LECTURE X.<\/p>\n
OBEDIENCE ENTIRE.<\/p>\n
The government of God accepts nothing as virtue but obedience to the
\nlaw of God.<\/p>\n
But it may be asked, Why state this proposition? Was this truth ever
\ncalled in question? I answer, that the truth of this proposition,
\nthough apparently so self-evident that to raise the question may
\nreasonably excite astonishment, is generally denied. Indeed, probably
\nnine-tenths of the nominal church deny it. They tenaciously hold
\nsentiments that are entirely contrary to it, and amount to a direct
\ndenial of it. They maintain that there is much true virtue in the
\nworld, and yet that there is no one who ever for a moment obeys the law
\nof God; that all Christians are virtuous, and that they are truly
\nreligious, and yet not one on earth obeys the moral law of God; in
\nshort, that God accepts as virtue that which, in every instance, comes
\nshort of obedience to his law. And yet it is generally asserted in
\ntheir articles of faith, that obedience to moral law is the only proper
\nevidence of a change of heart. With this sentiment in their creed, they
\nwill brand as a heretic, or as a hypocrite, any one who professes to
\nobey the law; and maintain that men may be, and are pious, and
\neminently so, who do not obey the law of God. This sentiment, which
\nevery one knows to be generally held by those who are styled orthodox
\nChristians, must assume that there is some rule of right, or of duty,
\nbesides the moral law; or that virtue, or true religion, does not imply
\nobedience to any law. In this discussion. I shall,–<\/p>\n
1. Attempt to show that there can be no rule of right or duty but the
\nmoral law; and,<\/p>\n
2. That nothing can be virtue, or true religion, but obedience to this
\nlaw, and that the government of God acknowledges nothing else as virtue
\nor true religion.<\/p>\n
1. There can be no rule of duty but the moral law. [2]<\/p>\n
Upon this proposition I remark,–<\/p>\n
(1.) That the moral law, as we have seen, is nothing else than the law
\nof nature, or that rule of action which is founded, not in the will of
\nGod, but in the nature and relations of moral agents. It prescribes the
\ncourse of action which is agreeable or suitable to our nature and
\nrelations. It is unalterably right to act in conformity with our nature
\nand relations. To deny this, is palpably absurd and contradictory. But
\nif this is right, nothing else can be right. If this course is
\nobligatory upon us, by virtue of our nature and relations, no other
\ncourse can possibly be obligatory upon us. To act in conformity with
\nour nature and relations, must be right, and nothing, either more or
\nless, can be right. If these are not truths of intuition, then there
\nare no such truths.<\/p>\n
(2.) God has never proclaimed any other rule of duty, and should he do
\nit, it could not be obligatory. The moral law did not originate in his
\narbitrary will. He did not create it, nor can he alter it, or introduce
\nany other rule of right among moral agents. Can God make anything else
\nright than to love him with all the heart, and our neighbor as
\nourselves? Surely not. Some have strangely dreamed that the law of
\nfaith has superseded the moral law. But we shall see that moral law is
\nnot made void, but is established by the law of faith. True faith, from
\nits very nature, always implies love or obedience to the moral law; and
\nlove or obedience to the moral law always implies faith. As has been
\nsaid on a former occasion, no being can create law. Nothing is, or can
\nbe, obligatory on a moral agent, but the course of conduct suited to
\nhis nature and relations. No being can set aside the obligation to do
\nthis. Nor can any being render anything more than this obligatory.
\nIndeed, there cannot possibly be any other rule of duty than the moral
\nlaw. There can be no other standard with which to compare our actions,
\nand in the light of which to decide their moral character. This brings
\nus to the consideration of the second proposition, namely,–<\/p>\n
2. That nothing can be virtue or true religion but obedience to the
\nmoral law.<\/p>\n
That every modification of true virtue is only obedience to moral law,
\nwill appear, if we consider,–<\/p>\n
(1.) That virtue is identical with true religion:<\/p>\n
(2.) That true religion cannot properly consist in anything else, than
\nthe love to God and man, enjoined by the moral law:<\/p>\n
(3.) That the Bible expressly recognizes love as the fulfilling of the
\nlaw, and as expressly denies, that anything else is acceptable to God.
\n“Therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.” “Though I speak with the
\ntongues of men and of angels, and have not charity (love), I am become
\nas sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of
\nprophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge; and though I
\nhave all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity,
\nI am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and
\nthough I give my body to be burned, and have not charity (love), it
\nprofiteth me nothing.” (1 Cor. xiii. 1-3) Love is repeatedly recognized
\nin the Bible, not only as constituting true religion, but as being the
\nwhole of religion. Every form of true religion is only a form of love
\nor benevolence.<\/p>\n
Repentance consists in the turning of the soul from a state of
\nselfishness to benevolence, from disobedience to God’s law, to
\nobedience to it.<\/p>\n
Faith is the receiving of, or confiding in, embracing, loving, truth
\nand the God of truth. It is only a modification of love to God and
\nChrist. Every Christian grace or virtue, as we shall more fully see
\nwhen we come to consider them in detail, is only a modification of
\nlove. God is love. Every modification of virtue and holiness in God is
\nonly love, or the state of mind which the moral law requires alike of
\nhim and of us. Benevolence is the whole of virtue in God, and in all
\nholy beings. Justice, truthfulness, and every moral attribute, is only
\nbenevolence viewed in particular relations.<\/p>\n
Nothing can be virtue that is not just what the moral law demands. That
\nis, nothing short of what it requires can be, in any proper sense,
\nvirtue.<\/p>\n
A common idea seems to be, that a kind of obedience is rendered to God
\nby Christians which is true religion, and which, on Christ’s account,
\nis accepted of God, which after all comes indefinitely short of full or
\nentire obedience at any moment; that the gospel has somehow brought
\nmen, that is. Christians, into such relations, that God really accepts
\nfrom them an imperfect obedience, something far below what his law
\nrequires; that Christians are accepted and justified while they render
\nat best but a partial obedience, and while they sin more or less at
\nevery moment. Now this appears to me, to be as radical an error as can
\nwell be taught. The subject naturally branches out into two distinct
\ninquiries:–<\/p>\n
(1.) Is it possible for a moral agent partly to obey, and partly to
\ndisobey, the moral law at the same time?<\/p>\n
(2.) Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present
\nand full obedience to the moral law?<\/p>\n
The first of these questions has been fully discussed in the preceding
\nlecture. We think that it has been shown, that obedience to the moral
\nlaw cannot be partial, in the sense that the subject can partly obey,
\nand partly disobey, at the same time.<\/p>\n
We will now attend to the second question, namely,–<\/p>\n
Can God, in any sense, justify one who does not yield a present and
\nfull obedience to the moral law? Or, in other words, Can he accept
\nanything as virtue or obedience, which is not, for the time being, full
\nobedience, or all that the law requires?<\/p>\n
The term justification is used in two senses:<\/p>\n
(a) In the sense of pronouncing the subject blameless:<\/p>\n
(b) In the sense of pardon, acceptance, and treating one who has
\nsinned, as if he had not sinned.<\/p>\n
It is in this last sense, that the advocates of this theory hold, that
\nChristians are justified, that is, that they are pardoned, and
\naccepted, and treated as just, though at every moment sinning, by
\ncoming short of rendering that obedience which the moral law demands.
