough, and
\nflatly contradicts the doctrine of rightarians themselves, that moral
\nobligation strictly belongs only to ultimate intention. If moral
\nobligation belongs only to ultimate intention, then nothing but
\nultimate intention can be right or wrong in itself. And every thing
\nelse, that is, all executive volitions and outward actions must be
\nright or wrong, (in the only sense in which moral character can be
\npredicated of them) as they proceed from a right or wrong ultimate
\nintention. This is the only form in which rightarians can consistently
\nadmit the doctrine of expediency, viz., that it relates exclusively to
\nexecutive volitions and outward actions. And this they can admit only
\nupon the assumption that executive volitions and outward actions have
\nstrictly no moral character in themselves, but are right or wrong only
\nas, and because, they proceed necessarily from a right or wrong
\nultimate intention. All schools that hold this doctrine, to wit, that
\nmoral obligation respects the ultimate intention only, must, if
\nconsistent, deny that any thing can be either right or wrong per se,
\nbut ultimate intention. Further, they must maintain, that utility,
\nexpediency, or tendency to promote the ultimate end upon which ultimate
\nintention terminates, is always a condition of the obligation to put
\nforth those volitions and actions that sustain to this end the relation
\nof means. And still further, they must maintain, that the obligation to
\nuse those means must be founded in the value of the end, and not in the
\ntendency of the means to secure it; for unless the end be intrinsically
\nvaluable, the tendency of means to secure it can impose no obligation
\nto use them. Tendency, utility, expediency, then, are only conditions
\nof the obligation to use any given means, but never the foundation of
\nobligation. The obligation in respect to outward action is always
\nfounded in the value of the end to which this action sustains the
\nrelation of a means, and the obligation is conditionated upon the
\nperceived tendency of the means to secure that end. Expediency can
\nnever have respect to the choice of an ultimate end, or to that in
\nwhich moral character consists, to wit, ultimate intention. The end is
\nto be chosen for its own sake. Ultimate intention is right or wrong in
\nitself, and no questions of utility, expediency, or tendency, have any
\nthing to do with the obligation to put forth ultimate intention, there
\nbeing only one ultimate reason for this, namely, the intrinsic value of
\nthe end itself. It is true, then, that whatever is expedient is right,
\nnot for that reason, but only upon that condition. The inquiry then, Is
\nit expedient? in respect to outward action, is always proper; for upon
\nthis condition does obligation to outward action turn. But in respect
\nto ultimate intention, or the choice of an ultimate end, an inquiry
\ninto the expediency of this choice or intention is never proper, the
\nobligation being founded alone upon the perceived and intrinsic value
\nof the end, and the obligation being without any condition whatever,
\nexcept the possession of the powers of moral agency, with the
\nperception of the end upon which intention ought to terminate, namely,
\nthe good of universal being. But the mistake of the utilitarian, that
\nexpediency is the foundation of moral obligation, is fundamental, for,
\nin fact, it cannot be so in any case whatever. I have said, and here
\nrepeat, that all schools that hold that moral obligation respects
\nultimate intention only, must, if consistent, maintain that perceived
\nutility, expediency, etc., is a condition of obligation to put forth
\nany outward action, or, which is the same thing, to use any means to
\nsecure the end of benevolence. Therefore, in practice or in daily life,
\nthe true doctrine of expediency must of necessity have a place. The
\nrailers against expediency, therefore, know not what they say nor
\nwhereof they affirm. It is, however, impossible to proceed in practice
\nupon the utilitarian philosophy. This teaches that the tendency of an
\naction to secure good, and not the intrinsic value of the good, is the
\nfoundation of the obligation to put forth that action. But this is too
\nabsurd for practice. For, unless the intrinsic value of the end be
\nassumed as the foundation of the obligation to choose it, it is
\nimpossible to affirm obligation to put forth an action to secure that
