LECTURE VIII.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

THE PRACTICAL TENDENCY OF THE VARIOUS THEORIES.

It has already been observed that this is a highly practical question,
and one of surpassing interest and importance. I have gone through the
discussion and examination of the several principal theories, for the
purpose of preparing the way to expose the practical results of those
various theories, and to show that they legitimately result in some of
the most soul-destroying errors that cripple the church and curse the
world.

1. I will begin with the theory that regards the sovereign will of God
as the foundation of moral obligation.

One legitimate and necessary result of this theory is, a totally
erroneous conception both of the character of God, and of the nature
and design of his government. If God’s will is the foundation of moral
obligation, it follows that he is an arbitrary sovereign. He is not
under law himself, and he has no rule by which to regulate his conduct,
nor by which either himself or any other being can judge of his moral
character. Indeed, unless he is subject to law, or is a subject of
moral obligation, he has and can have, no moral character; for moral
character always and necessarily implies moral law and moral
obligation. If God’s will is not itself under the law of his infinite
reason, or, in other words, it is not conformed to the law imposed upon
it by his intelligence, then his will is and must be arbitrary in the
worst sense; that is, in the sense of having no regard to reason, or to
the nature and relations of moral agents. But if his will is under the
law of his reason, if he acts from principle, or has good and
benevolent reasons for his conduct, then his will is not the foundation
of moral obligation, but those reasons that lie revealed in the divine
intelligence, in view of which it affirms moral obligation, or that he
ought to will in conformity with those reasons. In other words, if the
intrinsic value of his own well-being and that of the universe be the
foundation of moral obligation; if his reason affirms his obligation to
choose this as his ultimate end, and to consecrate his infinite
energies to the realization of it; and if his will is conformed to this
law it follows,–

(1.) That his will is not the foundation of moral obligation.

(2.) That he has infinitely good and wise reasons for what he wills,
says, and does.

(3.) That he is not arbitrary, but always acts in conformity with right
principles, and for reasons that will, when universally known, compel
the respect and even admiration of every intelligent being in the
universe.

(4.) That creation and providential and moral government, are the
necessary means to an infinitely wise and good end, and that existing
evils are only unavoidably incidental to this infinitely wise and
benevolent arrangement, and, although great, are indefinitely the less
of two evils. That is, they are an evil indefinitely less than no
creation and no government would have been. It is conceivable, that a
plan of administration might have been adopted that would have
prevented the present evils; but if we admit that God has been governed
by reason in the selection of the end he has in view, and in the use of
means for its accomplishment, it will follow that the evils are less
than would have existed under any other plan of administration; or at
least, that the present system, with all its evils, is the best that
infinite wisdom and love could adopt.

(5.) These incidental evils, therefore, do not at all detract from the
evidence of the wisdom and goodness of God; for in all these things he
is not acting from caprice, or malice, or an arbitrary sovereignty, but
is acting in conformity with the law of his infinite intelligence, and
of course has infinitely good and weighty reasons for what he does and
suffers to be done–reasons so good and so weighty, that he could not
do otherwise without violating the law of his own intelligence, and
therefore committing infinite sin.

(6.) It follows also that there is ground for perfect confidence, love,
and submission to his divine will in all things. That is, if his will
is not arbitrary, but conformed to the law of his infinite
intelligence, then it is obligatory, as our rule of action, because it
reveals infallibly what is in accordance with infinite intelligence. We
may always be entirely safe in obeying all the divine requirements, and
in submitting to all his dispensations, however mysterious, being
assured that they are perfectly wise and good. Not only are we safe in
doing so, but we are under infinite obligation to do so; not because
his arbitrary will imposes obligation, but because it reveals to us
infallibly the end we ought to choose, and the indispensable means of
securing it. His will is law, not in the sense of its originating and
imposing obligation of its own arbitrary sovereignty, but in the sense
of its being a revelation of both the end we ought to seek, and the
means by which the end can be secured. Indeed this is the only proper
idea of law. It does not in any case of itself impose obligation, but
is only a revelation of obligation. Law is a condition, but not the
foundation, of obligation. The will of God is a condition of
obligation, only so far as it is indispensable to our knowledge of the
end we ought to seek, and the means by which this end is to be secured.
Where these are known, there is obligation, whether God has revealed
his will or not.