\nThey do not pretend that they are justified at any moment by the law,
\nfor that at every moment condemns them for present sin; but that they
\nare justified by grace, not in the sense that they are made really and
\npersonally righteous by grace, but that grace pardons and accepts, and
\nin this sense justifies them when they are in the present commission of
\nan indefinite amount of sin; that grace accounts then righteous while,
\nin fact, they are continually sinning; that they are fully pardoned and
\nacquitted, while at the same moment committing sin, by coming entirely
\nand perpetually short of the obedience which, under the circumstances
\nthe law of God requires. While voluntarily withholding full obedience,
\ntheir partial obedience is accepted, and the sin of withholding full
\nobedience is forgiven. God accepts what the shiner has a mind to give,
\nand forgives what he voluntarily withholds. This is no caricature. It
\nis, if I understand them, precisely what many hold. In considering this
\nsubject, I wish to propose for discussion the following inquiries, as
\nof fundamental importance.<\/p>\n
1. How much sin may we commit, or how much may we, at every moment,
\ncome short of full obedience to the law of God, and yet be accepted and
\njustified?<\/p>\n
This must be an inquiry of infinite importance. If we may wilfully
\nwithhold a part of our hearts from God, and yet be accepted, how great
\na part may we withhold? If we may love God with less than all our
\nhearts, and our neighbor less than ourselves, and be accepted, how much
\nless than supreme love to God, and equal love to our neighbor, will be
\naccepted?<\/p>\n
Shall we be told, that the least degree of true love to God and our
\nneighbor will be accepted? But what is true love to God and our
\nneighbor? This is the point of inquiry. Is that true love which is not
\nwhat is required? If the least degree of love to God will be accepted,
\nthen we may love ourselves more than we love God, and yet be accepted.
\nWe may love God a little, and ourselves much, and still be in a state
\nof acceptance with God. We may love God a little and our neighbor a
\nlittle, and ourselves more than we love God and all our neighbors, and
\nvet be in a justified state. Or shall we be told that God must be loved
\nsupremely? But what is intended by this? Is supreme love a loving with
\nall the heart? But this is full and not partial obedience; yet the
\nlatter is the thing about which we are inquiring. Or is supreme love,
\nnot love with all the heart, but simply a higher degree of love than we
\nexercise toward any other being? But how much greater must it be?
\nBarely a little? How are we to measure it? In what scale are we to
\nweigh, or by what standard are we to measure, our love, so as to know
\nwhether we love God a little more than any other being? But how much
\nare we to love our neighbor, in order to our being accepted? If we may
\nlove him a little less than ourselves, how much less, and still be
\njustified? These are certainly questions of vital importance. But such
\nquestions look like trifling. Yet why should they? If the theory I am
\nexamining be true, these questions must not only be asked, but they
\nmust admit of a satisfactory answer. The advocates of the theory in
\nquestion are bound to answer them. And if they cannot, it is only
\nbecause their theory is false. Is it possible that their theory should
\nbe true, and yet no one be able to answer such vital questions as these
\njust proposed? If a partial obedience can be accepted, it is a
\nmomentous question, how partial, or how complete must that obedience
\nbe? I say again, that this is a question of agonizing interest. God
\nforbid that we should be left in the dark here. But again,<\/p>\n
2. If we are forgiven while voluntarily withholding a part of that
\nwhich would constitute full obedience, are we not forgiven sin of which
\nwe do not repent, and forgiven while in the act of committing the sin
\nfor which we are forgiven?<\/p>\n
The theory in question is that Christians never, at any time, in this
\nworld, yield a full obedience to the divine law; that they always
\nwithhold a part of their hearts from the Lord, and yet, while in the
\nvery act of committing this abominable sin of voluntarily defrauding
\nGod and their neighbor, God accepts their persons and their services,
\nfully forgives and justifies them. What is this, but pardoning present
\nand pertinacious rebellion! Receiving to favor a God-defrauding wretch!
\nForgiving a sin unrepented of and detestably persevered in! Yes, this
\nmust be, if it be true that Christians are justified without present
\nfull obedience. That surely must be a doctrine of devils, that
\nrepresents God as receiving to favor a rebel who has one hand filled
\nwith weapons against his throne.<\/p>\n
3. But what good can result to God, or the sinner, or to the universe,
\nby thus pardoning and justifying an unsanctified soul? Can God be
\nhonored by such a proceeding? Will the holy universe respect, fear, and
\nhonor God for such a proceeding? Does it, can it, commend itself to the
\nintelligence of the universe? Will pardon and justification save the
\nsinner, while he yet continues to withhold a part, at least, of his
\nheart from God, while he still cleaves to a part of his sins? Can
\nheaven be edified, or hell confounded, and its cavils silenced, by such
\na method of justification?<\/p>\n
4. But again: has God a right to pardon sin unrepented of;<\/p>\n
Some may feel shocked at the question, and may insist that this is a
\nquestion which we have no right to agitate. But let me inquire: Has
\nGod, as a moral governor, a right to act arbitrarily? Is there not some
\ncourse of conduct which is suitable to him? Has he not given us
\nintelligence on purpose that we may be able to see and judge of the
\npropriety of his public acts? Does he not invite and require scrutiny?
\nWhy has he required an atonement for sin, and why has he required
\nrepentance at all? Who does not know that no executive magistrate has a
\nright to pardon sin unrepented of? The lowest terms upon which any
\nruler can exercise mercy, are repentance, or, which is the same thing,
\na return to obedience. Who ever heard, in any government, of a rebel’s
\nbeing pardoned, while he only renounced a part of his rebellion? To
\npardon him while any part of his rebellion is persevered in, were to
\nsanction by a public act that which is lacking in his repentance. It
\nwere to pronounce a public justification of his refusal to render full
\nobedience.<\/p>\n
5. But have we a right to ask forgiveness while we persevere in the sin
\nof withholding a part of our hearts from him?<\/p>\n
God has no right to forgive us, and we have no right to desire him to
\nforgive us, while we keep back any part of the condition of
\nforgiveness. While we persist in defrauding God and our neighbor, we
\ncannot profess penitence and ask forgiveness without gross hypocrisy.
