LECTURE IX.<\/p>\n
UNITY OF MORAL ACTION.<\/p>\n
CAN OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW BE PARTIAL?<\/p>\n
1. What constitutes obedience to moral law?<\/p>\n
We have seen in former lectures, that disinterested benevolence is all
\nthat the spirit of moral law requires; that is, that the love which it
\nrequires to God and our neighbor is good-willing, willing the highest
\ngood or well-being of God, and of being in general, as an end, or for
\nits own sake; that this willing is a consecration of all the powers, so
\nfar as they are under the control of the will, to this end. Entire
\nconsecration to this end must of course constitute obedience to the
\nmoral law. The next question is: Can consecration to this end be real,
\nand yet partial in the sense of not being entire, for the time being?
\nThis conducts us to the second proposition, namely,–<\/p>\n
2. That obedience cannot be partial in the sense that the subject ever
\ndoes, or can, partly obey and partly disobey at the same time.<\/p>\n
That is, consecration, to be real, must be, for the time being, entire
\nand universal. It will be seen that this discussion respects the
\nsimplicity of moral action, that is whether the choices of the will
\nthat have any degree of conformity to moral law, are always and
\nnecessarily wholly conformed or wholly disconformed to it. There are
\ntwo distinct branches to this inquiry.<\/p>\n
(1.) The one is, Can the will at the same time make opposite choices?
\nCan it choose the highest good of being as an ultimate end, and at the
\nsame time choose any other ultimate end, or make any choices whatever
\ninconsistent with this ultimate choice?<\/p>\n
(2.) The second branch of this inquiry respects the strength or
\nintensity of the choice. Suppose but one ultimate choice can exist at
\nthe same time, may not that choice be less efficient and intense than
\nit ought to be? Let us take up these two inquiries in their order.<\/p>\n
(1.) Can the will at the same time choose opposite and conflicting
\nultimate ends? While one ultimate end is chosen, can the will choose
\nanything inconsistent with this end? In reply to the first branch of
\nthis inquiry I observe,<\/p>\n
(a) That the choice of an ultimate end is, and must be, the supreme
\npreference of the mind. Sin is the supreme preference of
\nself-gratification. Holiness is the supreme preference of the good of
\nbeing. Can then two supreme preferences co-exist in the same mind? It
\nis plainly impossible to make opposite choices at the same time, that
\nis, to choose opposite and conflicting ultimate ends.<\/p>\n
(b) All intelligent choice, as has been formerly shown, must respect
\nends or means. Choice is synonymous with intention. If there is a
\nchoice or intention, of necessity something must be chosen or intended.
\nThis something must he chosen for its own sake, or as an end, or for
\nthe sake of something else to which it sustains the relation of a
\nmeans. To deny this were to deny that the choice is intelligent. But we
\nare speaking of no other than intelligent choice, or the choice of a
\nmoral agent.<\/p>\n
(c) This conducts us to the inevitable conclusion–that no choice
\nwhatever can be made, inconsistent with the present choice of an
\nultimate end. The mind cannot choose one ultimate end, and choose at
\nthe same time another ultimate end. But if this cannot be, it is plain
\nthat it cannot choose one ultimate end, and at the same time, while in
\nthe exercise of that choice, choose the means to secure some other
\nultimate end, which other end is not chosen. But if all choice must
\nnecessarily respect ends or means, and if the mind can choose but one
\nultimate end at a time, it follows that, while in the exercise of one
\nchoice, or while in the choice of one ultimate end, the mind cannot
\nchoose, for the time being, anything inconsistent with that choice. The
\nmind, in the choice of an ultimate end, is shut up to the necessity of
\nwilling the means to accomplish that end; and before it can possibly
\nwill means to secure any other ultimate end, it must change its choice
\nof an end. If, for example, the soul chooses the highest well-being of
\nGod and the universe as an ultimate end, it cannot while it continues
\nto choose that end, use or choose the means to effect any other end. It
\ncannot, while this choice continues, choose self-gratification, or
\nanything else as an ultimate end, nor can it put forth any volition
\nwhatever known to be inconsistent with this end. Nay, it can put forth
\nno intelligent volition whatever that is not designed to secure this
\nend. The only possible choice inconsistent with this end is the choice
\nof another ultimate end. When this is done, other means can be used or
\nchosen, and not before. This, then, is plain, to wit, that obedience to
\nmoral law cannot be partial, in the sense either that the mind can
\nchoose two opposite ultimate ends at the same time, or that it can
\nchoose one ultimate end, and at the same time use or choose means to
\nsecure any other ultimate end. It “cannot serve God and mammon.” It
\ncannot will the good of being as an ultimate end, and at the same time
\nwill self-gratification as an ultimate end. In other words, it cannot
\nbe selfish and benevolent at the same time. It cannot choose as an
\nultimate end the highest good of being, and at the same time choose to
\ngratify self as an ultimate end. Until self-gratification is chosen as
\nan end, the mind cannot will the means of self gratification. This
\ndisposes of the first branch of the inquiry.<\/p>\n
(2.) The second branch of the inquiry respects the strength or
\nintensity of the choice. May not the choice of an end be real, and yet
\nhave less than the required strength or intensity? The inquiry resolves
\nitself into this: Can the mind honestly intend or choose an ultimate
\nend, and yet not choose it with all the strength or intensity which is
\nrequired, or with which it ought to choose it? Now what degree of
\nstrength is demanded? By what criterion is this question to be settled?
