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Title: Systematic Theology [1878]
Creator(s): Finney, Charles Grandison (1792-1875)
Rights: Public Domain
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LECTURES
on
SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY;
BY THE
REV. CHARLES G. FINNEY
LATE PRESIDENT OF OBERLIN COLLEGE AND PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY
EDITED BY
PRES. J. H. FAIRCHILD
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Published by
COLPORTER KEMP
Whittier, Calif.
This edition originally published in 1878 by E. J. Goodrich
Re-published in 1944 by Colporter Kemp
Second Edition 1946
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NOTE BY THE EDITOR.
Two editions of President Finney’s Lectures on Systematic Theology have
been published — the first in this country in 1846, the second in
England in 1851, — the English edition being somewhat more full than
its predecessor. Both editions have been exhausted, and the book has
disappeared from the market.
The present edition has been prepared from the English edition by a
process of condensation, omitting, to some extent, restatements or
repetitions of the argument, paragraphs of a hortatory character, and
other parts not essential to the expression or elucidation of the
doctrine.
Aside from these omissions, no changes have been made. No liberties
have been taken with the author’s style or thought. Every sentence is
his own, and even in those parts where, in the judgment of the editor,
the author’s views are not elaborated with perfect consistency, as in
the presentation of sin as selfishness, and in the lectures on
sanctification, no attempt has been made to secure consistency, as
might have been done by judicious omissions. The author was in the
habit of thinking and speaking for himself while living, and no one can
undertake to speak for him now that he is dead.
This condensed edition, it is believed, will not be less valuable, as
an exponent of Mr. Finney’s teaching, than the English edition, but
even more valuable. Unnecessary bulk in a volume is a hindrance and
discouragement to the reader. The topics will be found to be presented
with all necessary fullness.
J. H. F.
OBERLIN COLLEGE, 1878.
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PREFACE.
BY REV. GEORGE REDFORD, D.D.,
EDITOR OF THE ENGLISH EDITION.
THE Lectures of the Rev. Professor Finney, which are here given to the
British public, were first delivered to the class of theological
students at the Oberlin College, America, and subsequently published
there. They were unknown in this country, except to a few of the
Author’s personal friends, until his arrival in England, about two
years since. His name, however, was well known, and several of his
works had been extensively read.
The Editor having had the pleasure and honor of forming a personal
acquaintance with the Author soon after his arrival in this country,
did not long remain ignorant of his Theological Lectures. After his
first hasty perusal of them, he ventured strongly to recommend their
publication, both for the sake of making the British churches better
acquainted with the Author’s doctrinal views, and also on account of
the direct benefit which students, and other inquirers into the theory
of gospel doctrines, would be likely to derive from a work so
argumentative, and so unlike all the works on systematic and dogmatic
theology known to the English schools. After due consultation and
deliberation, the Author pressed upon the Editor the work of revision,
and placed the Lectures in his hands, with the request that he would
read them carefully, and suggest such alterations as he might deem
desirable to adapt the work to the English reader; and then submit the
whole to the Author’s adoption or rejection.
This task the Editor undertook, and has performed in the best manner
his time and ability would allow. The Author has carefully examined
every part of his work again, and made such corrections and alterations
as to him seemed needful. The Editor has merely performed the part of a
friend, in suggesting such improvements as might make the Author’s
meaning better understood; but without interfering with that meaning,
and without intending to give it an unqualified approbation. In fact,
the Lectures have been to a considerable extent re-written by the
Author, and in this edition proceed as strictly from his own pen, as in
the American edition.
The Editor, however, would not have ventured to recommend the
publication of these Lectures in this country, if he had not deemed
them, as a whole, eminently deserving the attention and examination of
British theologians. When they first came into his hands, they struck
him as so pleasingly unlike all the other systems of dogmatic theology
and moral philosophy it had ever been his lot to peruse, so thorough in
their grappling with difficulties, and often so successful in the
solution of them; so skillfully adjusted to modern metaphysical
speculations, and so comprehensive of what is valuable in them; so
manifestly the production of a masculine intellect and independent
thinker, that he was not only pleased with the air of freshness and
originality thrown over old themes of dry and elaborate discussion, but
greatly benefited and instructed by some of the Author’s views of
important moral and theological questions. It may not be the same with
all the Author’s English readers; but assuredly few will rise from the
perusal of the whole work without confessing that, at least, they have
seen some points in a new and impressive light, have been constrained
to think more closely of the opinions they hold, and in other respects
have been benefited by the perusal.