\nAnd shall God forgive us while we cannot, without hypocrisy, even
\nprofess repentance? To ask for pardon, while we do not repent and cease
\nfrom sin, is a gross insult to God.<\/p>\n
6. But does the Bible recognize the pardon of present sin, and while
\nunrepented of? Let the passage be found, if it can be, where sin is
\nrepresented as pardoned or pardonable, unless repented of and fully
\nforsaken. No such passage can be found. The opposite of this always
\nstands revealed, expressly or impliedly, on every page of divine
\ninspiration.<\/p>\n
7. Does the Bible anywhere recognize a justification in sin? Where is
\nsuch a passage to be found? Does not the law condemn sin, in every
\ndegree of it? Does it not unalterably condemn the sinner in whose heart
\nthe vile abomination is found? If a soul can sin, and yet not be
\ncondemned, then it must be because the law is abrogated, for surely, if
\nthe law still remains in force, it must condemn all sin. James most
\nunequivocally teaches this: “If any man keep the whole law, and yet
\noffend in one point, he is guilty of all.” What is this but asserting,
\nthat if there could be a partial obedience, it would be unavailing,
\nsince the law would condemn for any degree of sin; that partial
\nobedience, did it exist, would not be regarded as acceptable obedience
\nat all? The doctrine, that a partial obedience, in the sense that the
\nlaw is not at any time fully obeyed, is accepted of. God, is sheer
\nantinomianism. What! a sinner justified while indulging in rebellion
\nagainst God!<\/p>\n
But it has been generally held in the church, that a sinner must intend
\nfully to obey the law, as a condition of justification; that, in his
\npurpose and intention, he must forsake all sin; that nothing short of
\nperfection of aim or intention can be accepted of God. Now, what is
\nintended by this language? We have seen in former lectures, that moral
\ncharacter belongs properly only to the intention. If, then, perfection
\nof intention be an indispensable condition of justification, what is
\nthis, but an admission, after all, that full present obedience is a
\ncondition of justification? But this is what we hold, and they deny.
\nWhat then can they mean? It is of importance to ascertain what is
\nintended by the assertion, repeated by them thousands of times, that a
\nsinner cannot be justified but upon condition that he fully purposes
\nand intends to abandon all sin, and to live without sin; unless he
\nseriously intends to render full obedience to all the commands of God.
\nIntends to obey the law! What constitutes obedience to the law? Why,
\nlove, good-willing, good-intending. Intending to obey the law is
\nintending to intend, willing to will, choosing to choose! This is
\nabsurd.<\/p>\n
What then is the state of mind which is, and must be, the condition of
\njustification? Not merely an intention to obey, for this is only an
\nintending to intend, but intending what the law requires to be
\nintended, to wit, the highest well-being of God and of the universe.
\nUnless he intends this, it is absurd to say that he can intend full
\nobedience to the law; that he intends to live without sin. The
\nsupposition is, that he is now sinning; that is, for nothing else is
\nsin, voluntarily withholding from God and man their due. He chooses,
\nwills, and intends this, and yet the supposition is, that at the same
\ntime he chooses, wills, intends, fully to obey the law. What is this
\nbut the ridiculous assertion, that he at the same time intends full
\nobedience to the law, and intends not fully to obey, but only to obey
\nin part, voluntarily withholding from God and man their dues.<\/p>\n
But again, to the question, can man be justified while sin remains in
\nhim? Surely he cannot, either upon legal or gospel principles, unless
\nthe law be repealed. That he cannot be justified by the law, while
\nthere is a particle of sin in him, is too plain to need proof. But can
\nhe be pardoned and accepted, and then justified, in the gospel sense,
\nwhile sin, any degree of sin, remains in him? Certainly not. For the
\nlaw, unless it be repealed, continues to condemn him while there is any
\ndegree of sin in him. It is a contradiction to say, that he can both be
\npardoned, and at the same time condemned. But if he is all the time
\ncoming short of full obedience, there never is a moment in which the
\nlaw is not uttering its curses against him. “Cursed is every one that
\ncontinueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to
\ndo them.” The fact is, there never has been, and there never can be,
\nany such thing as sin without condemnation. “Beloved, if our heart
\ncondemn us, God is greater than our heart;” that is, he much more
\ncondemns us. “But if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence
\ntowards God.” God cannot repeal the law. It is not founded in his
\narbitrary will. It is as unalterable and unrepealable as his own
\nnature. God can never repeal nor alter it. He can, for Christ’s sake,
\ndispense with the execution of the penalty, when the subject has
\nreturned to full present obedience to the precept, but in no other
\ncase, and upon no other possible conditions. To affirm that he can, is
\nto affirm that God can alter the immutable and eternal principles of
\nmoral law and moral government.<\/p>\n
8. The next inquiry is, can there be such a thing as a partial
\nrepentance of sin? That is, does not true repentance imply a return to
\npresent full obedience to the law of God?<\/p>\n
To repent is to change the choice, purpose, intention. It is to choose
\na new end,–to begin a new life,–to turn from self seeking to seeking
\nthe highest good of being,–to turn from selfishness to disinterested
\nbenevolence,–from a state of disobedience to a state of obedience.
\nCertainly, if repentance means and implies anything, it does imply a
\nthorough reformation of heart and life. A reformation of heart consists
\nin turning from selfishness to benevolence. We have seen in a former
\nlecture, that selfishness and benevolence cannot co-exist, at the same
\ntime, in the same mind. They are the supreme choice of opposite ends.