\nIt cannot be that the degree of intensity required is equal to the real
\nvalue of the end chosen, for this is infinite. The value of the highest
\nwell-being of God and the universe is infinite. But a finite being
\ncannot be under obligation to exert infinite strength. The law requires
\nhim only to exert his own strength. But does he, or may he not, choose
\nthe right end, but with less than all his strength? All his strength
\nlies in his will; the question, therefore, is, may he not will it
\nhonestly, and yet at the same time withhold a part of the strength of
\nhis will? No one can presume that the choice can be acceptable unless
\nit be honest. Can it be honest and yet less intense and energetic than
\nit ought to be?<\/p>\n
We have seen in a former lecture that the perception of an end is a
\ncondition of moral obligation to choose that end. I now remark that, as
\nlight in respect to the end is the condition of the obligation, so the
\ndegree of obligation cannot exceed the degree of light. That is, the
\nmind must apprehend the valuable as a condition of the obligation to
\nwill it. The degree of the obligation must be just equal to the mind’s
\nhonest estimate of the value of the end. The degree of the obligation
\nmust vary as the light varies. This is the doctrine of the Bible and of
\nreason. If this is so, it follows that the mind is honest when, and
\nonly when, it devotes its strength to the end in view, with an
\nintensity just proportioned to its present light, or estimate of the
\nvalue of that end.<\/p>\n
We have seen that the mind cannot will anything inconsistent with a
\npresent ultimate choice. If, therefore, the end is not chosen with an
\nenergy and intensity equal to the present light, it cannot be because a
\npart of the strength is employed in some other choice. If all the
\nstrength is not given to this object, it must be because some part of
\nit is voluntarily withholden. That is, I choose the end, but not with
\nall my strength, or I choose the end, but choose not to choose it with
\nall my strength. Is this an honest choice, provided the end appears to
\nme to be worthy of all my strength? Certainly it is not honest.<\/p>\n
But again: it is absurd to affirm that I choose an ultimate end, and
\nyet do not consecrate to it all my strength. The choice of any ultimate
\nend implies that that is the thing, and the only thing, for which we
\nlive and act; that we aim at, and live for nothing else, for the time
\nbeing. Now what is intended by the assertion, that I may honestly
\nchoose an ultimate end, and yet with less strength or intensity than I
\nought? Is it intended that I can honestly choose an ultimate end, and
\nyet not at every moment keep my will upon the strain, and will at every
\nmoment with the utmost possible intensity? If this be the meaning, I
\ngrant that it may be so. But I at the same time contend, that the law
\nof God does not require that the will, or any other faculty, should be
\nat every moment upon the strain, and the whole strength exerted at
\nevery moment. If it does, it is manifest that even Christ did not obey
\nit. I insist that the moral law requires nothing more than honesty of
\nintention, and assumes that honesty of intention will and must secure
\njust that degree of intensity which from time to time, the mind in its
\nbest judgment sees to be demanded. The Bible everywhere assumes that
\nsincerity or honesty of intention is moral perfection; that it is
\nobedience to the law. The terms sincerity and perfection in scripture
\nlanguage are synonymous. Uprightness, sincerity, holiness, honesty,
\nperfection, are words of the same meaning in Bible language.<\/p>\n
Again, it seems to be intuitively certain that if the mind chooses its
\nultimate end, it must in the very act of choice consecrate all its
\ntime, and strength, and being, to that end; and at every moment, while
\nthe choice remains, choose and act with an intensity in precise
\nconformity with its ability and the best light it has. The intensity of
\nthe choice, and the strenuousness of its efforts to secure the end
\nchosen, must, if the intention be sincere, correspond with the view
\nwhich the soul has of the importance of the end chosen. It does not
\nseem possible that the choice or intention should be real and honest
\nunless this is so. To will at every moment with the utmost strength and
\nintensity, is not only impossible, but, were it possible to do so,
\ncould not be in accordance with the soul’s convictions of duty. The
\nirresistible judgment of the mind is, that the intensity of its action
\nshould not exceed the bound of endurance; that the energies of both
\nsoul and body should be so husbanded, as to be able to accomplish the
\nmost good upon the whole, and not in a given moment.<\/p>\n
But to return to the question: does the law of God require simply
\nuprightness of intention? or does it require not only uprightness, but
\nalso a certain degree of intensity in the intention? Is it satisfied
\nwith simple sincerity or uprightness of intention, or does it require
\nthat the highest possible intensity of choice shall exist at every
\nmoment? When it requires that we should love God with all the heart,
\nwith all the soul, with all the mind, and with all the strength, does
\nit mean that all our heart, soul, mind, and strength, shall be
\nconsecrated to this end, and be used up, from moment to moment, and
\nfrom hour to hour, according to the best judgment which the mind can
\nform of the necessity and expediency of strenuousness of effort? or
\ndoes it mean that all the faculties of soul and body shall be at every
\nmoment on the strain to the uttermost? Does it mean that the whole
\nbeing is to be consecrated to, and used up for God with the best
\neconomy of which the soul is capable? or does it require that the whole
\nbeing be not only consecrated to God, but be used up without any regard
\nto economy, and without the soul’s exercising any judgment or
\ndiscretion in the case? In other words, is the law of God the law of
\nreason, or of folly? Is it intelligible and just in its demands? or is
\nit perfectly unintelligible and unjust? Is it a law suited to the
\nnature, relations, and circumstances, of moral agents? or has it no
\nregard to them? If it has no regard to either, is it, can it be, moral
\nlaw, and impose moral obligation? It seems to me that the law of God
\nrequires that all our power, and strength, and being, be honestly and
\ncontinually consecrated to God, and held, not in a state of the utmost
\ntension, but that the strength shall be expended and employed in exact
\naccordance with the mind’s honest judgment of what is, at every moment,
\nthe best economy for God. If this be not the meaning and the spirit of
\nthe law, it cannot be law, for it could be neither intelligible nor
\njust. Nothing else can be a law of nature. What! does, or can the
\ncommand, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, with
\nall thy soul, with all thy might, and with all thy strength,” require
\nthat every particle of my strength, and every faculty of my being,
\nshall be in a state of the utmost possible tension? How long could my
\nstrength hold out, or my being last, under such a pressure as this?
\nWhat reason, or justice, or utility, or equity, or wisdom, could there
\nbe in such a commandment as this? Would this be suited to my nature and
\nrelations? That the law does not require the constant and most intense
\naction of the will, I argue for the following reasons:–<\/p>\n
1. No creature in heaven or earth could possibly know whether he ever
\nfor a single moment obeyed it. How could he know that no more tension
\ncould possibly be endured?<\/p>\n
2. Such a requirement would be unreasonable, inasmuch as such a state
\nof mind would be unendurable.<\/p>\n
3. Such a state of constant tension and strain of the faculties could
\nbe of no possible use.<\/p>\n
4. It would be uneconomical. More good could be effected by a
\nhusbanding of the strength.<\/p>\n
5. Christ certainly obeyed the moral law; and yet nothing is more
\nevident than that his faculties were not always on the strain.<\/p>\n
Every one knows that the intensity of the will’s action depends, and
\nmust depend, upon the clearness with which the value of the object
\nchosen is perceived. It is perfectly absurd to suppose that the will
\nshould, or possibly can, act at all times with the same degree of
\nintensity. As the mind’s apprehensions of truth vary, the intensity of
\nthe will’s action must vary, or it does not act rationally, and
\nconsequently not virtuously. The intensity of the actions of the will,
\nought to vary as light varies, and if it does not, the mind is not
\nhonest. If honest, it must vary as light and ability vary.<\/p>\n
That an intention cannot be right and honest in kind and deficient in
\nthe degree of intensity, I argue–<\/p>\n
1. From the fact that it is absurd to talk of an intention right in
\nkind, while it is deficient in intensity. What does rightness in kind
\nmean? Does it mean simply that the intention terminates on the proper
\nobject? But is this the right kind of intention, when only the proper
\nobject is chosen, while there is a voluntary withholding of the
\nrequired energy of choice? Is this, can this be, an honest intention?