\nend. The folly and the danger of utilitarianism is, that it overlooks
\nthe true foundation of moral obligation, and consequently the true
\nnature of virtue or holiness. A consistent utilitarian cannot conceive
\nrightly of either.<\/p>\n
The teachings of a consistent utilitarian must of necessity abound with
\npernicious error. Instead of representing virtue as consisting in
\ndisinterested benevolence, or in the consecration of the soul to the
\nhighest good of being in general, for its own sake, it must represent
\nit as consisting wholly in using means to promote good:–that is, as
\nconsisting wholly in executive volitions and outward actions, which,
\nstrictly speaking, have no moral character in them. Thus consistent
\nutilitarianism inculcates fundamentally false ideas of the nature of
\nvirtue. Of course it must teach equally erroneous ideas respecting the
\ncharacter of God–the spirit and meaning of his law–the nature of
\nrepentance–of sin–of regeneration–and, in short, of every practical
\ndoctrine of the Bible.<\/p>\n
4. Practical bearings and tendency of rightarianism.<\/p>\n
It will be recollected that this philosophy teaches that right is the
\nfoundation of moral obligation. With its advocates, virtue consists in
\nwilling the right for the sake of the right, instead of willing the
\ngood for the sake of the good, or more strictly, in willing the good
\nfor the sake of the right, and not for the sake of the good; or, as we
\nhave seen, the foundation of obligation consists in the relation of
\nintrinsic fitness existing between the choice and the good. The right
\nis the ultimate end to be aimed at in all things, instead of the
\nhighest good of being for its own sake. From such a theory the
\nfollowing consequences must flow. I speak only of consistent
\nrightarianism.<\/p>\n
(1.) If the rightarian theory is true, there is a law of right entirely
\ndistinct from, and opposed to, the law of love or benevolence. The
\nadvocates of this theory often assume, perhaps unwittingly, the
\nexistence of such a law. They speak of multitudes of things as being
\nright or wrong in themselves, entirely independent of the law of
\nbenevolence. Nay, they go so far as to affirm it conceivable that doing
\nright might necessarily tend to, and result in, universal misery; and
\nthat, in such a case, we should be under obligation to do right, or
\nwill right, or intend right, although universal misery should be the
\nnecessary result. This assumes and affirms that right has no necessary
\nrelation to willing the highest good of being for its own sake, or,
\nwhat is the same thing, that the law of right is not only distinct from
\nthe law of benevolence, but may be directly opposed to it; that a moral
\nagent may be under obligation to will as an ultimate end that which he
\nknows will and must, by a law of necessity, promote and secure
\nuniversal misery. Rightarians sternly maintain that right would be
\nright, and that virtue would be virtue, although this result were a
\nnecessary consequence. What is this but maintaining that moral law may
\nrequire moral agents to set their hearts upon and consecrate themselves
\nto that which is necessarily subversive of the well-being of the entire
\nuniverse? And what is this but assuming that that may be moral law that
\nrequires a course of willing and acting entirely inconsistent with the
\nnature and relations of moral agents? Thus virtue and benevolence not
\nonly may be different but opposite things; and benevolence may be sin.
\nThis is not only opposed to our reason, but a more capital or
\nmischievous error in morals or philosophy can hardly be conceived.<\/p>\n
Nothing is or can be right, as an ultimate choice, but benevolence.
\nNothing can be moral law but that which requires that the highest
\nwell-being of God and of the universe should be chosen as an ultimate
\nend. If benevolence is right, this must be self-evident. Rightarianism
\noverlooks and misrepresents the very nature of moral law. Let any one
\ncontemplate the grossness of the absurdity that maintains, that moral
\nlaw may require a course of willing that necessarily results in
\nuniversal and perfect misery. What then, it may be asked, has moral law
\nto do with the nature and relations of moral agents, except to mock,
\ninsult, and trample them under foot? Moral law is, and must be, the law
\nof nature, that is, suited to the nature and relations of moral agents.