As a contribution to theological science, in an age when vague
speculation and philosophical theories are bewildering many among all
denominations of Christians, this work will be considered by all
competent judges to be both valuable and seasonable. Upon several
important and difficult subjects the Author has thrown a clear and
valuable light which will guide many a student through perplexities and
difficulties which he had long sought unsuccessfully to explain. The
Editor frankly confesses, that when a student he would gladly have
bartered half the books in his library to have gained a single perusal
of these Lectures; and he cannot refrain from expressing the belief,
that no young student of theology will ever regret the purchase or
perusal of Mr. Finney’s Lectures.
One recommendation he begs respectfully to offer to all readers whether
old or young; it is this: suspend your judgment of the Author and his
theology until you have gone completely through his work. On many
subjects, at the outset of the discussion, startling propositions may
be found which will clash with your settled opinions; but if you will
calmly and patiently await the Author’s explanation, and observe how he
qualifies some strong or novel assertions, you will most probably find
in the issue, that you have less reason than you supposed to object to
his statements.
In many respects Mr. Finney’s theological and moral system will be
found to differ both from the Calvinistic and Arminian. In fact, it is
a system of his own, if not in its separate portions, yet in its
construction; and as a whole is at least unique and compact; a system
which the Author has wrought out for himself, with little other aid
than what he has derived from the fount itself of heavenly truth, and
his own clear and strong perception of the immutable moral principles
and laws by which the glorious Author of the universe governs all his
intellectual creatures.
There is one circumstance that will recommend the volume, and ought to
recommend it, to impartial inquirers who are not bound to the words of
any master save their Divine one; it is, that the Author in his youth
was trained in none of the theological schools of his country, and had
imbibed, therefore, no educational preference for one system more than
another. He had been disciplined to argumentation, logic, and the laws
of evidence, in a very different arena; and had advanced in the science
of the Law before he had felt the truth of Christianity, or thought of
studying its doctrines. His views, therefore, will be found more
deserving of attention and examination, from the fact of his mental
independence in the formation of them.
Should the work be read in a calm, devout, unprejudiced and liberal
spirit, there can be no doubt that the reader will derive both pleasure
and instruction. The earnestness, single-mindedness, deep piety, and
eminent usefulness of the Author, both as a preacher and lecturer,
justly entitle this production of his pen to the candid and patient
investigation of English divines.
Apart from the peculiarities which will be observed, and the critical
objections to which some will deem his theology justly liable, there
can be no doubt that many will find in it a treasure of inestimable
worth, a key to many perplexing enigmas, and a powerful reinforcement
of their faith in the Christian verities. With at least the hope that
such will be the effects of its publication in England, the Editor has
cheerfully contributed his humble aid, and now commits the work to the
blessing of Him by whose Word of Truth its real value must be finally
tested.
G. R.
Worcester, (Eng.) 1851.
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PREFACE BY THE AUTHOR
1. To a great extent, the truths of the blessed gospel have been hidden
under a false philosophy. In my early inquiries on the subject of
religion, I found myself wholly unable to understand either the oral or
written instructions of uninspired religious teachers. They seemed to
me to resolve all religion into states either of the intellect or of
the sensibility, which my consciousness assured me were wholly passive
or involuntary. When I sought for definitions and explanations, I felt
assured that they did not well understand themselves. I was struck with
the fact that they so seldom defined, even to themselves, their own
positions. Among the words of most frequent use, I could find scarcely
a single term intelligibly defined. I inquired in what sense the terms
“regeneration,” “faith,” “repentance,” “love,” etc., were used, but
could obtain no answer, at which it did not appear to me that both
reason and revelation revolted. The doctrines of a nature, sinful per
se, of a necessitated will, of inability, and of physical regeneration,
and physical Divine influence in regeneration, with their kindred and
resulting dogmas, embarrassed and even confounded me at every step. I
often said to myself, “If these things are really taught in the Bible,
I must be an infidel.” But the more I read my Bible, the more clearly I
saw that these things were not found there upon any fair principles of
interpretation, such as would be admitted in a court of justice. I
could not but perceive that the true idea of moral government had no
place in the theology of the church; and, on the contrary, that
underlying the whole system were the assumptions that all government
was physical, as opposed to moral, and that sin and holiness are rather
natural attributes, than moral, voluntary acts.