\nIf so, what is meant by an honest intention? Is it honest, can it be
\nhonest, voluntarily to withhold from God and the universe what we
\nperceive to be their due, and what we are conscious we might render? It
\nis a contradiction to call this honest. In what sense then may, or can,
\nan intention be acceptable in kind, while deficient in degree?
\nCertainly in no sense, unless known and voluntary dishonesty can be
\nacceptable. But again, let me ask, what is intended by an intention
\nbeing deficient in degree of intensity? If this deficiency be a sinful
\ndeficiency, it must be a known deficiency. That is, the subject of it
\nmust know at the time that his intention is in point of intensity less
\nthan it ought to be, or that he wills with less energy than he ought;
\nor, in other words, that the energy of the choice does not equal, or is
\nnot agreeable to, his own estimate of the value of the end chosen. But
\nthis implies an absurdity. Suppose I choose an end, that is, I choose a
\nthing solely on account of its own intrinsic value. It is for its value
\nthat I choose it. I choose it for its value, but not according to its
\nvalue. My perception of its value led me to choose it; and yet, while I
\nchoose it for that reason, I voluntarily withhold that degree of
\nintensity which I know is demanded by my own estimate of the value of
\nthe thing which I choose! This is a manifest absurdity and
\ncontradiction. If I choose a thing for its value, this implies that I
\nchoose it according to my estimate of its value. Happiness, for
\nexample, is a good in itself. Now, suppose I will its existence
\nimpartially, that is, solely on account of its intrinsic value; now,
\ndoes not this imply that every degree of happiness must be willed
\naccording to its real or relative value? Can I will it impartially, for
\nits own sake, for and only for its intrinsic value, and yet not prefer
\na greater to a less amount of happiness? This is impossible. Willing it
\non account of its intrinsic value implies willing it according to my
\nestimate of its intrinsic value. So, it must be that an intention
\ncannot be sincere, honest, and acceptable in kind, while it is sinfully
\ndeficient in degree.<\/p>\n
As holiness consists in ultimate intention, so does sin. And as
\nholiness consists in choosing the highest well-being of God and the
\ngood of the universe, for its own sake, or as the supreme ultimate end
\nof pursuit; so sin consists in willing, with a supreme choice or
\nintention, self-gratification and self-interest. Preferring a less to a
\ngreater good, because it is our own, is selfishness. All selfishness
\nconsists in a supreme ultimate intention. By an ultimate intention, as
\nI have said, is intended that which is chosen for its own sake as an
\nend, and not as a means to some other end. Whenever a moral being
\nprefers or chooses his own gratification, or his own interest, in
\npreference to a higher good, because it is his own, he chooses it as an
\nend, for its own sake, and as an ultimate end, not designing it as a
\nmeans of promoting any other and higher end, nor because it is a part
\nof universal good. Every sin, then, consists in an act of will. It
\nconsists in preferring self-gratification, or self-interest, to the
\nauthority of God, the glory of God, and the good of the universe. It
\nis, therefore, and must be, a supreme ultimate choice, or intention.
\nSin and holiness, then, both consist in supreme, ultimate, and opposite
\nchoices, or intentions, and cannot by any possibility, co-exist.<\/p>\n
Five suppositions may be made, and so far as I can see, only five, in
\nrespect to this subject.<\/p>\n
1. It may be supposed, that selfishness and benevolence can co-exist in
\nthe same mind.<\/p>\n
2. It may be supposed, that the same act or choice may have a complex
\ncharacter, on account of complexity in the motives which induce it.<\/p>\n
3. It may be supposed, that an act or choice may be right, or holy in
\nkind, but deficient in intensity or degree. Or–<\/p>\n
4. That the will, or heart, may be right, while the affections, or
\nemotions, are wrong. Or–<\/p>\n
5. That there may be a ruling, latent, actually existing, holy
\npreference, or intention, co-existing with opposing volitions.<\/p>\n
Now, unless one of these suppositions is true, it must follow that
\nmoral character is either wholly right or wholly wrong, and never
\npartly right and partly wrong at the same time. And now to the
\nexamination.<\/p>\n
1. It may be supposed, that selfishness and benevolence can co-exist in
\nthe same mind.<\/p>\n
It has been shown that selfishness and benevolence are supreme,
\nultimate, and opposite choices, or intentions. They cannot, therefore,
\nby any possibility, co-exist in the same mind.<\/p>\n
2. The next supposition is, that the same act or choice may have a
\ncomplex character, on account of complexity in the motives. On this let
\nme say:–<\/p>\n
(1.) Motives are objective or subjective. An objective motive is that
\nthing external to the mind that induces choice or intention. Subjective
\nmotive is the intention itself.<\/p>\n
(2.) Character, therefore, does not belong to the objective motive, or
\nto that thing which the mind chooses; but moral character is confined
\nto the subjective motive, which is synonymous with choice or intention.
\nThus we say a man is to be judged by his motives, meaning that his
\ncharacter is as his intention is. Multitudes of objective motives or
\nconsiderations, may have concurred, directly or indirectly, in their
\ninfluence to induce choice or intention; but the intention or
\nsubjective motive is always necessarily simple and indivisible. In
\nother words, moral character consists in the choice of an ultimate end,
\nand this end is to be chosen for its own sake, else it is not an
\nultimate end. If the end chosen be the highest well-being of God and
\nthe good of the universe–if it be the willing or intending to promote
\nand treat every interest in the universe, according to its perceived
\nrelative value, it is a right, a holy motive, or intention. If it be
\nanything else, it is sinful. Now, whatever complexity there may have
\nbeen in the considerations that led the way to this choice or
\nintention, it is self-evident that the intention must be one, simple,
\nand indivisible.<\/p>\n
(3.) Whatever complexity there might have been in those considerations
\nthat prepared the way to the settling down upon this intention, the
\nmind in a virtuous choice has, and can have, but one ultimate reason
\nfor its choice, and that is the intrinsic value of the thing chosen.