\nThese ends cannot both be chosen at the same time. To talk of partial
\nrepentance as a possible thing is to talk nonsense. It is to overlook
\nthe very nature of repentance. What! a man both turn away from, and
\nhold on to sin at the same time! Serve God and mammon at one and the
\nsame time! It is impossible. This impossibility is affirmed both by
\nreason and by Christ. But perhaps it will be objected, that the sin of
\nthose who render but a partial obedience, and whom God pardons and
\naccepts, is not a voluntary sin. This leads to the inquiry:–<\/p>\n
9. Can there be any other than voluntary sin?<\/p>\n
What is sin? Sin is a transgression of the law. The law requires
\nbenevolence, good-willing. Sin is not a mere negation, or a not
\nwilling, but consists in willing self-gratification. It is a willing
\ncontrary to the commandment of God. Sin, as well as holiness, consists
\nin choosing, willing, intending. Sin must be voluntary; that is, it
\nmust be intelligent and voluntary. It consists in willing, and it is
\nnonsense to deny that sin is voluntary. The fact is, there is either no
\nsin, or there is voluntary sin. Benevolence is willing the good of
\nbeing in general, as an end, and, of course, implies the rejection of
\nself-gratification, as an end. So sin is the choice of
\nself-gratification, as an end, and necessarily implies the rejection of
\nthe good of being in general, as an end. Sin and holiness, naturally
\nand necessarily, exclude each other. They are eternal opposites and
\nantagonists. Neither can consist with the presence of the other in the
\nheart. They consist in the active state of the will, and there can be
\nno sin or holiness that does not consist in choice.<\/p>\n
10. Must not present sin be sin unrepented of?<\/p>\n
Yes, it is impossible for one to repent of present sin. To affirm that
\npresent sin is repented of, is to affirm a contradiction. It is
\noverlooking both the nature of sin, and the nature of repentance. Sin
\nis selfish willing; repentance is turning from selfish to benevolent
\nwilling. These two states of will, as has just been said, cannot
\npossibly co-exist. Whoever, then, is at present falling short of full
\nobedience to the law of God, is voluntarily sinning against God, and is
\nimpenitent. It is nonsense to say, that he is partly penitent and
\npartly impenitent; that he is penitent so far as he obeys, and
\nimpenitent so far as he disobeys. This really seems to be the loose
\nidea of many, that a man can be partly penitent, and partly impenitent
\nat the same time. This idea, doubtless, is founded on the mistake, that
\nrepentance consists in sorrow for sin, or is a phenomenon of the
\nsensibility. But repentance consists in a change of ultimate
\nintention–a change in the choice of an end–a turning from selfishness
\nto supreme disinterested benevolence. It is, therefore, plainly
\nimpossible for one to be partly penitent, and partly impenitent at the
\nsame time; inasmuch as penitence and impenitence consist in supreme
\nopposite choices.<\/p>\n
So then it is plain, that nothing is accepted as virtue under the
\ngovernment of God, but present full obedience to his law.<\/p>\n
REMARKS.<\/p>\n
1. If what has been said is true, we see that the church has fallen
\ninto a great and ruinous mistake, in supposing that a state of present
\nsinlessness is a very rare, if not an impossible, attainment in this
\nlife. If the doctrine of this lecture be true, it follows that the very
\nbeginning of true religion in the soul, implies the renunciation of all
\nsin. Sin ceases where holiness begins. Now, how great and ruinous must
\nthat error be, that teaches us to hope for heaven, while living in
\nconscious sin; to look upon a sinless state, as not to be expected in
\nthis world; that it is a dangerous error to expect to stop sinning,
\neven for an hour or a moment, in this world; and yet to hope for
\nheaven!<\/p>\n
2. How great and ruinous the error, that justification is conditionated
\nupon a faith that does not purify the heart of the believer; that one
\nmay be in a state of justification who lives in the constant commission
\nof more or less sin! This error has slain more souls, I fear, than all
\nthe universalism that ever cursed the world.<\/p>\n
3. We see that, if a righteous man forsake his righteousness, and die
\nin his sin, he must sink to hell. Whenever a Christian sins he comes
\nunder condemnation, and must repent and do his first works, or be lost.
\n__________________________________________________________________<\/p>\n
[2] See ante, p. 5.–Exclusiveness.