\nBut can that law be suited to the nature and relations of moral agents
\nthat requires a course of action necessarily resulting in universal
\nmisery? Rightarianism then, not only overlooks, but flatly contradicts,
\nthe very nature of moral law, and sets up a law of right in direct
\nopposition to the law of nature.<\/p>\n
(2.) This philosophy tends naturally to fanaticism. Conceiving as it
\ndoes of right as distinct from, and often opposed to, benevolence, it
\nscoffs or rails at the idea of inquiring what the highest good
\nevidently demands. It insists that such and such things are right or
\nwrong in themselves, entirely irrespective of what the highest good
\ndemands. Having thus in mind a law of right distinct from, and perhaps,
\nopposed to benevolence, what frightful conduct may not this philosophy
\nlead to? This is indeed the law of fanaticism. The tendency of this
\nphilosophy is illustrated in the spirit of many reformers, who are
\nbitterly contending for the right, which, after all, is to do nobody
\nany good.<\/p>\n
(3.) This philosophy teaches a false morality and a false religion. It
\nexalts right above God, and represents virtue as consisting in the love
\nof right instead of the love of God. It exhorts men to will the right
\nfor the sake of the right, instead of the good of being for the sake of
\nthe good, or for the sake of being. It teaches us to inquire, How shall
\nI do right? instead of, How shall I do good? What is right? instead of,
\nWhat will most promote the good of the universe? Now that which is most
\npromotive of the highest good of being, is right. To intend the highest
\nwell-being of God and of the universe, is right. To use the necessary
\nmeans to promote this end, is right; and whatever in the use of means
\nor in outward action is right, is so for this reason, namely, that it
\nis designed to promote the highest well-being of God and of the
\nuniverse. But rightarianism points out an opposite course. It says:
\nWill right for the sake of the right, that is, as an end; and in
\nrespect to means, inquire not what is manifestly for the highest good
\nof being, for with this you have nothing to do; your business is to
\nwill the right for the sake of the right. If you inquire how you are to
\nknow what is right, it does not direct you to the law of benevolence as
\nthe only standard, but it directs you to an abstract idea of right, as
\nan ultimate rule, having no regard to the law of benevolence or love.
\nIt tells you that right is right, because it is right; and not that
\nright is conformity to the law of benevolence, and right for this
\nreason. Now certainly such teaching is radically false, and subversive
\nof all sound morality and true religion.<\/p>\n
(4.) As we have formerly seen, this philosophy does not represent
\nvirtue as consisting in the love of God, or of Christ, or our neighbor.
\nConsistency must require the abettors of this scheme to give
\nfundamentally false instructions to inquiring sinners. Instead of
\nrepresenting God and all holy beings as devoted to the public good, and
\ninstead of exhorting sinners to love God and their neighbor, this
\nphilosophy must represent God and holy beings as consecrated to right
\nfor the sake of the right; and must exhort sinners, who ask what they
\nshall do to be saved, to will the right for the sake of the right, to
\nlove the right, to deify right, and fall down and worship it. There is
\nmuch of this false morality and religion in the world and in the
\nchurch. Infidels are great sticklers for this religion, and often
\nexhibit as much of it as do some rightarian professors of religion. It
\nis a severe, stern, loveless, Godless, Christless philosophy, and
\nnothing but happy inconsistency prevents its advocates from manifesting
\nit in this light to the world. The law of right, when conceived of as
\ndistinct from, or opposed to, the law of benevolence, is a perfect
\nstrait-jacket, an iron collar, a snare of death.<\/p>\n
This philosophy represents all war, all slavery, and many things as
\nwrong per se, without insisting upon such a definition of those things
\nas necessarily implies selfishness. Any thing whatever is wrong in
\nitself that includes and implies selfishness, and nothing else is or
\ncan be. All war waged for selfish purposes is wrong per se. But war
\nwaged for benevolent purposes, or war required by the law of
\nbenevolence, and engaged in with a benevolent design, is neither wrong
\nin itself, nor wrong in any proper sense. All holding men in bondage
\nfrom selfish motives is wrong in itself, but holding men in bondage in
\nobedience to the law of benevolence is not wrong but right. And so it
\nis with every thing else. Therefore, where it is insisted that all war
\nand all slavery, or any thing else is wrong in itself, such a
\ndefinition of things must be insisted on as necessarily implies
\nselfishness. But consistent rightarianism will insist that all war, all
\nslavery, and all of many other things, are wrong in themselves without
\nregard to their being violations of the law of benevolence. This is
\nconsistent with such philosophy, but it is most false and absurd in
\nfact. Indeed, any philosophy that assumes the existence of a law of
\nright distinct from, and possibly opposed to, the law of benevolence,
\nmust teach many doctrines at war with both reason and revelation. It
\nsets men in chase of a philosophical abstraction as the supreme end of
\nlife, instead of the concrete reality of the highest well-being of God
\nand the universe. It preys upon the human soul, and turns into solid
\niron all the tender sensibilities of our being. Do but contemplate a
\nhuman being supremely devoted to an abstraction, as the end of human
\nlife. He wills the right for the sake of the right. Or, more strictly,
\nhe wills the good of being, not from any regard to being, but because
\nof the relation of intrinsic fitness or rightness existing between
\nchoice and its object. For this he lives, and moves, and has his being.