The foregoing, and many other important truths, little less important
than those already mentioned, and too numerous to be now distinctly
noticed, follow from the fact that the good of being, and not the
arbitrary will of God, is the foundation of moral obligation. But no
one of them is or can be true, if his will be the foundation of
obligation. Nor can any one, who consistently holds or believes that
his will is the foundation of obligation, hold or believe any of the
foregoing truths, nor indeed hold or believe any truth of the law or
gospel. Nay, he cannot, if he be at all consistent, have even a correct
conception of one truth of God’s moral government. Let us see if he
can.

(1.) Can he believe that God’s will is wise and good, unless he admits
and believes that it is subject to the law of his intelligence? If he
consistently holds that the divine will is the foundation of moral
obligation, he must either deny that his will is any evidence of what
is wise and good, or maintain the absurdity, that whatever God wills is
wise and good, simply for the reason that God wills it, and that if he
willed the directly opposite of what he does, it would be equally wise
and good. But this is an absurdity palpable enough to confound any one
who has reason and moral agency.

(2.) If he consistently holds and believes that God’s sovereign will is
the foundation of moral obligation, he cannot regard him as having any
moral character, for the reason, that there is no standard by which to
judge of his willing and acting; for, by the supposition, he has no
intelligent rule of action, and, therefore, can have no moral
character, as he is not a moral agent, and can himself have no idea of
the moral character of his own actions; for, in fact, upon the
supposition in question, they have none. Any one, therefore, who holds
that God is not a subject of moral law, imposed on him by his own
reason, but, on the contrary, that his sovereign will is the foundation
of moral obligation, must, if consistent, deny that he has moral
character; and he must deny that God is an intelligent being, or else
admit that he is infinitely wicked for not conforming his will to the
law of his intelligence; and for not being guided by his infinite
reason, instead of setting up an arbitrary sovereignty of will.

(3.) He who holds that God’s sovereign will is the foundation of moral
obligation, instead of being a revelation of obligation, if he be at
all consistent, can neither have nor assign any good reason either for
confidence in him, or submission to him. If God has no good and wise
reasons for what he commands, why should we obey him? If he has no good
and wise reasons for what he does, why should we submit to him?

Will it be answered, that if we refuse, we do it at our peril, and,
therefore, it is wise to do so, even if he has no good reasons for what
he does and requires? To this I answer that it is impossible, upon the
supposition in question, either to obey or submit to God with the
heart. If we can see no good reasons, but, on the other hand, are
assured there are no good and wise reasons for the divine commands and
conduct, it is rendered forever naturally impossible, from the laws of
our nature, to render anything more than feigned obedience and
submission. Whenever we do not understand the reason for a divine
requirement, or of a dispensation of divine Providence, the condition
of heart-obedience to the one and submission to the other, is the
assumption that he has good and wise reasons for both. But assume the
contrary, to wit, that he has no good and wise reasons for either, and
you render heart-obedience, confidence, and submission impossible. It
is perfectly plain, therefore, that he who consistently holds the
theory in question, can neither conceive rightly of God, nor of
anything respecting his law, gospel, or government, moral or
providential. It is impossible for him to have an intelligent piety.
His religion, if he have any, must be sheer superstition, inasmuch as
he neither knows the true God, nor the true reason why he should love,
believe, obey, or submit to him. In short, he neither knows, nor, if
consistent, can know, anything of the nature of true religion, and has
not so much as a right conception of what constitutes virtue.

But do not understand me as affirming, that none who profess to hold
the theory in question have any true knowledge of God, or any true
religion. No, they are happily so purely theorists on this subject, and
so happily inconsistent with themselves, as to have, after all, a
practical judgment in favor of the truth. They do not see the logical
consequences of their theory, and of course do not embrace them, and
this happy inconsistency is an indispensable condition of their
salvation.