These errors were not stated in words, but I could not fail to see that
they were assumed. The distinction between original and actual sin, and
the utter absence of a distinction between physical and moral
depravity, embarrassed me. Indeed, I was satisfied either that I must
be an infidel, or that these were errors that had no place in the
Bible. I was often warned against reasoning and leaning to my own
understanding. I found that the discriminating teachers of religion
were driven to confess that they could not establish the logical
consistency of their system, and that they were obliged to shut their
eyes and believe, when revelation seemed to conflict with the
affirmations of reason. But this course I could not take. I found, or
thought I found, nearly all the doctrines of Christianity embarrassed
by the assumptions above named. But the Spirit of God conducted me
through the darkness, and delivered me from the labyrinth and fog of a
false philosophy, and set my feet upon the rock of truth, as I trust.
But to this day I meet with those who seem to me to be in much
confusion upon most of the practical doctrines of Christianity. They
will admit, that sin and holiness must be voluntary, and yet speak of
regeneration as consisting in anything but a voluntary change, and of
Divine influence in regeneration, as anything but moral or persuasive.
They seem not at all aware of what must follow from, and be implied in,
the admission of the existence of moral government, and that sin and
holiness must be free and voluntary acts and states of mind. In this
work I have endeavored to define the terms used by Christian divines,
and the doctrines of Christianity, as I understand them, and to push to
their logical consequences the cardinal admissions of the more recent
and standard theological writers. Especially do I urge, to their
logical consequences, the two admissions that the will is free, and
that sin and holiness are voluntary acts of mind. I will not presume
that I have satisfied others upon the points I have discussed, but I
have succeeded at least in satisfying myself. I regard the assertion,
that the doctrines of theology cannot preserve a logical consistency
throughout, as both dangerous and ridiculous.
2. My principal design in publishing Systematic Theology at first, was
to furnish my pupils with a class or textbook, wherein many points and
questions were discussed of great practical importance, but which have
not, to my knowledge, been discussed in any system of theological
instruction extant. I also hoped to benefit other studious and pious
minds.
3. I have written for those who are willing to take the trouble of
thinking and of forming opinions of their own on theological questions.
It has been no part of my aim to spare my pupils or any one else the
trouble of intense thought. Had I desired to do so, the subjects
discussed would have rendered such an attempt abortive.
4. There are many questions of great practical importance, and
questions in which multitudes are taking a deep interest at present,
that cannot be intelligently settled without instituting fundamental
inquiries involving the discussion of those questions that lie at the
foundation of morality and religion.
5. Most of the subjects of dispute among Christians at the present day
are founded in misconceptions upon the subjects discussed in the
volume. If I have succeeded in settling the questions which I have
discussed, we shall see, that in a future volume most of the subjects
of disagreement among Christians at the present day can be
satisfactorily adjusted with comparative ease.
6. What I have said on “Moral Law” and on the “Foundation of Moral
Obligation” is the key to the whole subject. Whoever masters and
understands these can readily understand all the rest. But he who will
not possess himself of my meaning upon these subjects, will not
understand the rest.
7. Let no one despair in commencing the book, nor stumble at the
definitions, thinking that he can never understand so abstruse a
subject. Remember that what follows is an expansion and an explanation
by way of application, of what you find so condensed in the first pages
of the book. My brother, sister, friend — read, study, think, and read
again. You were made to think. It will do you good to think; to develop
your powers by study. God designed that religion should require
thought, intense thought, and should thoroughly develop our powers of
thought. The Bible itself is written in a style so condensed as to
require much intense study. I do not pretend to so explain theology as
to dispense with the labor of thinking. I have no ability and no wish
to do so.
8. If any of my brethren think to convince me of error, they must first
understand me, and show that they have read the book through, and that
they understand it, and are candidly inquiring after truth and not
“striving for masteries.” If my brother is inquiring after truth, I
will, by the grace of God, “hear with both ears, and then judge.” But I
will not promise to attend to all that cavillers may say, nor to notice
what those impertinent talkers and writers may say or write who must
have controversy. But to all honest inquirers after truth I would say,
Hail, my brother! Let us be thorough. Truth shall do us good.
9. It will be seen that the present volume contains only a part of a
course of Systematic Theology. Should the entire course ever appear
before the public, one volume will precede, and another succeed the
present one. I published this volume first, because it contains all the
points upon which I have been supposed to differ from the commonly
received views. As a teacher of theology, I thought it due to the
church and to the world, to give them my views upon those points upon
which I had been accused of departing from the common opinions of
Christians.