\nThe highest well-being of God, the good of the universe, and every good
\naccording to its perceived relative value, must be chosen for one, and
\nonly one reason, and that is the intrinsic value of the good which is
\nchosen for its own sake. If chosen for any other reason, the choice is
\nnot virtuous. It is absurd to say, that a thing is good and valuable in
\nitself, but may be rightly chosen, not for that but for some other
\nreason–that God’s highest well-being and the happiness of the universe
\nare an infinite good in themselves, but are not to be chosen for that
\nreason, and on their own account, but for some other reason. Holiness,
\nthen, must always consist in singleness of eye or intention. It must
\nconsist in the supreme disinterested choice, willing, or intending the
\ngood of God and of the universe, for its own sake. In this intention
\nthere cannot be any complexity. If there were, it would not be holy,
\nbut sinful. It is, therefore, sheer nonsense to say, that one and the
\nsame choice may have a complex character, on account of complexity of
\nmotive. For that motive in which moral character consists, is the
\nsupreme ultimate intention, or choice. This choice, or intention, must
\nconsist in the choice of a thing as an end, and for its own sake. The
\nsupposition, then, that the same choice or intention may have a complex
\ncharacter, on account of complexity in the motives, is wholly
\ninadmissible.<\/p>\n
If it be still urged, that the intention or subjective motive may be
\ncomplex — that several things may be included in the intention, and be
\naimed at by the mind — and that it may, therefore, be partly holy and
\npartly sinful — I reply:–<\/p>\n
(4.) If by this it be meant that several things may be aimed at or
\nintended by the mind at the same time, I inquire what things?–It is
\ntrue, that the supreme, disinterested choice of the highest good of
\nbeing, may include the intention to use all the necessary means. It may
\nalso include the intention to promote every interest in the universe,
\naccording to its perceived relative value. These are all properly
\nincluded in one intention; but this implies no such complexity in the
\nsubjective motive, as to include both sin and holiness.<\/p>\n
(5.) If by complexity of intention is meant, that it may be partly
\ndisinterestedly benevolent, and partly selfish, which it must be to be
\npartly holy and partly sinful, I reply, that this supposition is
\nabsurd. It has been shown that selfishness and benevolence consist in
\nsupreme, ultimate, and opposite choices or intentions. To suppose,
\nthen, that an intention can be both holy and sinful, is to suppose that
\nit may include two supreme, opposite, and ultimate choices or
\nintentions, at the same time; in other words, that I may supremely and
\ndisinterestedly intend to regard and promote every interest in the
\nuniverse, according to its perceived relative value, for its own sake;
\nand at the same time, may supremely regard my own self-interest and
\nself-gratification, and in some things supremely intend to promote my
\nselfish interests, in opposition to the interests of the universe and
\nthe commands of God. But this is naturally impossible. An ultimate
\nintention, then, may be complex in the sense, that it may include the
\ndesign to promote every perceived interest, according to its relative
\nvalue; but it cannot, by any possibility, be complex in the sense that
\nit includes selfishness and benevolence, or holiness and sin.<\/p>\n
3. The third supposition is, that holiness may be right, or pure in
\nkind, but deficient in degree. On this, I remark:–<\/p>\n
(1.) We have seen that moral character consists in the ultimate
\nintention.<\/p>\n
(2.) The supposition, therefore, must be, that the intention may be
\nright, or pure in kind, but deficient in the degree of its strength.<\/p>\n
(3.) Our intention is to be tried by the law of God, both in respect to
\nits kind and degree.<\/p>\n
(4.) The law of God requires us to will, or intend the promotion of
\nevery interest in the universe, according to its perceived relative
\nvalue, for its own sake; in other words, that all our powers shall be
\nsupremely and disinterestedly devoted to the glory of God, and the good
\nof the universe.<\/p>\n
(5.) This cannot mean, that any faculty shall at every moment be kept
\nupon the strain, or in a state of utmost tension, for this would be
\ninconsistent with natural ability. It would be to require a natural
\nimpossibility, and therefore be unjust.<\/p>\n
(6.) It cannot mean that at all times, and on all subjects, the same
\ndegree of exertion shall be made; for the best possible discharge of
\nduty does not always require the same degree or intensity of mental or
\ncorporeal exertion.<\/p>\n
(7.) The law cannot, justly or possibly, require more than that the
\nwhole being shall be consecrated to God–that we shall fully and
\nhonestly will or intend the promotion of every interest, according to
\nits perceived relative value, and according to the extent of our
\nability.<\/p>\n
(8.) Now the strength or intensity of the intention must, and ought, of
\nnecessity, to depend upon the degree of our knowledge or light in
\nregard to any object of choice. If our obligation is not to be
\ngraduated by the light we possess, then it would follow, that we may be
\nunder obligation to exceed our natural ability, which cannot be.<\/p>\n
(9.) The importance which we attach to objects of choice, and
\nconsequently the degree of ardor or intenseness of the intention, must
\ndepend upon the clearness or obscurity of our views, of the real or
\nrelative value of the objects of choice.<\/p>\n
(10.) Our obligation cannot be measured by the views which God has of
\nthe importance of those objects of choice. It is a well-settled and
\ngenerally-admitted truth, that increased light increases
\nresponsibility, or moral obligation. No creature is bound to will any
\nthing with the intenseness or degree of strength with which God wills
\nit, for the plain reason, that no creature sees its importance or real
\nvalue, as He does. If our obligation were to be graduated by God’s
\nknowledge of the real value of objects, we could never obey the moral
\nlaw, either in this world or the world to come, nor could any being but
\nGod ever, by any possibility, meet its demands.<\/p>\n
The fact is, that the obligation of every moral being must be graduated
\nby his knowledge. If, therefore, his intention be equal in its
\nintensity to his views or knowledge of the real or relative value of
\ndifferent objects, it is right. It is up to the full measure of his
\nobligation; and if his own honest judgment is not to be made the
\nmeasure of his obligation, then his obligation can exceed what he is
\nable to know; which contradicts the true nature of moral law, and is,
\ntherefore, false.<\/p>\n
If conscious honesty of intention, both as it respects the kind and
\ndegree of intention, according to the degree of light possessed, be not
\nentire obedience to moral law, then there is no being in heaven or
\nearth, who can know himself to be entirely obedient; for all that any
\nbeing can possibly know upon this subject, is that he honestly wills or
\nintends, in accordance with the dictates of his reason, or the judgment
\nwhich he has of the real or relative value of the object chosen. No
\nmoral being can possibly blame or charge himself with any default, when