\n__________________________________________________________________<\/p>\n
LECTURE XI.<\/p>\n
OBEDIENCE TO THE MORAL LAW.<\/p>\n
We have seen, that all the law requires is summarily expressed in the
\nsingle word, love; that this word is synonymous with benevolence; that
\nbenevolence consists in the choice of the highest well-being of God and
\nof the universe, as an end, or for its own sake; that this choice is an
\nultimate intention. In short, we have seen, that good-will to being in
\ngeneral is obedience to the moral law. Now the question before us is,
\nwhat is not implied in this good-will, or in this benevolent ultimate
\nintention?<\/p>\n
Since the law of God, as revealed in the Bible, is the standard, and
\nthe only standard, by which the question in regard to what is not, and
\nwhat is, implied in entire sanctification, is to be decided, it is of
\nfundamental importance, that we understand what is, and what is not,
\nimplied in entire obedience to this law. Our judgment of our own state,
\nor of the state of others, can never be relied upon, till these
\ninquiries are settled. Christ was perfect, and yet so erroneous were
\nthe notions of the Jews, in regard to what constituted perfection, that
\nthey thought him possessed with a devil, instead of being holy, as he
\nclaimed to be. I will state then, what is not implied in entire
\nobedience to the moral law, as I understand it. The law, as epitomized
\nby Christ, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and
\nwith all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength,
\nand thy neighbor as thyself,” — I understand to lay down the whole
\nduty of man to God, and to his fellow creatures. Now, the questions
\nare, what is not, and what is, implied in perfect obedience to this
\nlaw?<\/p>\n
1. Entire obedience does not imply any change in the substance of the
\nsoul or body, for this the law does not require; and it would not be
\nobligatory if it did, because the requirement would be inconsistent
\nwith natural justice, and, therefore, not law. Entire obedience is the
\nentire consecration of the powers, as they are, to God. It does not
\nimply any change in them, but simply the right use of them.<\/p>\n
2. It does not imply the annihilation of any constitutional traits of
\ncharacter, such as constitutional ardor or impetuosity. There is
\nnothing, certainly, in the law of God that requires such constitutional
\ntraits to be annihilated, but simply that they should be rightly
\ndirected in their exercise.<\/p>\n
3. It does not imply the annihilation of any of the constitutional
\nappetites or susceptibilities. It seems to be supposed by some, that
\nthe constitutional appetites and susceptibilities are in themselves
\nsinful, and that a state of entire conformity to the law of God implies
\ntheir entire annihilation. I have been not a little surprised to find,
\nthat some persons who, I had supposed, were far enough from embracing
\nthe doctrine of physical moral depravity, were, after all, resorting to
\nthis assumption, in order to set aside the doctrine of entire
\nsanctification in this life. But let us appeal to the law. Does the law
\nanywhere, expressly or impliedly, condemn the constitution of man, or
\nrequire the annihilation of any thing that is properly a part of the
\nconstitution itself? Does it require the annihilation of the appetite
\nfor food, or is it satisfied merely with regulating its indulgence? In
\nshort, does the law of God any where require any thing more than the
\nconsecration of all the powers, appetites, and susceptibilities of body
\nand mind to the service of God?<\/p>\n
4. Entire obedience does not imply the annihilation of natural
\naffection, or natural resentment. By natural affection I mean, that
\ncertain persons may be naturally pleasing to us. Christ appears to have
\nhad a natural affection for John. By natural resentment I mean, that,
\nfrom the laws of our being, we must resent or feel opposed to injustice
\nor ill-treatment. Not that a disposition to retaliate or revenge
\nourselves is consistent with the law of God. But perfect obedience to
\nthe law of God does not imply that we should have no sense of injury
\nand injustice, when we are abused. God has this, and ought to have it,
\nand so has every moral being. To love your neighbor as yourself, does
\nnot imply, that if he injure you, you should feel no sense of the
\ninjury or injustice, but that you should love him and do him good,
\nnotwithstanding his injurious treatment.<\/p>\n
5. It does not imply any unhealthy degree of excitement of the mind.
\nMoral law is to be so interpreted as to be consistent with physical
\nlaw. God’s laws certainly do not clash with each other. And the moral
\nlaw cannot require such a state of constant mental excitement as will
\ndestroy the physical constitution. It cannot require any more mental
\nexcitement than is consistent with all the laws, attributes, and
\ncircumstances of both soul and body. It does not imply that any organ
\nor faculty is to be at all times exerted to the full measure of its
\ncapacity. This would soon exhaust and destroy any and every organ of
\nthe body. Whatever may be true of the mind, when separated from the
\nbody, it is certain, while it acts through a material organ, that a
\nconstant state of excitement is impossible. When the mind is strongly
\nexcited, there is of necessity a great determination of blood to the
\nbrain. A high degree of excitement cannot long continue, without
\nproducing inflammation of the brain, and consequent insanity. And the
\nlaw of God does not require any degree of emotion, or mental
\nexcitement, inconsistent with life and health. Our Lord Jesus Christ
\ndoes not appear to have been in a state of continual mental excitement.
\nWhen he and his disciples had been in a great excitement for a time,
\nthey would turn aside, “and rest a while.”<\/p>\n
Who that has ever philosophized on this subject, does not know that the
\nhigh degree of excitement which is sometimes witnessed in revivals of
\nreligion, must necessarily be short, or that the people must become
\nderanged? It seems sometimes to be indispensable that a high degree of
\nexcitement should prevail for a time, to arrest public and individual
\nattention, and draw off people from other pursuits, to attend to the
\nconcerns of their souls. But if any suppose that this high degree of
\nexcitement is either necessary or desirable, or possible to be long
\ncontinued, they have not well considered the matter. And here is one
\ngrand mistake of the church. They have supposed that the revival
\nconsists mostly in this state of excited emotion, rather than in
\nconformity of the human will to the law of God. Hence, when the reasons
\nfor much excitement have ceased, and the public mind begins to grow
\nmore calm, they begin immediately to say, that the revival is on the
\ndecline; when, in fact, with much less excited emotion, there may be
\nvastly more real religion in the community. Excitement is often
\nimportant and indispensable, but the vigorous actings of the will are
\ninfinitely more important. And this state of mind may exist in the
\nabsence of highly excited emotions.<\/p>\n
Nor does it imply that the same degree of emotion, volition, or
\nintellectual effort, is at all times required. All volitions do not
\nneed the same strength. They cannot have equal strength, because they
\nare not produced by equally influential reasons. Should a man put forth
\nas strong a volition to pick up an apple, as to extinguish the flames
\nof a burning house? Should a mother, watching over her sleeping
\nnursling, when all is quiet and secure, put forth as powerful
\nvolitions, as might be required to snatch it from the devouring flames?
\nNow, suppose that she were equally devoted to God, in watching her
\nsleeping babe, and in rescuing it from the jaws of death. Her holiness
\nwould not consist in the fact, that she exercised equally strong
\nvolitions, in both cases; but that in both cases the volition was equal
\nto the accomplishment of the thing required to be done. So that persons
\nmay be entirely holy, and, yet continually varying in the strength of
\ntheir affections, emotions, or volitions, according to their
\ncircumstances, the state of their physical system, and the business in
\nwhich they are engaged.<\/p>\n
All the powers of body and mind are to be held at the service and
\ndisposal of God. Just so much of physical, intellectual, and moral
\nenergy are to be expended in the performance of duty, as the nature and
\nthe circumstances of the case require. And nothing is further from the
\ntruth than that the law of God requires a constant, intense state of
\nemotion and mental action, on any and every subject alike.<\/p>\n
6. Entire obedience does not imply that God is to be at all times the
\ndirect object of attention and affection. This is not only impossible
\nin the nature of the case, but would render it impossible for us to
\nthink of or love our neighbor as ourselves.<\/p>\n
The law of God requires the supreme love of the heart. By this is meant
\nthat the mind’s supreme preference should be of God–that God should be
\nthe great object of its supreme regard. But this state of mind is
\nperfectly consistent with our engaging in any of the necessary business
\nof life–giving to that business that attention, and exercising about
\nit all those affections and emotions, which its nature and importance
\ndemand.<\/p>\n
If a man love God supremely, and engage in any business for the
\npromotion of his glory, if his eye be single, his affections and
\nconduct, so far as they have any moral character, are entirely holy
\nwhen necessarily engaged in the right transaction of his business,
\nalthough, for the time being, neither his thoughts nor affections are
\nupon God; just as a man, who is intensely devoted to his family, may be
\nacting consistently with his supreme affection, and rendering them the
\nmost important and perfect service, while he does not think of them at
\nall. The moral heart is the mind’s supreme preference. The natural
\nheart propels the blood through all the physical system. Now there is a
\nstriking analogy between this and the moral heart. And the analogy
\nconsists in this, that as the natural heart, by its pulsations,
\ndiffuses life through the physical system, so the moral heart, or the
\nsupreme governing preference, or ultimate intention of the mind, is
\nthat which gives life and character to man’s moral actions. For
\nexample, suppose that I am engaged in teaching mathematics; in this, my
\nultimate intention is to glorify God in this particular calling. Now in
\ndemonstrating some of its intricate propositions, I am obliged, for
\nhours together, to give the entire attention of my mind to that object.
\nWhile my mind is thus intensely employed in one particular business, it
\nis impossible that I should have any thoughts about God, or should
\nexercise any direct affections, or emotions, or volitions, towards him.