10. I have not yet been able to stereotype my theological views, and
have ceased to expect ever to do so. The idea is preposterous. None but
an omniscient mind can continue to maintain a precise identity of views
and opinions. Finite minds, unless they are asleep or stultified by
prejudice, must advance in knowledge. The discovery of new truth will
modify old views and opinions, and there is perhaps no end to this
process with finite minds in any world. True Christian consistency does
not consist in stereotyping our opinions and views, and in refusing to
make any improvement lest we should be guilty of change, but it
consists in holding our minds open to receive the rays of truth from
every quarter and in changing our views and language and practice as
often and as fast, as we can obtain further information. I call this
Christian consistency, because this course alone accords with a
Christian profession. A Christian profession implies the profession of
candor and of a disposition to know and obey all truth. It must follow,
that Christian consistency implies continued investigation and change
of views and practice corresponding with increasing knowledge. No
Christian, therefore, and no theologian should be afraid to change his
views, his language, or his practices in conformity with increasing
light. The prevalence of such a fear would keep the world, at best, at
a perpetual standstill, on all subjects of science, and consequently
all improvements would be precluded.
Every uninspired attempt to frame for the church an authoritative
standard of opinion which shall be regarded as an unquestionable
exposition of the word of God, is not only impious in itself, but it is
also a tacit assumption of the fundamental dogma of Papacy. The
Assembly of Divines did more than to assume the necessity of a Pope to
give law to the opinions of men; they assumed to create an immortal
one, or rather to embalm their own creed, and preserve it as the Pope
of all generations; or it is more just to say, that those who have
adopted that confession of faith and catechism as an authoritative
standard of doctrine, have absurdly adopted the most obnoxious
principle of Popery, and elevated their confession and catechism to the
Papal throne and into the place of the Holy Ghost. That the instrument
framed by that assembly should in the nineteenth century be recognized
as the standard of the church, or of an intelligent branch of it, is
not only amazing, but I must say that it is most ridiculous. It is as
absurd in theology as it would be in any other branch of science, and
as injurious and stultifying as it is absurd and ridiculous. It is
better to have a living than a dead Pope. If we must have an
authoritative expounder of the word of God, let us have a living one,
so as not to preclude the hope of improvement. “A living dog is better
than a dead lion;” so a living Pope is better than a dead and
stereotyped confession of faith, that holds all men bound to subscribe
to its unalterable dogmas and its unvarying terminology.
11. I hold myself sacredly bound, not to defend these positions at all
events, but on the contrary, to subject every one of them to the most
thorough discussion, and to hold and treat them as I would the opinions
of any one else; that is, if upon further discussion and investigation
I see no cause to change, I hold them fast; but if I can see a flaw in
any one of them, I shall amend or wholly reject it, as further light
shall demand. Should I refuse or fail to do this, I should need to
blush for my folly and inconsistency, for I say again, that true
Christian consistency implies progress in knowledge and holiness, and
such changes in theory and in practice as are demanded by increasing
light.
On the strictly fundamental questions in theology, my views have not,
for many years, undergone any change, except as I have clearer
apprehensions of them than formerly, and should now state some of them,
perhaps, in some measure, differently from what I should then have
done.
THE AUTHOR
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CONTENTS.
LECTURE I.
MORAL GOVERNMENT.
Definition of the term law. — Distinction between physical and moral
law. — The essential attributes of moral law. — Subjectivity. —
Objectivity. — Liberty, as opposed to necessity. — Fitness. —
Universality. — Impartiality. — Practicability. — Independence. —
Immutability. — Unity. — Expediency. — Exclusiveness
1
LECTURE II.
MORAL GOVERNMENT — Continued.
Definition of the term government. — Distinction between moral and
physical government. — The fundamental reason of moral government. —
Whose right it is to govern. — What is implied in the right to govern.
— The limits of this right. — Moral obligation. — The conditions of
moral obligation
6
LECTURE III.
MORAL OBLIGATION.
Man a subject of moral obligation. — Extent of moral obligation 19
LECTURE IV.
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.
What is intended by the foundation of moral obligation. — Self-evident
principles. — That the sovereign will of God is not the foundation of
moral obligation. — The theory of Paley. — The utilitarian philosophy
27
LECTURE V.
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. FALSE THEORIES.
Right as the foundation of obligation 38
LECTURE VI.
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. FALSE THEORIES.
The goodness or moral excellence of God as the foundation of obligation
49
LECTURE VII.
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. FALSE THEORIES.
Moral order as the foundation of obligation. — The nature and
relations of moral beings as the true foundation of obligation. —
Moral obligation as founded in the idea of duty. — The complexity of
the foundation of obligation. — Summing up
64
LECTURE VIII.
FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. PRACTICAL BEARINGS OF THE DIFFERENT THEORIES.
The theory that regards the sovereign will of God as the foundation of
moral obligation. — The theory of the selfish school. — The natural
and necessary results of utilitarianism. — Practical bearings and
tendency of rightarianism. — The practical bearings of the true theory
of the foundation of obligation
80
LECTURE IX.