\nhe is conscious of honestly intending, willing, or choosing, and
\nacting, according to the best light he has; for in this case he obeys
\nthe law, as he understands it, and, of course, cannot conceive himself
\nto be condemned by the law.<\/p>\n
Good-willing, or intending is, in respect to God, to be at all times
\nsupreme; and in respect to other beings, it is to be in proportion to
\nthe relative value of their happiness, as perceived by the mind. This
\nis always to be the intention. The volitions, or efforts of the will to
\npromote these objects, may vary, and ought to vary indefinitely in
\ntheir intensity, in proportion to the particular duty to which, for the
\ntime being, we are called.<\/p>\n
But further, we have seen that virtue consists in willing every good
\naccording to its perceived relative value, and that nothing short of
\nthis is virtue. But this is perfect virtue for the time being. In other
\nwords, virtue and moral perfection, in respect to a given act, or state
\nof the will, are synonymous terms. Virtue is holiness. Holiness is
\nuprightness. Uprightness is that which is just what, under the
\ncircumstances, it should be; and nothing else is virtue, holiness, or
\nuprightness. Virtue, holiness, uprightness, moral perfection–when we
\napply these terms to any given state of the will–are synonymous. To
\ntalk, therefore, of a virtue, holiness, uprightness, justice, right in
\nkind, but deficient in degree, is to talk sheer nonsense. It is the
\nsame absurdity as to talk of sinful holiness, an unjust justice, a
\nwrong rightness, an impure purity, an imperfect perfection, a
\ndisobedient obedience.<\/p>\n
Virtue, holiness, uprightness, etc., signify a definite thing, and
\nnever anything else than conformity to the law of God. That which is
\nnot entirely conformed to the law of God is not holiness. This must be
\ntrue in philosophy, and the Bible affirms the same thing. “Whosoever
\nshall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of
\nall.” The spirit of this text as clearly and as fully assumes and
\naffirms the doctrine under consideration, as if it had been uttered
\nwith that design alone.<\/p>\n
4. The next supposition is, that the will, or heart, may be right,
\nwhile the affections or emotions are wrong. Upon this I remark:<\/p>\n
(1.) That this supposition overlooks the very thing in which moral
\ncharacter consists. It has been shown that moral character consists in
\nthe supreme ultimate intention of the mind, and that this supreme,
\ndisinterested benevolence, good-willing or intention, is the whole of
\nvirtue. Now this intention originates volitions. It directs the
\nattention of the mind, and therefore, produces thoughts, emotions, or
\naffections. It also, through volition, produces bodily action. But
\nmoral character does not lie in outward actions, the movements of the
\narm, nor in the volition that moves the muscles; for that volition
\nterminates upon the action itself. I will to move my arm, and my arm
\nmust move by a law of necessity. Moral character belongs solely to the
\nintention that produced the volition that moved the muscles to the
\nperformance of the outward act. So intention produces the volition that
\ndirects the attention of the mind to a given object. Attention, by a
\nnatural necessity, produces thought, affection, or emotion. Now
\nthought, affection, or emotion, are all connected with volition, by a
\nnatural necessity; that is, if the attention is directed to an object,
\ncorresponding thoughts and emotions must exist, as a matter of course.
\nMoral character no more lies in emotion, than in outward action. It
\ndoes not lie in thought, or attention. It does not lie in the specific
\nvolition that directed the attention; but in that intention, or design
\nof the mind, that produced the volition, which directed the attention,
\nwhich, again, produced the thought, which, again, produced the emotion.
\nNow the supposition, that the intention may be right, while the
\nemotions or feelings of the mind may be wrong, is the same as to say,
\nthat outward action may be wrong, while the intention is right. The
\nfact is, that moral character is, and must be, as the intention is. If
\nany feeling or outward action is inconsistent with the existing
\nultimate intention, it must be so in spite of the agent. But if any
\noutward action or state of feeling exists, in opposition to the
\nintention or choice of the mind, it cannot, by any possibility, have
\nmoral character. Whatever is beyond the control of a moral agent, he
\ncannot be responsible for. Whatever he cannot control by intention, he
\ncannot control at all. Everything for which he can possibly be
\nresponsible, resolves itself into his intention. His whole character,
\ntherefore, is, and must be, as his intention is. If, therefore,
\ntemptations, from whatever quarter they may come, produce emotions
\nwithin him inconsistent with his intention, and which he cannot
\ncontrol, he cannot be responsible for them.<\/p>\n
(2.) As a matter of fact, although emotions, contrary to his
\nintentions, may, by circumstances beyond his control, be brought to
\nexist in his mind; yet, by willing to divert the attention of the mind
\nfrom the objects that produce them, they can ordinarily be banished
\nfrom the mind. If this is done as soon as in the nature of the case it
\ncan be, there is no sin. If it is not done as soon as in the nature of
\nthe case it can be, then it is absolutely certain that the intention is
\nnot what it ought to be. The intention is to devote the whole being to
\nthe service of God and the good of the universe, and of course to avoid
\nevery thought, affection, and emotion, inconsistent with this. While
\nthis intention exists, it is certain that if any object be thrust upon
\nthe attention which excites thoughts and emotions inconsistent with our
\nsupreme ultimate intention, the attention of the mind will be instantly
\ndiverted from those objects, and the hated emotion hushed, if this is
\npossible. For, while the intention exists, corresponding volitions must
\nexist. There cannot, therefore, be a right state of heart or intention,
\nwhile the emotions, or affections, of the mind are sinful. For emotions
\nare in themselves in no case sinful, and when they exist against the
\nwill, through the force of temptation, the soul is not responsible for
\ntheir existence. And, as I said, the supposition overlooks that in
\nwhich moral character consists, and makes it to consist in that over
\nwhich the law does not properly legislate; for love, or benevolence, is
\nthe fulfilling of the law.<\/p>\n
But here it may be said, that the law not only requires benevolence, or
\ngood-willing, but requires a certain kind of emotions, just as it
\nrequires the performance of certain outward actions, and that therefore
\nthere may be a right intention where there is a deficiency, either in
\nkind or degree of right emotion. To this I answer:–<\/p>\n
Outward actions are required of men, only because they are connected
\nwith intention, by a natural necessity. And no outward action is ever
\nrequired of us, unless it can be produced by intending and aiming to do
\nit. If the effect does not follow our honest endeavors, because of any
\nantagonistic influence, opposed to our exertions, which we cannot
\novercome, we have, by our intentions, complied with the spirit of the
\nlaw, and are not to blame that the outward effect does not take place.