\nYet if, in this particular calling, all selfishness is excluded, and my
\nsupreme design is to glorify God, my mind is in a state of entire
\nobedience, even though, for the time being, I do not think of God.<\/p>\n
It should be understood, that while the supreme preference or intention
\nof the mind has such efficiency as to exclude all selfishness, and to
\ncall forth just that strength of volition, thought, affection, and
\nemotion, that is requisite to the right discharge of any duty to which
\nthe mind may be called, the heart is in a right state. By a suitable
\ndegree of thought and feeling, to the right discharge of duty, I mean
\njust that intensity of thought, and energy of action, that the nature
\nand importance of the particular duty, to which, for the time being, I
\nam called, demand, in my honest estimation.<\/p>\n
In making this statement, I take it for granted, that the brain
\ntogether with all the circumstances of the constitution are such that
\nthe requisite amount of thought, feeling, etc., are possible. If the
\nphysical constitution be in such a state of exhaustion, as to be unable
\nto put forth that amount of exertion which the nature of the case might
\notherwise demand, even in this case, the languid efforts, though far
\nbelow the importance of the subject, would be all that the law of God
\nrequires. Whoever, therefore, supposes that a state of entire obedience
\nimplies a state of entire abstraction of mind from everything but God,
\nlabors under a grievous mistake. Such a state of mind is as
\ninconsistent with duty, as it is impossible, while we are in the flesh.<\/p>\n
The fact is that the language and spirit of the law have been and
\ngenerally are, grossly misunderstood, and interpreted to mean what they
\nnever did, or can, mean, consistently with natural justice. Many a mind
\nhas been thrown open to the assaults of Satan, and kept in a state of
\ncontinual bondage and condemnation, because God was not, at all times,
\nthe direct object of thought, affection, and emotion; and because the
\nmind was not kept in a state of perfect tension, and excited to the
\nutmost at every moment.<\/p>\n
7. Nor does it imply a state of continual calmness of mind. Christ was
\nnot in a state of continual calmness. The deep peace of his mind was
\nnever broken up, but the surface or emotions of his mind were often in
\na state of great excitement, and at other times, in a state of great
\ncalmness. And here let me refer to Christ, as we have his history in
\nthe Bible, in illustration of the positions I have already taken. For
\nexample, Christ had all the constitutional appetites and
\nsusceptibilities of human nature. Had it been otherwise, he could not
\nhave been “tempted in all points like as we are;” nor could he have
\nbeen tempted in any point as we are, any further than he possessed a
\nconstitution similar to our own. Christ also manifested natural
\naffection for his mother and for other friends. He also showed that he
\nhad a sense of injury and injustice, and exercised a suitable
\nresentment when he was injured and persecuted. He was not always in a
\nstate of great excitement. He appears to have had his seasons of
\nexcitement and of calm–of labor and rest–of joy and sorrow, like
\nother good men. Some persons have spoken of entire obedience to the
\nlaw, as implying a state of uniform and universal calmness, and as if
\nevery kind and degree of excited feeling, except the feeling of love to
\nGod, were inconsistent with this state. But Christ often manifested a
\ngreat degree of excitement when reproving the enemies of God. In short,
\nhis history would lead to the conclusion that his calmness and
\nexcitement were various, according to the circumstances of the case.
\nAnd although he was sometimes so pointed and severe in his reproof, as
\nto be accused of being possessed of a devil, yet his emotions and
\nfeelings were only those that were called for, and suited to the
\noccasion.<\/p>\n
8. Nor does it imply a state of continual sweetness of mind, without
\nany indignation or holy anger at sin and sinners. Anger at sin is only
\na modification of love to being in general. A sense of justice, or a
\ndisposition to have the wicked punished for the benefit of the
\ngovernment, is only another of the modifications of love. And such
\ndispositions are essential to the existence of love, where the
\ncircumstances call for their exercise. It is said of Christ, that he
\nwas angry. He often manifested anger and holy indignation. “God is
\nangry with the wicked every day.” And holiness, or a state of
\nobedience, instead of being inconsistent with, always implies, the
\nexistence of anger, whenever circumstances occur which demand its
\nexercise.<\/p>\n
9. It does not imply a state of mind that is all compassion, and no
\nsense of justice. Compassion is only one of the modifications of love.
\nJustice, or willing the execution of law and the punishment of sin, is
\nanother of its modifications. God, and Christ, and all holy beings,
\nexercise all those dispositions that constitute the different
\nmodifications of love, under every possible circumstance.<\/p>\n
10. It does not imply that we should love or hate all men alike,
\nirrespective of their value, circumstances, and relations. One being
\nmay have a greater capacity for well-being, and be of much more
\nimportance to the universe, than another. Impartiality and the law of
\nlove require us not to regard all beings and things alike, but all
\nbeings and things according to their nature, relations, circumstances,
\nand value.<\/p>\n
11. Nor does it imply a perfect knowledge of all our relations. Such an
\ninterpretation of the law as would make it necessary, in order to yield
\nobedience, for us to understand all our relations, would imply in us
\nthe possession of the attribute of omniscience; for certainly there is
\nnot a being in the universe to whom we do not sustain some relation.
\nAnd a knowledge of all these relations plainly implies infinite
\nknowledge. It is plain that the law of God cannot require any such
\nthing as this.<\/p>\n
12. Nor does it imply freedom from mistake on any subject whatever. It
\nis maintained by some that the grace of the gospel pledges to every man
\nperfect knowledge, or at least such knowledge as to exempt him from any
\nmistake. I cannot stop here to debate this question, but would merely
\nsay, the law does not expressly or impliedly require infallibility of
\njudgment in us. It only requires us to make the best use we can of all
\nthe light we have.<\/p>\n
13. It does not imply the same degree of knowledge we might have
\npossessed, had we always improved our time in its acquisition. The law
\ncannot require us to love God or man, as well as we might have been
\nable to love them, had we always improved all our time in obtaining all
\nthe knowledge we could, in regard to their nature, character, and
\ninterests. If this were implied in the requisition of the law, there is
\nnot a saint on earth or in heaven that does, or ever can, perfectly
\nobey. What is lost in this respect is lost, and past neglect can never
\nbe so remedied, that we shall ever be able to make up in our
\nacquisitions of knowledge what we have lost. It will no doubt be true
\nto all eternity, that we shall have less knowledge than we might have
\npossessed, had we filled up all our time in its acquisition. We do not,
\ncannot, nor shall we ever be able to, love God as well as we might have
\nloved him, had we always applied our minds to the acquisition of
\nknowledge respecting him. And if entire obedience is to be understood
\nas implying that we love God as much as we should, had we all the
\nknowledge we might have had, then I repeat it, there is not a saint on
\nearth or in heaven, nor ever will be, that is entirely obedient.<\/p>\n
14. It does not imply the same amount of service that we might have
\nrendered, had we never sinned. The law of God does not imply or
\nsuppose, that our powers are in a perfect state; that our strength of
\nbody or mind is what it would have been, had we never sinned. But it
\nsimply requires us to use what strength we have. The very wording of
\nthe law is proof conclusive, that it extends its demand only to the
\nfull amount of what strength we have. And this is true of every moral
\nbeing, however great or small.<\/p>\n
The most perfect development and improvement of our powers, must depend
\nupon the most perfect use of them. And every departure from their
\nperfect use, is a diminishing of their highest development, and a
\ncurtailing of their capabilities to serve God in the highest and best
\nmanner. All sin then does just so much towards crippling and curtailing
\nthe powers of body and mind, and rendering them, by just so much,
\nincapable of performing the service they might otherwise have rendered.<\/p>\n
To this view of the subject it has been objected, that Christ taught an
\nopposite doctrine, in the case of the woman who washed his feet with
\nher tears, when he said, “To whom much is forgiven, the same loveth
\nmuch.” But can it be that Christ intended to be understood as teaching,
\nthat the more we sin the greater will be our love, and our ultimate
\nvirtue? If this be so, I do not see why it does not follow that the
\nmore sin in this life, the better, if so be that we are forgiven. If
\nour virtue is really to be improved by our sins, I see not why it would
\nnot be good economy, both for God and man, to sin as much as we can
\nwhile in this world. Certainly Christ meant to lay down no such
\nprinciple as this. He undoubtedly meant to teach that a person who was
\ntruly sensible of the greatness of his sins, would exercise more of the
\nlove of gratitude than would be exercised by one who had a less
\naffecting sense of ill-desert.<\/p>\n
15. Entire obedience does not imply the same degree of faith that might
\nhave been exercised but for our ignorance and past sin. We cannot
\nbelieve anything about God of which we have neither evidence nor
\nknowledge. Our faith must therefore be limited by our intellectual
\nperceptions of truth. The heathen are not under obligation to believe
\nin Christ, and thousands of other things of which they have no
\nknowledge. Perfection in a heathen would imply much less faith than in
\na Christian. Perfection in an adult would imply much more and greater
\nfaith than in a child. And perfection in an angel would imply much
\ngreater faith than in a man, just in proportion as he knows more of God
\nthan man does. Let it be always understood, that entire obedience to
\nGod never implies that which is naturally impossible. It is naturally
\nimpossible for us to believe that of which we have no knowledge. Entire
\nobedience implies, in this respect, nothing more than the heart’s faith
\nor confidence in all the truth that is perceived by the intellect.<\/p>\n
16. Nor does it imply the conversion of all men in answer to our
\nprayers. It has been maintained by some, that entire obedience implies
\nthe offering of prevailing prayer for the conversion of all men. To
\nthis I reply,–Then Christ did not obey, for he offered no such prayer.