(4.) Another pernicious consequence of this theory is that those who
hold it will of course give false directions to inquiring sinners.
Indeed, if they be ministers, the whole strain of their instructions
must be false. They must, if consistent, not only represent God to
their hearers as an absolute and arbitrary sovereign, but they must
represent religion as consisting in submission to arbitrary
sovereignty. If sinners inquire what they must do to be saved, such
teachers must answer in substance, that they must cast themselves on
the sovereignty of a God whose law is solely an expression of his
arbitrary will, and whose every requirement and purpose is founded in
his arbitrary sovereignty. This is the God whom they must love, in whom
they must believe, and whom they must serve with a willing mind. How
infinitely different such instructions are from those that would be
given by one who knew the truth. Such an one would represent God to an
inquirer as infinitely reasonable in all his requirements, and in all
his ways. He would represent the sovereignty of God as consisting, not
in arbitrary will, but in benevolence or love, directed by infinite
knowledge in the promotion of the highest good of being. He would
represent his law, not as the expression of his arbitrary will, but as
having its foundation in the self-existent nature of God, and in the
nature of moral agents; as being the very rule which is agreeable to
the nature and relations of moral agents; that its requisitions are not
arbitrary, hut that the very thing, and only that, is required which is
in the nature of things indispensable to the highest well-being of
moral agents; that God’s will does not originate obligation by any
arbitrary fiat, but on the contrary, that he requires what he does,
because it is obligatory in the nature of things; that his requirement
does not create right, but that he requires only that which is
naturally and of necessity right. These and many such like things would
irresistibly commend the character of God to the human intelligence, as
worthy to be trusted, and as a being to whom submission is infallibly
safe and infinitely reasonable.

The fact is, the idea of arbitrary sovereignty is shocking and
revolting, not only to the human heart, whether unregenerate or
regenerate, but also to the human intelligence. Religion, based upon
such a view of God’s character and government, must be sheer
superstition or gross fanaticism.

2. I will next glance at the legitimate results of the theory of the
selfish school.

This theory teaches that our own interest is the foundation of moral
obligation. In conversing with a distinguished defender of this
philosophy, I requested the theorist to define moral obligation, and
this was the definition given: “It is the obligation of a moral agent
to seek his own happiness.” Upon the practical bearing of this theory I
remark,–

(1.) It tends directly and inevitably to the confirmation and despotism
of sin in the soul. All sin, as we shall hereafter see, resolves itself
into a spirit of self-seeking, or into a disposition to seek good to
self, and upon condition of its relations to self, and not impartially
and disinterestedly. This philosophy represents this spirit of
self-seeking as virtue, and only requires that in our efforts to secure
our own happiness, we should not interfere with the rights of others in
seeking theirs. But here it may be asked, when these philosophers
insist that virtue consists in willing our own happiness, and that, in
seeking it, we are bound to have respect to the rights and happiness of
others, do they mean that we are to have a positive, or merely a
negative regard to the rights and happiness of others? If they mean
that we are to have a positive regard to others’ rights and happiness,
what is that but giving up their theory, and holding the true one, to
wit, that the happiness of each one shall be esteemed according to its
intrinsic value, for its own sake? That is, that we should be
disinterestedly benevolent? But if they mean that we are to regard our
neighbor’s happiness negatively, that is, merely in not hindering it,
what is this but the most absurd thing conceivable? What! I need not
care positively for my neighbor’s happiness, I need not will it as a
good in itself, and for its own value, and yet I must take care not to
hinder it. But why? Why, because it is intrinsically as valuable as my
own. Now, if this is assigning any good reason why I ought not to
hinder it, it is just because it is assigning a good reason why I ought
positively and disinterestedly to will it; which is the same thing as
the true theory. But if this is not a sufficient reason to impose
obligation, positively and disinterestedly, to will it, it can never
impose obligation to avoid hindering it, and I may then pursue my own
happiness in my own way without the slightest regard to that of any
other.