\nJust so with emotions. All we have power to do, is, to direct the
\nattention of the mind to those objects calculated to secure a given
\nstate of emotion. If, from any exhaustion of the sensibility, or from
\nany other cause beyond our control, the emotions do not arise which the
\nconsideration of that subject is calculated to produce, we are no more
\nresponsible for the absence or weakness of the emotion than we should
\nbe for the want of power or weakness of motion in our muscles, when we
\nwilled to move them, provided that weakness was involuntary and beyond
\nour control. The fact is, we cannot be blameworthy for not feeling or
\ndoing that which we cannot do or feel by intending it. If the intention
\nthen is what it ought to be for the time being, nothing can be morally
\nwrong.<\/p>\n
5. The last supposition is, that a latent preference, or right
\nintention, may co-exist with opposing or sinful volitions. I formerly
\nsupposed that this could be true, but am now convinced that it cannot
\nbe true, for the following reasons:<\/p>\n
(1.) Observe, the supposition is, that the intention or ruling
\npreference may be right–may really exist as an active and virtuous
\nstate of mind, while, at the same time, volition may exist inconsistent
\nwith it.<\/p>\n
(2.) Now what is a right intention? I answer: Nothing short of this —
\nwilling, choosing, or intending the highest good of God and of the
\nuniverse, and to promote this at every moment, to the extent of our
\nability. In other words — right intention is supreme, disinterested
\nbenevolence. Now what are the elements which enter into this right
\nintention?<\/p>\n
(a.) The choice or willing of every interest according to its perceived
\nintrinsic value.<\/p>\n
(b.) To devote our entire being, now and forever, to this end. This is
\nright intention. Now the question is, can this intention co-exist with
\na volition inconsistent with it? Volition implies the choice of
\nsomething, for some reason. If it be the choice of whatever can promote
\nthis supremely benevolent end, and for that reason, the volition is
\nconsistent with the intention; but if it be the choice of something
\nperceived to be inconsistent with this end, and for a selfish reason,
\nthen the volition is inconsistent with the supposed intention. But the
\nquestion is, do the volition and intention co-exist? According to the
\nsupposition, the will chooses, or wills, something for a selfish
\nreason, or something perceived to be inconsistent with supreme,
\ndisinterested benevolence. Now it is plainly impossible, that this
\nchoice can take place while the opposite intention exists. For this
\nselfish volition is, according to the supposition, sinful or selfish;
\nthat is, something is chosen for its own sake, which is inconsistent
\nwith disinterested benevolence. But here the intention is ultimate. It
\nterminates upon the object chosen for its own sake. To suppose, then,
\nthat benevolence still remains in exercise, and that a volition
\nco-exists with it that is sinful, involves the absurdity of supposing,
\nthat selfishness and benevolence can co-exist in the same mind, or that
\nthe will can choose, or will, with a supreme preference or choice, two
\nopposites at the same time. This is plainly impossible. Suppose I
\nintend to go to the city of New York as soon as I possibly can. Now,
\nif, on my way, I will to loiter needlessly a moment, I necessarily
\nrelinquish one indispensable element of my intention. In willing to
\nloiter, or turn aside to some other object for a day, or an hour, I
\nmust of necessity, relinquish the intention of going as soon as I
\npossibly can. I may not design finally to relinquish my journey, but I
\nmust of necessity relinquish the intention of going as soon as I can.
\nNow, virtue consists in intending to do all the good I possibly can, or
\nin willing the glory of God and the good of the universe, and intending
\nto promote them to the extent of my ability. Nothing short of this is
\nvirtue. If at any time, I will something perceived to be inconsistent
\nwith this intention, I must, for the time being, relinquish the
\nintention, as it must indispensably exist in my mind, in order to be
\nvirtue. I may not come to the resolution, that I will never serve God
\nany more; but I must of necessity relinquish, for the time being, the
\nintention of doing my utmost to glorify God, if at any time I put forth
\na selfish volition. For a selfish volition implies a selfish intention.
\nI cannot put forth a volition intended to secure an end until I have
\nchosen the end. Therefore a holy intention cannot co-exist with a
\nselfish volition. It must be, therefore, that in every sinful choice,
\nthe will of a holy being must necessarily drop the exercise of supreme,
\nbenevolent intention, and pass into an opposite state of choice; that
\nis, the agent must cease, for the time being, to exercise benevolence,
\nand make a selfish choice. For, be it understood, that volition is the
\nchoice of a means to an end; and of course a selfish volition implies a
\nselfish choice of an end.<\/p>\n
Having briefly examined the several suppositions that can be made in
\nregard to the mixed character of actions, I will now answer a few
\nobjections; after which, I will bring this philosophy, as briefly as
\npossible, into the light of the Bible.<\/p>\n
Objection. Does a Christian cease to be a Christian, whenever he
\ncommits a sin.? I answer:<\/p>\n
1. Whenever he sins, he must, for the time being, cease to be holy.
\nThis is self-evident. Whenever he sins, he must be condemned; he must
\nincur the penalty of the law of God. If he does not, it must be because
\nthe law of God is abrogated. But if the law of God be abrogated, he has
\nno rule of duty; consequently, he can neither be holy nor sinful. If it
\nbe said that the precept is still binding upon him, but that, with
\nrespect to the Christian, the penalty is forever set aside, or
\nabrogated, I reply, that to abrogate the penalty is to repeal the
\nprecept; for a precept without penalty is no law. It is only counsel or
\nadvice. The Christian, therefore, is justified no longer than he obeys,
\nand must be condemned when he disobeys; or Antinomianism is true. Until
\nhe repents he cannot be forgiven. In these respects, then, the sinning
\nChristian and the unconverted sinner are upon precisely the same
\nground.<\/p>\n
2. In two important respects the sinning Christian differs widely from
\nthe unconverted sinner:<\/p>\n
(1.) In his relations to God. A Christian is a child of God. A sinning
\nChristian is a disobedient child of God. An unconverted sinner is a
\nchild of the devil. A Christian sustains a covenant relation to God;
\nsuch a covenant relation as to secure to him that discipline which
\ntends to reclaim and bring him back, if he wanders away from God. “If
\nhis children forsake my law, and walk not in my judgments; if they
\nbreak my statutes and keep not my commandments; then will I visit their
\ntransgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes.