\nThe law of God makes no such demands, either expressly or impliedly. We
\nhave no right to believe that all men will be converted in answer to
\nour prayers, unless we have an express or implied promise to that
\neffect. As, therefore, there is no such promise, we are under no
\nobligation to offer such a prayer. Nor does the non-conversion of the
\nworld imply, that there are no saints in the world who fully obey God’s
\nlaw.<\/p>\n
It does not imply the conversion of any one for whom there is not an
\nexpress or implied promise in the word of God. The fact that Judas was
\nnot converted in answer to Christ’s prayer, does not prove that Christ
\ndid not fully obey.<\/p>\n
Nor does it imply that all those things which are expressly or
\nimpliedly promised, will be granted in answer to our prayers; or, in
\nother words, that we should pray in faith for them, if we are ignorant
\nof the existence or application of those promises. A state of perfect
\nlove implies the discharge of all known duty. And nothing strictly
\nspeaking can be duty, of which the mind has no knowledge. It cannot,
\ntherefore, be our duty to believe a promise of which we are entirely
\nignorant, or the application of which to any specific object we do not
\nunderstand.<\/p>\n
If there is sin in such a case as this, it lies in the fact, that the
\nsoul neglects to know what it ought to know. But it should always be
\nunderstood that the sin lies in this neglect to know, and not in the
\nneglect of that of which we have no knowledge. Entire obedience is
\ninconsistent with any present neglect to know the truth; for such
\nneglect is sin. But it is not inconsistent with our failing to do that
\nof which we have no knowledge. James says, “He that knoweth to do good
\nand doeth it not, to him it is sin.” “If ye were blind,” says Christ,
\n“ye should have no sin, but because ye say, We see, therefore your sin
\nremaineth.”<\/p>\n
17. Entire obedience to the divine law does not imply, that others will
\nof course regard our state of mind, and our outward life, as entirely
\nconformed to the law.<\/p>\n
It was insisted and positively believed by the Jews, that Jesus Christ
\nwas possessed of a wicked instead of a holy spirit. Such were their
\nnotions of holiness, that they no doubt supposed him to be actuated by
\nany other than the Spirit of God. They especially supposed so on
\naccount of his opposition to the current orthodoxy, and to the
\nungodliness of the religious teachers of the day. Now, who does not
\nsee, that when the church is, in a great measure, conformed to the
\nworld, a spirit of holiness in any man would certainly lead him to aim
\nthe sharpest rebukes at the spirit and life of those in this state,
\nwhether in high or low places? And who does not see, that this would
\nnaturally result in his being accused of possessing a wicked spirit?
\nAnd who does not know, that where a religious teacher finds himself
\nunder the necessity of attacking a false orthodoxy, he will certainly
\nbe hunted, almost as a beast of prey, by the religious teachers of his
\nday, whose authority, influence, and orthodoxy are thus assailed?<\/p>\n
18. Nor does it imply exemption from sorrow or mental suffering. It was
\nnot so with Christ. Nor is it inconsistent with our sorrowing for our
\nown past sins, and sorrowing that we have not now the health, and
\nvigor, and knowledge, and love, that we might have had, if we had
\nsinned less; or sorrow for those around us–sorrow in view of human
\nsinfulness, or suffering. These are all consistent with a state of
\njoyful love to God and man, and indeed are the natural results of it.<\/p>\n
19. Nor is it inconsistent with our living in human society–with
\nmingling in the scenes, and engaging in the affairs of this world, as
\nsome have supposed. Hence the absurd and ridiculous notions of papists
\nin retiring to monasteries, and convents–in taking the veil, and, as
\nthey say, retiring to a life of devotion. Now I suppose this state of
\nvoluntary exclusion from human society, to be utterly inconsistent with
\nany degree of holiness, and a manifest violation of the law of love to
\nour neighbor.<\/p>\n
20. Nor does it imply moroseness of temper and manners. Nothing is
\nfurther from the truth than this. It is said of Xavier, than whom,
\nperhaps, few holier men have ever lived, that “he was so cheerful as
\noften to be accused of being gay.” Cheerfulness is certainly the result
\nof holy love. And entire obedience no more implies moroseness in this
\nworld than it does in heaven.<\/p>\n
In all the discussions I have seen upon the subject of Christian
\nholiness, writers seldom or never raise the distinct inquiry: What does
\nobedience to the law of God imply, and what does it not imply? Instead
\nof bringing everything to this test, they seem to lose sight of it. On
\nthe one hand, they include things that the law of God never required of
\nman in his present state. Thus they lay a stumbling-block and a snare
\nfor the saints, to keep them in perpetual bondage, supposing that this
\nis the way to keep them humble, to place the standard entirely above
\ntheir reach. Or, on the other hand, they really abrogate the law, so as
\nto make it no longer binding. Or they so fritter away what is really
\nimplied in it, as to leave nothing in its requirements, but a sickly,
\nwhimsical, inefficient sentimentalism, or perfectionism, which in its
\nmanifestations and results, appears to me to be anything but that which
\nthe law of God requires.<\/p>\n
21. It does not imply that we always or ever aim at, or intend to do
\nour duty. That is, it does not imply that the intention always, or
\never, terminates on duty as an ultimate end. It is our duty to aim at
\nor intend the highest well-being of God and the universe, as an
\nultimate end, or for its own sake. This is the infinitely valuable end
\nat which we are at all times to aim. It is our duty to aim at this.