(2.) If this theory be true, sinful and holy beings are precisely
alike, so far as ultimate intention is concerned, in which we have seen
all moral character consists. They have precisely the same end in view,
and the difference lies exclusively in the means they make use of to
promote their own happiness. That sinners are seeking their own
happiness, is a truth of consciousness to them. If moral agents are
under obligation to seek their own happiness as the supreme end of
life, it follows, that holy beings do so. So that holy and sinful
beings are precisely alike, so far as the end for which they live is
concerned; the only difference being, as has been observed, in the
different means they make use of to promote this end. But observe, no
reason can be assigned, in accordance with this philosophy, why they
use different means, only that they differ in judgment in respect to
them; for, let it be remembered, that this philosophy denies that we
are bound to have a positive and disinterested regard to our neighbor’s
interest; and, of course, no benevolent considerations prevent the holy
from using the same means as do the wicked. Where, therefore, is the
difference in their character, although they do use this diversity of
means? I say again, there is none. If this difference be not ascribed
to disinterested benevolence in one, and to selfishness in the other,
there really is and can be no difference in character between them.
According to this theory nothing is right in itself, but the intention
to promote my own happiness; and anything is right or wrong as it is
intended to promote this result or otherwise. For let it be borne in
mind that, if moral obligation respects strictly the ultimate intention
only, it follows that ultimate intention alone is right or wrong in
itself, and all other things are right or wrong as they proceed from a
right or wrong ultimate intention. This must be true.

Further, if my own happiness be the foundation of my moral obligation,
it follows that this is the ultimate end at which I ought to aim, and
that nothing is right or wrong in itself, in me, but this intention or
its opposite; and furthermore, that everything else must be right or
wrong in me as it proceeds from this, or from an opposite intention. I
may do, and upon the supposition of the truth of this theory, I am
bound to do, whatever will, in my estimation, promote my own happiness,
and that, not because of its intrinsic value as a part of universal
good, but because it is my own. To seek it as a part of universal
happiness, and not because it is my own, would be to act on the true
theory, or the theory of disinterested benevolence; which this theory
denies.

(3.) Upon this theory I am not to love God supremely, and my neighbor
as myself. If I love God and my neighbor, it is to be only as a means
of promoting my own happiness, which is not loving them, but loving
myself supremely.

(4.) This theory teaches radical error in respect both to the character
and government of God; and the consistent defenders of it cannot but
hold fundamentally false views in respect to what constitutes holiness
or virtue, either in God or man. They do not and cannot know the
difference between virtue and vice.

(5.) The teachers of this theory must fatally mislead all who
consistently follow out their instructions. In preaching, they must, if
consistent, appeal wholly to hope and fear. All their instructions must
tend to confirm selfishness. All the motives they present, if
consistent, tend only to stir up a zeal within them to secure their own
happiness. If they pray, it will only be to implore the help of God to
accomplish their selfish ends.

Indeed, it is impossible that this theory should not blind its
advocates to the fundamental truths of morality and religion, and it is
hardly conceivable that one could more efficiently serve the devil than
by the inculcation of such a philosophy as this.

3. Let us in the next place look into the natural and, if its advocates
are consistent, necessary results of utilitarianism.

This theory, you know, teaches that the utility of an action or of a
choice, renders it obligatory. That is, I am bound to will good, not
for the intrinsic value of the good; but because willing good tends to
produce good–to choose an end, not because of the intrinsic value of
the end, but because the willing of it tends to secure it. The
absurdity of this theory has been sufficiently exposed. It only remains
to notice its legitimate practical results.

(1.) It naturally, and I may say, necessarily diverts the attention
from that in which all morality consists, namely, the ultimate
intention. Indeed, it seems that the abettors of this scheme must have
in mind only outward action, or at most executive volitions, when they
assert that the tendency of an action is the reason of the obligation
to put it forth. It seems impossible that they should assert that the
reason for choosing an ultimate end should or could be the tendency of
choice to secure it. This is so palpable a contradiction, that it is
difficult to believe that they have ultimate intention in mind when
they make the assertion. An ultimate end is ever chosen for its
intrinsic value, and not because choice tends to secure it. How, then,
is it possible for them to hold that the tendency of choice to secure
an ultimate end is the reason of an obligation to make that choice? But
if they have not their eye upon ultimate intention, when they speak of
moral obligation, they are discoursing of that which is, strictly
without the pale of morality. A consistent utilitarian, therefore,
cannot conceive rightly of the nature of morality or virtue. He cannot
consistently hold that virtue consists in willing the highest
well-being of God and of the universe as an ultimate end, or for its
own sake, but must, on the contrary, confine his ideas of moral
obligation to volitions and outward actions, in which there is strictly
no morality, and withal assign an entirely false reason for these, to
wit, their tendency to secure an end, rather than the value of the end
which they tend to secure.