UNITY OF MORAL ACTION.
What constitutes obedience to moral law. — Obedience cannot be
partial. — Possible suppositions. — Objections considered
95
LECTURE X.
OBEDIENCE ENTIRE.
Nothing virtue but obedience to the law of God. — No rule of duty but
moral law: Condition of justification
115
LECTURE XI.
OBEDIENCE TO THE MORAL LAW.
What is not implied in entire obedience to the law of God 124
LECTURE XII.
ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.
Certain facts revealed in consciousness. — Attributes of that love
which constitutes obedience to the law. — Voluntariness. — Liberty.
— Intelligence. — Virtuousness. — Disinterestedness. —
Impartiality. — Universality
135
LECTURE XIII.
ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE — Continued.
Efficiency. — Complacency. — Opposition to sin. — Compassion 145
LECTURE XIV.
ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE — Continued.
Mercy. — Justice. — Veracity 157
LECTURE XV.
ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE — Continued.
Patience. — Meekness. — Self-denial. — Condescension. — Stability.
— Holiness, or Purity
166
LECTURE XVI.
DISOBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW.
What disobedience to moral law cannot consist in. — What disobedience
to moral law must consist in
180
LECTURE XVII.
ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS.
Voluntariness. — Liberty. — Intelligence. — Unreasonableness. —
Interestedness. — Partiality. — Efficiency. — Opposition to
benevolence or to virtue. — Cruelty. — Injustice
183
LECTURE XVIII.
ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS — Continued.
Falsehood, or lying. — Pride. — Intemperance. — Total moral
depravity 196
LECTURE XIX.
SANCTIONS OF MORAL LAW.
What constitutes the sanctions of law. — In what light sanctions are
to be regarded. — Duration of the penal sanctions of the law of God
208
LECTURE XX.
HUMAN GOVERNMENT.
Me ultimate end of God in Creation. — Providential and moral
governments indispensable to the highest good of the universe. — Human
governments a necessity of human nature. — This necessity will
continue as long as human beings exist in this world. — Human
governments are plainly recognized in the Bible as a part of the moral
government of God. — Objections answered. — The limits of the right
of government
214
LECTURE XXI.
HUMAN GOVERNMENT — Continued.
No form of civil government universally obligatory. — Revolutions. —
In what cases human legislation is valid, and in what cases it is null
and void. — The rights and duties of governments and subjects in
relation to the execution of the penalties of law
222
LECTURE XXII.
MORAL DEPRAVITY.
Definition. — Distinction between physical and moral depravity. —
Mankind both physically and morally depraved. — Moral depravity of
mankind universal. — Moral depravity total
228
LECTURE XXIII.
MORAL DEPRAVITY — Continued.
Proper method of accounting for moral depravity. — Dr. ‘Woods’ view of
physical and moral depravity examined. — Standards of the Presbyterian
Church examined 235
LECTURE XXIV.
MORAL DEPRAVITY — Continued.
Further arguments in support of the position that human nature is in
itself sinful. — The proper method of accounting for moral depravity.
— Summary of the truth on this subject — Remarks 245
LECTURE XXV.
ATONEMENT.
Established governmental principles. — The term atonement. —
Affirmations of reason upon the subject. — The fact of atonement. —
Christ’s obedience did not constitute the atonement. — The atonement
not a commercial transaction. — The atonement a satisfaction of public
justice 258
LECTURE XXVI.
EXTENT OF ATONEMENT.
For whose benefit the atonement was intended. — Objections answered
274
LECTURE XXVII.
REGENERATION.
The common distinction between regeneration and conversion. — The
assigned reasons for this distinction. — Objections to this
distinction. — What regeneration is. — The universal necessity of
regeneration. — Agencies employed in regeneration. —
Instrumentalities employed in the work. — The subject both passive and
active. — What is implied in regeneration 282
LECTURE XXVIII.
REGENERATION — Continued.
Different theories of regeneration examined. — The taste scheme. —
The divine efficiency scheme. — The susceptibility scheme. — Theory
of a divine moral suasion. — Objections to this theory. — Remarks 291
LECTURE XXIX.
EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION.
Wherein saints and sinners may agree. — Remarks 300
LECTURE XXX.
EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION — Continued.
Wherein saints and sinners must differ 309
LECTURE XXXI.
NATURAL ABILITY.