\nWhat sort of religion is this? I wish not to be understood as holding,
\nor insinuating, that professed rightarians universally, or even
\ngenerally, pursue their theory to its legitimate boundary, or that they
\nmanifest the spirit that it naturally begets. No, I am most happy in
\nacknowledging that with many, and perhaps with most of them, it is so
\npurely a theory, that they are not greatly influenced by it in
\npractice. Many of them I regard as the excellent of the earth, and I am
\nhappy to count them among my dearest and most valued friends. But I
\nspeak of the philosophy, with its natural results, when embraced not
\nmerely as a theory, but when adopted by the heart as the rule of life.
\nIt is only in such cases that its natural and legitimate fruits appear.
\nOnly let it be borne in mind that right is conformity to moral law,
\nthat moral law is the law of nature, or the law founded in the nature
\nand relations of moral agents, the law that requires just that course
\nof willing and action that tends naturally to secure the highest
\nwell-being of all moral agents, that requires this course of willing
\nand acting for the sake of the end in which it naturally and
\ngovernmentally results, and requires that this end shall be aimed at or
\nintended by all moral agents as the supreme good and the only ultimate
\nend of life;–I say, only let these truths be borne in mind, and you
\nwill never talk of a right, or a virtue, or a law, obedience to which
\nnecessarily results in universal misery; nor will you conceive that
\nsuch a thing is possible.<\/p>\n
5. Lastly, I come to the consideration of the practical bearings of
\nwhat I regard as the true theory of the foundation of moral obligation,
\nnamely, that the intrinsic nature and value of the highest well-being
\nof God and of the universe is the sole foundation of moral obligation.<\/p>\n
Upon this philosophy I remark–<\/p>\n
That if this be true, the whole subject of moral obligation is
\nperfectly simple and intelligible; so plain, indeed, that “the
\nwayfaring man, though a fool, cannot err therein.”<\/p>\n
Upon this theory, every moral agent knows in every possible instance
\nwhat is right, and can never mistake his real duty.<\/p>\n
His duty is to will this end with all the known conditions and means
\nthereof. Intending this end with a single eye, and doing what appears
\nto him, with all the light he can obtain, to be in the highest degree
\ncalculated to secure this end, he really does his duty. If in this case
\nhe is mistaken in regard to what is the best means of securing this
\nend, still, with a benevolent intention, he does not sin. He has done
\nright, for he has intended as he ought, and acted outwardly as he
\nthought was the path of duty, under the best light he could obtain.
\nThis, then, was his duty. He did not mistake his duty; because it was
\nduty to intend as he intended, and under the circumstances, to act as
\nhe acted. How else should he have acted?<\/p>\n
If a moral agent can know what end he aims at or lives for, he can
\nknow, and cannot but know, at all times, whether he is right or wrong.