\nNevertheless my loving-kindness will I not utterly take from him, nor
\nsuffer my faithfulness to fail. My covenant will I not break, nor alter
\nthe thing that is gone out of my lips.” Ps. lxxxix. 30-34.<\/p>\n
(2.) The sinning Christian differs from the unconverted man, in the
\nstate of his sensibility. In whatever way it takes place, every
\nChristian knows that the state of his sensibility in respect to the
\nthings of God, has undergone a great change. Now it is true, that moral
\ncharacter does not lie in the sensibility, nor in the will’s obeying
\nthe sensibility. Nevertheless our consciousness teaches us, that our
\nfeelings have great power in promoting wrong choice on the one hand,
\nand in removing obstacles to right choice on the other. In every
\nChristian’s mind there is, therefore, a foundation laid for appeals to
\nthe sensibilities of the soul, that gives truth a decided advantage
\nover the will. And multitudes of things in the experience of every
\nChristian, give truth a more decided advantage over his will, through
\nthe intelligence, than is the case with unconverted sinners.<\/p>\n
Obj. Can a man be born again, and then be unborn? I answer:<\/p>\n
If there were anything impossible in this, then perseverance would be
\nno virtue. None will maintain, that there is anything naturally
\nimpossible in this, except it be those who hold to physical
\nregeneration. If regeneration consist in a change in the ruling
\npreference of the mind, or in the ultimate intention, as we shall see
\nit does, it is plain, that an individual can be born again, and
\nafterwards cease to be virtuous. That a Christian is able to
\napostatize, is evident, from the many warnings addressed to Christians
\nin the Bible. A Christian may certainly fall into sin and unbelief, and
\nafterwards be renewed, both to repentance and faith.<\/p>\n
Obj. Can there be no such thing as weak faith, weak love, and weak
\nrepentance? I answer:<\/p>\n
If you mean comparatively weak, I say, yes. But if you mean weak, in
\nsuch a sense as to be sinful, I say, no. Faith, repentance, love, and
\nevery Christian grace, properly so called, do and must consist in acts
\nof will, and resolve themselves into some modification of supreme,
\ndisinterested benevolence.<\/p>\n
I shall, in a future lecture, have occasion to show the philosophical
\nnature of faith. Let it suffice here to say, that faith necessarily
\ndepends upon the clearness or obscurity of the intellectual
\napprehension of truth. Faith, to be real or virtuous, must embrace
\nwhatever of truth is apprehended by the intelligence for the time
\nbeing. Various causes may operate to divert the intelligence from the
\nobjects of faith, or to cause the mind to perceive but few of them, and
\nthose in comparative obscurity. Faith may be weak, and will certainly
\nand necessarily be weak in such cases, in proportion to the obscurity
\nof the views. And yet, if the will or heart confides so far as it
\napprehends the truth, which it must do to be virtuous at all, faith
\ncannot be weak in such a sense as to be sinful; for if a man confides
\nso far as he apprehends or perceives the truth, so far as faith is
\nconcerned he is doing his whole duty.<\/p>\n
Again, faith may be weak in the sense, that it often intermits and
\ngives place to unbelief. Faith is confidence, and unbelief is the
\nwithholding of confidence. It is the rejection of truth perceived.
\nFaith is the reception of truth perceived. Faith and unbelief, then,
\nare opposite states of choice, and can by no possibility co-exist.<\/p>\n
Faith may be weak also in respect to its objects. The disciples of our
\nLord Jesus Christ knew so little of him, were so filled with ignorance
\nand the prejudices of education, as to have very weak faith in respect
\nto the Messiahship, power, and divinity of their blaster. He speaks of
\nthem as having but little confidence, and yet it does not appear that
\nthey did not implicitly trust him, so far as they understood him. And
\nalthough, through ignorance, their faith was weak, yet there is no
\nevidence, that when they had any faith at all they did not confide in
\nwhatever of truth they apprehended.<\/p>\n
But did not the disciples pray, “Increase our faith?” I answer:<\/p>\n
Yes. And by this they must have intended to pray for instruction; for
\nwhat else could they mean? Unless a man means this, when he prays for
\nfaith, he does not know what he prays for. Christ produces faith by
\nenlightening the mind. When we pray for faith we pray for light. And
\nfaith, to be real faith at all, must be equal to the light we have. If
\napprehended truth be not implicitly received and confided in, there is
\nno faith, but unbelief. If it be, faith is what it ought to be, wholly
\nunmixed with sin.<\/p>\n
But did not one say to our Lord, “Lord, I believe, help thou my
\nunbelief;” thus implying, that he was in the exercise both of faith and
\nunbelief at the same time? I answer yes, but–<\/p>\n
1. This was not inspiration.<\/p>\n
2. It is not certain that he had any faith at all.<\/p>\n
3. If he had, and prayed understandingly, he meant nothing more than to
\nask for an increase of faith, or for such a degree of light as to
\nremove his doubts in respect to the divine power of Christ.<\/p>\n
Again, it is objected that this philosophy contradicts Christian
\nexperience. To this I reply,<\/p>\n
That it is absurd to appeal from reason and the Bible to empirical
\nconsciousness which must be the appeal in this case. Reason and the
\nBible plainly attest the truth of the theory here advocated. What
\nexperience is then to be appealed to, to set their testimony aside?