The Edwardean notion of ability and of natural inability. — Natural
ability identical with freedom or liberty of will. — The human will
free. — Moral inability according to the Edwardean school. — This
distinction between natural and moral inability nonsensical. —
Fundamental error of the Edwardean school on the subject of ability. —
Another scheme of inability 320
LECTURE XXXII.
GRACIOUS ABILITY.
What is intended by the term. — This doctrine absurd. — In what sense
a gracious ability is possible 341
LECTURE XXXIII.
THE NOTION OF INABILITY.
Proper mode of accounting for it 353
LECTURE XXXIV.
REPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE.
What repentance is not, and what it is. — What is implied in it. —
What impenitence is not. — What it is. — Some things that are implied
in it. — Some evidences of ft 364
LECTURE XXXV.
FAITH AND UNBELIEF.
What evangelical faith is not. — What it is. — What is implied in it.
— What unbelief is not. — What it is. — What is implied in it. —
Conditions of both faith and unbelief. — The guilt of unbelief. —
Consequences of both faith and unbelief 373
LECTURE XXXVI.
JUSTIFICATION.
What justification is not.–What it is. — Conditions of justification.
— Foundation of justification 382
LECTURE XXXVII.
SANCTIFICATION.
Some points that have been settled. — Definition of terms. — The real
question. — Entire sanctification attainable in this life 402
LECTURE XXXVIII.
SANCTIFICATION.
Paul entirely sanctified 423
LECTURE XXXIX.
SANCTIFICATION.
Conditions of its attainment. — Relations of Christ to the soul 433
LECTURE XL.
SANCTIFICATION.
Objections answered 448
LECTURE XLI.
SANCTIFICATION.
Objections continued 462
LECTURE XLII.
SANCTIFICATION.
Remarks 472
LECTURE XLIII.
Election 481
LECTURE XLIV.
Reprobation 499
LECTURE XLV.
Divine Sovereignty 515
LECTURE XLVI.
Purposes of God 524
LECTURE XLVII.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS.
The different kinds of certainty. — What is not intended by the
perseverance of the saints 544
LECTURE XLVIII.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS.
The doctrine proved 554
LECTURE XLIX.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS.
Further proof 563
LECTURE L.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS.
Objections considered 585
LECTURE LI.
PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS.
Further objections 605
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SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.
LECTURE I.
MORAL LAW.
Law, in a sense of the term both sufficiently popular and scientific
for my purpose, is A RULE OF ACTION. In its generic signification, it
is applicable to every kind of action, whether of matter or of
mind–whether intelligent or unintelligent–whether free or necessary
action.
Physical law is a term that represents the order of sequence, in all
the changes that occur under the law of necessity, whether in matter or
mind. I mean all changes whether of state or action, that do not
consist in the states or actions of free will. Physical law is the law
of the material universe. It is also the law of mind, so far as its
states and changes are involuntary. All mental states or actions, which
are not free and sovereign actions of will, must occur under, and be
subject to, physical law. They cannot possibly be accounted for, except
as they are ascribed to the law of necessity or force.
Moral law is a rule of moral action with sanctions. It is that rule to
which moral agents ought to conform all their voluntary actions, and is
enforced by sanctions equal to the value of the precept. It is the rule
for the government of free and intelligent action, as opposed to
necessary and unintelligent action. It is the law of liberty, as
opposed to the law of necessity–of motive and free choice, as opposed
to force of every kind. Moral law is primarily a rule for the direction
of the action of free will, and strictly of free will only. But
secondarily, and less strictly, it is the rule for the regulation of
all those actions and states of mind and body, that follow the free
actions of will by a law of necessity. Thus, moral law controls
involuntary mental states and outward action only by securing
conformity of the actions of free will to its precept.
The essential attributes of moral law, are,
1. Subjectivity. It is, and must be, an idea of reason developed in the
mind of the subject. It is an idea, or conception, of that state of
will, or course of action, which is obligatory upon a moral agent. No
one can be a moral agent, or the subject of moral law, unless he has
this idea developed; for this idea is identical with the law. It is the
law developed or revealed within himself; and thus he becomes “a law to
himself,” his own reason affirming his obligation to conform to this
idea, or law.
2. Objectivity. Moral law may be regarded as a rule of duty, prescribed
by the supreme Lawgiver, and external to self. When thus contemplated,
it is objective.
3. Liberty, as opposed to necessity. The precept must lie developed in
the reason, as a rule of duty–a law of moral obligation–a rule of
choice, or of ultimate intention, declaring that which a moral agent
ought to choose, will, intend. But it does not, must not, can not
possess the attribute of necessity in its relations to the actions of
free will. It must not, cannot, possess an element or attribute of
force, in any such sense as to render conformity of will to its precept
unavoidable. This would confound it with physical law.