\nWhile we aim at this, we do our duty, but to aim at duty is not doing
\nduty.<\/p>\n
Nor does it imply that we always think, at the time, of its being duty,
\nor of our moral obligation to intend the good of being. This obligation
\nis a first truth, and is always and necessarily assumed by every moral
\nagent, and this assumption or knowledge is a condition of his moral
\nagency. But it is not at all essential to virtue or true obedience to
\nthe moral law, that moral obligation should at all times be present to
\nthe thoughts as an object of attention.<\/p>\n
Nor does it imply that the rightness or moral character of benevolence
\nis, at all times, the object of the mind’s attention. We may intend the
\nglory of God and the good of our neighbor, without at all times
\nthinking of the moral character of this intention. But the intention is
\nnot the less virtuous on this account. The mind unconsciously, but
\nnecessarily, assumes the rightness of benevolence, or of willing the
\ngood of being, just as it assumes other first truths, without being
\ndistinctly conscious of the assumption. It is not therefore, at all
\nessential to obedience to the law of God, that we should at all times
\nhave before our minds the virtuousness or moral character of
\nbenevolence.<\/p>\n
22. Nor does obedience to the moral law imply, that the law itself
\nshould be, at all times, the object of thought, or of the mind’s
\nattention. The law lies developed in the reason of every moral agent in
\nthe form of an idea. It is the idea of that choice or intention which
\nevery moral agent is bound to exercise. In other words, the law, as a
\nrule of duty, is a subjective idea always and necessarily developed in
\nthe mind of every moral agent. This idea he always and necessarily
\ntakes along with him, and he is always and necessarily a law to
\nhimself. Nevertheless, this law or idea, is not always the object of
\nthe mind’s attention and thought. A moral agent may exercise good-will
\nor love to God and man, without at the time being conscious of
\nthinking, that this love is required of him by the moral law. Nay, if I
\nam not mistaken, the benevolent mind generally exercises benevolence so
\nspontaneously, as not, for much of the time, even to think that this
\nlove to God is required of him. But this state of mind is not the less
\nvirtuous on this account. If the infinite value of God’s well-being and
\nof his infinite goodness constrains me to love him with all my heart,
\ncan any one suppose that this is regarded by him as the less virtuous,
\nbecause I did not wait to reflect, that God commanded me to love him,
\nand that it was my duty to do so?<\/p>\n
The thing upon which the intention must or ought to terminate is the
\ngood of being, and not the law that requires me to will it. When I will
\nthat end, I will the right end, and this willing is virtue, whether the
\nlaw be so much as thought of or not. Should it be said that I may will
\nthat end for a wrong reason, and, therefore, thus willing it is not
\nvirtue; that unless I will it because of my obligation, and intend
\nobedience to moral law, or to God, it is not virtue; I answer, that the
\nobjection involves an absurdity and a contradiction. I cannot will the
\ngood of God and of being, as an ultimate end, for a wrong reason. The
\nreason of the choice and the end chosen are identical, so that if I
\nwill the good of being as an ultimate end, I will it for the right
\nreason.<\/p>\n
It is impossible to will God’s good as an end, out of regard to his
\nauthority. This is to make his authority the end chosen, for the reason
\nof a choice is identical with the end chosen. Therefore, to will
\nanything for the reason that God requires it, is to will God’s
\nrequirement as an ultimate end. I cannot, therefore, love God with any
\nacceptable love, primarily, because he commands it. God never expected
\nto induce his creatures to love him, or to will his good, by commanding
\nthem to do so.<\/p>\n
23. Obedience to the moral law does not imply that we should
\npractically treat all interests that are of equal value according to
\ntheir value. For example, the precept, “Love thy neighbor as thyself,”
\ncannot mean that I am to take equal care of my own soul, and the soul
\nof every other human being. This were impossible. Nor does it mean that
\nI should take the same care and oversight of my own, and of all the
\nfamilies of the earth. Nor that I should divide what little of
\nproperty, or time, or talent I have, equally among all mankind. This
\nwere–<\/p>\n
(1.) Impossible.<\/p>\n
(2.) Uneconomical for the universe. More good will result to the
\nuniverse by each individual’s giving his attention particularly to the
\npromotion of those interests that are within his reach, and that are so
\nunder his influence that he possesses particular advantages for
\npromoting them. Every interest is to be esteemed according to its
\nrelative value; but our efforts to promote particular interests should
\ndepend upon our relations and capacity to promote them. Some interests
\nof great value we may be under no obligation to promote, for the reason
\nthat we have no ability to promote them, while we may be under
\nobligation to promote interests of vastly less value, for the reason,
\nthat we are able to promote them. We are to aim at promoting those
\ninterests that we can most surely and extensively promote, but always
\nin a manner that shall not interfere with others promoting other
\ninterests, according to their relative value. Every man is bound to
\npromote his own, and the salvation of his family, not because they
\nbelong to self, but because they are valuable in themselves, and
\nbecause they are particularly committed to him, as being directly
\nwithin his reach. This is a principle everywhere assumed in the
\ngovernment of God, and I wish it to be distinctly borne in mind, as we
\nproceed in our investigations, as it will, on the one hand, prevent
\nmisapprehension, and, on the other, avoid the necessity of
\ncircumlocution, when we wish to express the same idea; the true intent
\nand meaning of the moral law, no doubt, is, that every interest or good
\nknown to a moral being shall be esteemed according to its intrinsic
\nvalue, and that, in our efforts to promote good, we are to aim at
\nsecuring the greatest practicable amount, and to bestow our efforts
\nwhere, as it appears from our circumstances and relations, we can
\naccomplish the greatest good. This ordinarily can be done, beyond all
\nquestion, only by each one attending to the promotion of those
\nparticular interests which are most within the reach of his influence.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
LECTURE X. OBEDIENCE ENTIRE. The government of God accepts nothing as virtue but obedience to the law of God. But it may be asked, Why state this proposition? Was this truth ever called in question? I answer, that the truth of this proposition, though apparently so self-evident that to raise the question may reasonably excite…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"twitterCardType":"","cardImageID":0,"cardImage":"","cardTitle":"","cardDesc":"","cardImageAlt":"","cardPlayer":"","cardPlayerWidth":0,"cardPlayerHeight":0,"cardPlayerStream":"","cardPlayerCodec":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-5434","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5434","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5434"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5434\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5434"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5434"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/purposedriven.ca\/wiki\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5434"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}