\nWhy, Christian experience, it is replied. But what is Christian
\nexperience? How shall we learn what it is? Why surely by appealing to
\nreason and the Bible. But these declare that if a man offend in one
\npoint, he does and must, for the time being, violate the spirit of the
\nwhole law. Nothing is or can be more express than is the testimony of
\nboth reason and revelation upon this subject. Here, then, we have the
\nunequivocal decision of the only court of competent jurisdiction in the
\ncase; and shall we befool ourselves by appealing from this tribunal to
\nthe court of empirical consciousness? Of what does that take
\ncognizance? Why, of what actually passes in the mind; that is, of its
\nmental states. These we are conscious of as facts. But we call these
\nstates Christian experience. How do we ascertain that they are in
\naccordance with the law and gospel of God? Why only by an appeal to
\nreason and the Bible. Here, then, we are driven back to the court from
\nwhich we had before appealed, whose judgment is always the same.<\/p>\n
Obj. But it is said, this theory seems to be true in philosophy, that
\nis, the intelligence seems to affirm it, but it is not true in fact.<\/p>\n
Answer. If the intelligence affirms it, it must be true, or reason
\ndeceives us. But if the reason deceives in this, it may also in other
\nthings. If it fails us here, it fails us on the most important of all
\nquestions. If reason gives false testimony, we can never know truth
\nfrom error upon any moral subject. We certainly can never know what
\nreligion is or is not, if the testimony of reason can be set aside. If
\nthe reason cannot be safely appealed to, how are we to know what the
\nBible means? for it is the faculty by which we get at the truth of the
\noracles of God.<\/p>\n
These are the principal objections to the philosophical view I have
\ntaken of the simplicity of moral action, that occur to my mind. I will
\nnow briefly advert to the consistency of this philosophy with the
\nscriptures.<\/p>\n
1. The Bible every where seems to assume the simplicity of moral
\naction. Christ expressly informed his disciples, that they could not
\nserve God and mammon. Now by this he did not mean, that a man could not
\nserve God at one time and mammon at another; but that he could not
\nserve both at the same time. The philosophy that makes it possible for
\npersons to be partly holy and partly sinful at the same time, does make
\nit possible to serve God and mammon at the same time, and thus flatly
\ncontradicts the assertion of our Saviour.<\/p>\n
2. James has expressly settled this philosophy, by saying, that
\n“Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is
\nguilty of all.” Here he must mean to assert, that one sin involves a
\nbreach of the whole spirit of the law, and is, therefore, inconsistent
\nwith any degree of holiness existing with it. Also, “Doth a fountain
\nsend forth at the same place sweet water and bitter? Can the fig-tree,
\nmy brethren, bear olive-berries? either a vine, figs? So can no
\nfountain both yield salt-water and fresh,” James iii. 11, 12. In this
\npassage he clearly affirms the simplicity of moral action; for by the
\n“the same place” he evidently means, the same time, and what he says is
\nequivalent to saying, that a man cannot be holy and sinful at the same
\ntime.<\/p>\n
3. Christ has expressly taught, that nothing is regeneration, or
\nvirtue, but entire obedience, or the renunciation of all selfishness.
\n“Except a man forsake all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple.”<\/p>\n
4. The manner in which the precepts and threatenings of the Bible are
\nusually given, shows that nothing is regarded as obedience, or virtue,
\nbut doing exactly that which God commands.<\/p>\n
I might go to great lengths in the examination of scripture testimony,
\nbut it cannot be necessary, or in these lectures expedient. I must
\nclose this lecture with a few inferences and remarks.<\/p>\n
1. It has been supposed by some, that the simplicity of moral action
\nhas been resorted to as a theory, by the advocates of entire
\nsanctification in this life, as the only consistent method of carrying
\nout their principle. To this I reply:–<\/p>\n
(1.) That this theory is held in common, both by those who hold and
\nthose who deny the doctrine of entire sanctification in this life.<\/p>\n
(2.) The truth of the doctrine of entire sanctification does not depend
\nat all upon this philosophical theory for its support; but may be
\nestablished by Bible testimony, whatever the philosophy of holiness may
\nbe.<\/p>\n
2. Growth in grace consists in two things:–<\/p>\n
(1.) In the stability or permanency of holy, ultimate intention.<\/p>\n
(2.) In intensity or strength. As knowledge increases, Christians will
\nnaturally grow in grace, in both these respects.<\/p>\n
3. The theory of the mixed character of moral actions, is an eminently
\ndangerous theory, as it leads its advocates to suppose, that in their
\nacts of rebellion there is something holy, or, more strictly, there is
\nsome holiness in them, while they are in the known commission of sin.<\/p>\n
It is dangerous, because it leads its advocates to place the standard
\nof conversion, or regeneration, exceedingly low–to make regeneration,
\nrepentance, true love to God, faith, etc., consistent with the known or
\nconscious commission of present sin. This must be a highly dangerous
\nphilosophy. The fact is, regeneration, or holiness, under any form, is
\nquite another thing than it is supposed to be, by those who maintain
\nthe philosophy of the mixed character of moral action. There can
\nscarcely be a more dangerous error than to say, that while we are
\nconscious of present sin, we are or can be in a state of acceptance
\nwith God.<\/p>\n
4. The false philosophy of many leads them to adopt a phraseology
\ninconsistent with truth; and to speak as if they were guilty of present
\nsin, when in fact they are not, but are in a state of acceptance with
\nGod.<\/p>\n
5. It is erroneous to say that Christians sin in their most holy
\nexercises, and it is as injurious and dangerous as it is false. The
\nfact is, holiness is holiness, and it is really nonsense to speak of a
\nholiness that consists with sin.<\/p>\n
6. The tendency of this philosophy is to quiet in their delusions those
\nwhose consciences accuse them of present sin, as if this could be true,
\nand they, notwithstanding, in a state of acceptance with God.<\/p>\n
7. The only sense in which obedience to moral law can be partial is,
\nthat obedience may be intermittent. That is, the subject may sometimes
\nobey, and at other times disobey. He may at one time be selfish, or
\nwill his own gratification, because it is his own, and without regard
\nto the well-being of God and his neighbor, and at another time will the
\nhighest well-being of God and the universe, as an end, and his own good
\nin proportion to its relative value. These are opposite choices, or
\nultimate intentions. The one is holy; the other is sinful. One is
\nobedience, entire obedience, to the law of God; the other is
\ndisobedience, entire disobedience, to that law. These, for aught we can
\nsee, may succeed each other an indefinite number of times, but co-exist
\nthey plainly cannot.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
LECTURE IX. UNITY OF MORAL ACTION. CAN OBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW BE PARTIAL? 1. What constitutes obedience to moral law? We have seen in former lectures, that disinterested benevolence is all that the spirit of moral law requires; that is, that the love which it requires to God and our neighbor is good-willing, willing the…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"twitterCardType":"","cardImageID":0,"cardImage":"","cardTitle":"","cardDesc":"","cardImageAlt":"","cardPlayer":"","cardPlayerWidth":0,"cardPlayerHeight":0,"cardPlayerStream":"","cardPlayerCodec":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5432","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5432","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5432"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5432\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5432"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5432"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5432"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}