4. Fitness. It must be the law of nature, that is, its precept must
prescribe and require just those actions of the will which are suitable
to the nature and relations of moral beings, and nothing more nor less;
that is, the intrinsic value of the well-being of God and of the
universe being given as the ground, and the nature and relations of
moral beings as the condition of the obligation, the reason hereupon
necessarily affirms the intrinsic propriety and fitness of choosing
this good, and of consecrating the whole being to its promotion. This
is what is intended by the law of nature. It is the law or rule of
action imposed on us by God, in and by the nature which he has given
us.
5. Universality. The conditions and circumstances being the same, it
requires, and must require, of all moral agents, the same things, in
whatever world they may be found.
6. Impartiality. Moral law is no respecter of persons–knows no
privileged classes. It demands one thing of all, without regard to
anything, except the fact that they are moral agents. By this it is not
intended that the same course of outward conduct is required of all;
but the same state of heart in all–that all shall have one ultimate
intention–that all shall consecrate themselves to one end–that all
shall entirely conform, in heart and life, to their nature and
relations.
7. Practicability. That which the precept demands must be possible to
the subject. That which demands a natural impossibility is not, and
cannot be, moral law. The true definition of law excludes the
supposition that it can, under any circumstances, demand an absolute
impossibility. Such a demand could not be in accordance with the nature
and relations of moral agents, and therefore practicability must always
be an attribute of moral law. To talk of inability to obey moral law is
to talk nonsense.
8. Independence. It is an eternal and necessary idea of the divine
reason. It is the eternal, self-existent rule of the divine conduct,
the law which the intelligence of God prescribes to himself. Moral law,
as we shall see hereafter more fully, does not, and cannot originate in
the will of God. It eternally existed in the divine reason. It is the
idea of that state of will which is obligatory upon God, upon condition
of his natural attributes, or, in other words, upon condition of his
nature. As a law, it is entirely independent of his will just as his
own existence is. It is obligatory also upon every moral agent,
entirely independent of the will of God. Their nature and relations
being given, and their intelligence being developed, moral law must be
obligatory upon them, and it lies not in the option of any being to
make it otherwise. Their nature and relations being given, to pursue a
course of conduct suited to their nature and relations, is necessarily
and self-evidently obligatory, independent of the will of any being.
9. Immutability. Moral law can never change, or be changed. It always
requires of every moral agent a state of heart, and course of conduct,
precisely suited to his nature and relations. Whatever his nature is,
his capacity and relations are, entire conformity to just that nature,
those capacities and relations, so far as he is able to understand
them, is required at every moment, and nothing more nor less. If
capacity is enlarged, the subject is not thereby rendered capable of
works of supererogation–of doing more than the law demands; for the
law still, as always, requires the full consecration of his whole being
to the public interests. If by any means whatever, his ability is
abridged, moral law, always and necessarily consistent with itself,
still requires that what is left–nothing more or less–shall be
consecrated to the same end as before. Whatever demands more or less
than entire, universal, and constant conformity of heart and life, to
the nature, capacity and relations of moral agents, be they what they
may, is not, and cannot be moral law. If therefore, the capacity is by
any means abridged, the subject does not thereby become incapable of
rendering full obedience; for the law still demands and urges, that the
heart and life shall be fully conformed to the present, existing
nature, capacity, and relations. Anything that requires more or less
than this, cannot be moral law. Moral law invariably holds one
language. It never changes its requirement. “Thou shalt love,” or be
perfectly benevolent, is its uniform and its only demand. This demand
it never varies, and never can vary. It is as immutable as God is, and
for the same reason. To talk of letting down, or altering moral law, is
to talk absurdly. The thing is naturally impossible. No being has the
right or the power to do so. The supposition overlooks the very nature
of moral law. Moral law is not a statute, an enactment, that has its
origin or its foundation in the will of any being. It is the law of
nature, the law which the nature or constitution of every moral agent
imposes on himself and which God imposes upon us because it is entirely
suited to our nature and relations, and is therefore naturally
obligatory upon us. It is the unalterable demand of the reason, that
the whole being, whatever there is of it at any time, shall be entirely
consecrated to the highest good of universal being, and for this reason
God requires this of us, with all the weight of his authority.
10. Unity. Moral law proposes but one ultimate end of pursuit to God,
and to all moral agents. All its requisitions, in their spirit, are
summed up and expressed in one word, love or benevolence. This I only
announce here. It will more fully appear hereafter. Moral law is a pure
and simple idea of the reason. It is the idea of perfect, universal,
and constant consecration of the whole being to the highest good of
being. Just this is, and nothing more nor less can be, moral law; for
just this, and nothing more nor less, is a state of heart and a course
of life exactly suited to the nature and relations of moral agents,
which is the only true definition of moral law.