This is the proper place to speak of the doctrine of expediency, a
doctrine strenuously maintained by utilitarians, and as strenuously
opposed by rightarians. It is this, that whatever is expedient is
right, for the reason, that the expediency of an action or measure is
the foundation of the obligation to put forth that action, or adopt
that measure. It is easy to see that this is just equivalent to saying,
that the utility of an action or measure is the reason of the
obligation to put forth that action or to adopt that measure. But, as
we have seen, utility, tendency, expediency, is only a condition of the
obligation, to put forth outward action or executive volition, but
never the foundation of the obligation–that always being the intrinsic
value of the end to which the volition, action, or measure, sustains
the relation of a means. I do not wonder that rightarians object to
this, although I do wonder at the reason which, if consistent, they
must assign for this obligation, to wit, that any action or volition,
(ultimate intention excepted), can be right or wrong in itself,
irrespective of its expediency or utility. This is absurd enough, and
flatly contradicts the doctrine of rightarians themselves, that moral
obligation strictly belongs only to ultimate intention. If moral
obligation belongs only to ultimate intention, then nothing but
ultimate intention can be right or wrong in itself. And every thing
else, that is, all executive volitions and outward actions must be
right or wrong, (in the only sense in which moral character can be
predicated of them) as they proceed from a right or wrong ultimate
intention. This is the only form in which rightarians can consistently
admit the doctrine of expediency, viz., that it relates exclusively to
executive volitions and outward actions. And this they can admit only
upon the assumption that executive volitions and outward actions have
strictly no moral character in themselves, but are right or wrong only
as, and because, they proceed necessarily from a right or wrong
ultimate intention. All schools that hold this doctrine, to wit, that
moral obligation respects the ultimate intention only, must, if
consistent, deny that any thing can be either right or wrong per se,
but ultimate intention. Further, they must maintain, that utility,
expediency, or tendency to promote the ultimate end upon which ultimate
intention terminates, is always a condition of the obligation to put
forth those volitions and actions that sustain to this end the relation
of means. And still further, they must maintain, that the obligation to
use those means must be founded in the value of the end, and not in the
tendency of the means to secure it; for unless the end be intrinsically
valuable, the tendency of means to secure it can impose no obligation
to use them. Tendency, utility, expediency, then, are only conditions
of the obligation to use any given means, but never the foundation of
obligation. The obligation in respect to outward action is always
founded in the value of the end to which this action sustains the
relation of a means, and the obligation is conditionated upon the
perceived tendency of the means to secure that end. Expediency can
never have respect to the choice of an ultimate end, or to that in
which moral character consists, to wit, ultimate intention. The end is
to be chosen for its own sake. Ultimate intention is right or wrong in
itself, and no questions of utility, expediency, or tendency, have any
thing to do with the obligation to put forth ultimate intention, there
being only one ultimate reason for this, namely, the intrinsic value of
the end itself. It is true, then, that whatever is expedient is right,
not for that reason, but only upon that condition. The inquiry then, Is
it expedient? in respect to outward action, is always proper; for upon
this condition does obligation to outward action turn. But in respect
to ultimate intention, or the choice of an ultimate end, an inquiry
into the expediency of this choice or intention is never proper, the
obligation being founded alone upon the perceived and intrinsic value
of the end, and the obligation being without any condition whatever,
except the possession of the powers of moral agency, with the
perception of the end upon which intention ought to terminate, namely,
the good of universal being. But the mistake of the utilitarian, that
expediency is the foundation of moral obligation, is fundamental, for,
in fact, it cannot be so in any case whatever. I have said, and here
repeat, that all schools that hold that moral obligation respects
ultimate intention only, must, if consistent, maintain that perceived
utility, expediency, etc., is a condition of obligation to put forth
any outward action, or, which is the same thing, to use any means to
secure the end of benevolence. Therefore, in practice or in daily life,
the true doctrine of expediency must of necessity have a place. The
railers against expediency, therefore, know not what they say nor
whereof they affirm. It is, however, impossible to proceed in practice
upon the utilitarian philosophy. This teaches that the tendency of an
action to secure good, and not the intrinsic value of the good, is the
foundation of the obligation to put forth that action. But this is too
absurd for practice. For, unless the intrinsic value of the end be
assumed as the foundation of the obligation to choose it, it is
impossible to affirm obligation to put forth an action to secure that
end. The folly and the danger of utilitarianism is, that it overlooks
the true foundation of moral obligation, and consequently the true
nature of virtue or holiness. A consistent utilitarian cannot conceive
rightly of either.