\nAll that upon this theory a moral agent needs to be certain of is,
\nwhether he lives for the right end, and this, if at all honest, or if
\ndishonest, he really cannot but know. If he would ask, what is right or
\nwhat is duty at any time, he need not wait for a reply. It is right for
\nhim to intend the highest good of being as an end. If he honestly does
\nthis, he cannot mistake his duty, for in doing this he really performs
\nthe whole of duty. With this honest intention, it is impossible that he
\nshould not use the means to promote this end, according to the best
\nlight he has; and this is right. A single eye to the highest good of
\nGod and the universe, is the whole of morality, strictly considered;
\nand, upon this theory, moral law, moral government, moral obligation,
\nvirtue, vice, and the whole subject of morals and religion are the
\nperfection of simplicity. If this theory be true, no honest mind ever
\nmistook the path of duty. To intend the highest good of being is right
\nand is duty. No mind is honest that is not steadily pursuing this end.
\nBut in the honest pursuit of this end there can be no sin, no mistaking
\nthe path of duty. That is and must be the path of duty that really
\nappears to a benevolent mind to be so. That is, it must be his duty to
\nact in conformity with his honest convictions. This is duty, this is
\nright. So, upon this theory, no one who is truly honest in pursuing the
\nhighest good of being, ever did or can mistake his duty in any such
\nsense as to commit sin.<\/p>\n
I have spoken with great plainness, and perhaps with some severity, of
\nthe several systems of error, as I cannot but regard them, upon the
\nmost fundamental and important of subjects; not certainly from any want
\nof love to those who hold them, but from a concern, long cherished and
\ngrowing upon me, for the honor of truth and for the good of being.
\nShould any of you ever take the trouble to look into this subject, in
\nits length and breadth, and read the various systems, and take the
\ntrouble to trace out their practical results, as actually developed in
\nthe opinions and practices of men, you certainly would not be at a loss
\nto account for the theological and philosophical fogs that so bewilder
\nthe world. How can it be otherwise, while such confusion of opinion
\nprevails upon the fundamental question of morals and religion?<\/p>\n
How is it, that there is so much profession and so little real
\npractical benevolence in the world? Multitudes of professed Christians
\nseem to have no conception that benevolence constitutes true religion;
\nthat nothing else does; and that selfishness is sin, and totally
\nincompatible with religion. They live on in their self-indulgences, and
\ndream of heaven. This could not be, if the true idea of religion, as
\nconsisting in sympathy with the benevolence of God, was fully developed
\nin their minds.<\/p>\n
I need not dwell upon the practical bearings of the other theories
\nwhich I have examined; what I have said may suffice, as an illustration
\nof the importance of being well-established in this fundamental truth.
\nIt is affecting to see what conceptions multitudes entertain in regard
\nto the real spirit and meaning of the law and gospel of God, and,
\nconsequently, of the nature of holiness.<\/p>\n
In dismissing this subject, I would remark, that any system of moral
\nphilosophy that does not correctly define a moral action, and the real
\nground of obligation, must be fundamentally defective. Nay, if
\nconsistent, it must be highly pernicious and dangerous. But let moral
\naction be clearly and correctly defined, let the true ground of
\nobligation be clearly and correctly stated; and let both these be kept
\nconstantly in view, and such a system would be of incalculable value.
\nIt would be throughout intelligible, and force conviction upon every
\nintelligent reader. But I am not aware that any such system exists. So
\nfar as I know, they are all faulty, either in their definition of a
\nmoral action, and do not fasten the eye upon the ultimate intention,
\nand keep it there as being the seat of moral character, and that from
\nwhich the character of all our actions is derived; or they soon forget
\nthis, and treat mere executive acts as right or wrong, without
\nreference to the ultimate intention. I believe they have all failed in
\nnot clearly defining the true ground of obligation, and, consequently,
\nare faulty in their definition of virtue.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
LECTURE VIII. FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. THE PRACTICAL TENDENCY OF THE VARIOUS THEORIES. It has already been observed that this is a highly practical question, and one of surpassing interest and importance. I have gone through the discussion and examination of the several principal theories, for the purpose of preparing the way to expose the…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"twitterCardType":"","cardImageID":0,"cardImage":"","cardTitle":"","cardDesc":"","cardImageAlt":"","cardPlayer":"","cardPlayerWidth":0,"cardPlayerHeight":0,"cardPlayerStream":"","cardPlayerCodec":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5430","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5430","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5430"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5430\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5430"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5430"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5430"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}