11. Expediency. That which is upon the whole most wise is expedient.
That which is upon the whole expedient is demanded by moral law. True
expediency and the spirit of moral law are always identical. Expediency
may be inconsistent with the letter, but never with the spirit of moral
law. Law in the form of commandment is a revelation or declaration of
that course which is expedient. It is expediency revealed, as in the
case of the decalogue, and the same is true of every precept of the
Bible, it reveals to us what is expedient. A revealed law or
commandment is never to be set aside by our views of expediency. We may
know with certainty that what is required is expedient. The command is
the expressed judgment of God in the case, and reveals with unerring
certainty the true path of expediency. When Paul says, “All things are
lawful unto me, but all things are not expedient,” we must not
understand him as meaning that all things in the absolute sense were
lawful to him, or that anything that was not expedient was lawful to
him. But he doubtless intended, that many things were inexpedient that
are not expressly prohibited by the letter of the law,–that the spirit
of the law prohibited many things not expressly forbidden by the
letter. It should never be forgotten that that which is plainly
demanded by the highest good of the universe is law. It is expedient.
It is wise. The true spirit of the moral law does and must demand it.
So, on the other hand, whatever is plainly inconsistent with the
highest good of the universe is illegal, unwise, inexpedient, and must
be prohibited by the spirit of moral law. But let the thought be
repeated, that the Bible precepts always reveal that which is truly
expedient, and in no case are we at liberty to set aside the spirit of
any commandment upon the supposition that expediency requires it. Some
have denounced the doctrine of expediency altogether, as at all times
inconsistent with the law of right. These philosophers proceed upon the
assumption that the law of right and the law of benevolence are not
identical but inconsistent with each other. This is a common but
fundamental mistake, which leads me to remark that–Law proposes the
highest good of universal being as its end, and requires all moral
agents to consecrate themselves to the promotion of this end.
Consequently, expediency must be one of its attributes. That which is
upon the whole in the highest degree useful to the universe must be
demanded by moral law. Moral law must, from its own nature, require
just that course of willing and acting that is upon the whole in the
highest degree promotive of the public good,–in other words, that
which is upon the whole in the highest degree useful, and therefore
expedient. It has been strangely and absurdly maintained that right
would be obligatory if it necessarily tended to and resulted in
universal and perfect misery. Than which a more nonsensical affirmation
was never made. The affirmation assumes that the law of right and of
good-will are not only distinct, but may be antagonistic. It also
assumes that that can be law that is not suited to the nature and
relations of moral agents. Certainly it will not be pretended that that
course of willing and acting that necessarily tends to, and results in,
universal misery, can be consistent with the nature and relations of
moral agents. Nothing is or can be suited to their nature and
relations, that is not upon the whole promotive of their highest
well-being. Expediency and right are always and necessarily at one.
They can never be inconsistent. That which is upon the whole most
expedient is right, and that which is right is upon the whole
expedient.
12. Exclusiveness. Moral law is the only possible rule of moral
obligation. A distinction is usually made between moral, ceremonial,
civil and positive laws. This distinction is in some respects
convenient, but is liable to mislead, and to create an impression that
something can be obligatory, in other words can be law, that has not
the attributes of moral law. Nothing can be law, in any proper sense of
the term, that is not and would not be universally obligatory upon
moral agents under the same circumstances. It is law because, and only
because, under all the circumstances of the case, the course prescribed
is fit, proper, suitable, to their natures, relations, and
circumstances. There can be no other rule of action for moral agents
but moral law, or the law of benevolence. Every other rule is
absolutely excluded by the very nature of moral law. Surely there can
be no law that is or can be obligatory upon moral agents but one suited
to, and founded in their nature, relations, and circumstances. This is
and must be the law of love or benevolence. This is the law of right,
and nothing else is or can be. Every thing else that claims to be law,
and to impose obligation upon moral agents, must be an imposition and
“a thing of nought.”
On this day…
- Early Christianity – 2025
- Era of the Apostles – 2025
- Jeremiah 6 – 2024
- WALK IN THE LIGHT – 2024
- If we find refuge and shelter under the cross of Jesus Christ we have peace – 2012
- Backsliding always begins in the heart – 2012
- Increasing signs of failure – 2012
- Eternal life – 2012
- A NEW PRAYER – 2011
- A Genuine Gift – 2011
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