The teachings of a consistent utilitarian must of necessity abound with
pernicious error. Instead of representing virtue as consisting in
disinterested benevolence, or in the consecration of the soul to the
highest good of being in general, for its own sake, it must represent
it as consisting wholly in using means to promote good:–that is, as
consisting wholly in executive volitions and outward actions, which,
strictly speaking, have no moral character in them. Thus consistent
utilitarianism inculcates fundamentally false ideas of the nature of
virtue. Of course it must teach equally erroneous ideas respecting the
character of God–the spirit and meaning of his law–the nature of
repentance–of sin–of regeneration–and, in short, of every practical
doctrine of the Bible.

4. Practical bearings and tendency of rightarianism.

It will be recollected that this philosophy teaches that right is the
foundation of moral obligation. With its advocates, virtue consists in
willing the right for the sake of the right, instead of willing the
good for the sake of the good, or more strictly, in willing the good
for the sake of the right, and not for the sake of the good; or, as we
have seen, the foundation of obligation consists in the relation of
intrinsic fitness existing between the choice and the good. The right
is the ultimate end to be aimed at in all things, instead of the
highest good of being for its own sake. From such a theory the
following consequences must flow. I speak only of consistent
rightarianism.

(1.) If the rightarian theory is true, there is a law of right entirely
distinct from, and opposed to, the law of love or benevolence. The
advocates of this theory often assume, perhaps unwittingly, the
existence of such a law. They speak of multitudes of things as being
right or wrong in themselves, entirely independent of the law of
benevolence. Nay, they go so far as to affirm it conceivable that doing
right might necessarily tend to, and result in, universal misery; and
that, in such a case, we should be under obligation to do right, or
will right, or intend right, although universal misery should be the
necessary result. This assumes and affirms that right has no necessary
relation to willing the highest good of being for its own sake, or,
what is the same thing, that the law of right is not only distinct from
the law of benevolence, but may be directly opposed to it; that a moral
agent may be under obligation to will as an ultimate end that which he
knows will and must, by a law of necessity, promote and secure
universal misery. Rightarians sternly maintain that right would be
right, and that virtue would be virtue, although this result were a
necessary consequence. What is this but maintaining that moral law may
require moral agents to set their hearts upon and consecrate themselves
to that which is necessarily subversive of the well-being of the entire
universe? And what is this but assuming that that may be moral law that
requires a course of willing and acting entirely inconsistent with the
nature and relations of moral agents? Thus virtue and benevolence not
only may be different but opposite things; and benevolence may be sin.
This is not only opposed to our reason, but a more capital or
mischievous error in morals or philosophy can hardly be conceived.

Nothing is or can be right, as an ultimate choice, but benevolence.
Nothing can be moral law but that which requires that the highest
well-being of God and of the universe should be chosen as an ultimate
end. If benevolence is right, this must be self-evident. Rightarianism
overlooks and misrepresents the very nature of moral law. Let any one
contemplate the grossness of the absurdity that maintains, that moral
law may require a course of willing that necessarily results in
universal and perfect misery. What then, it may be asked, has moral law
to do with the nature and relations of moral agents, except to mock,
insult, and trample them under foot? Moral law is, and must be, the law
of nature, that is, suited to the nature and relations of moral agents.
But can that law be suited to the nature and relations of moral agents
that requires a course of action necessarily resulting in universal
misery? Rightarianism then, not only overlooks, but flatly contradicts,
the very nature of moral law, and sets up a law of right in direct
opposition to the law of nature.

(2.) This philosophy tends naturally to fanaticism. Conceiving as it
does of right as distinct from, and often opposed to, benevolence, it
scoffs or rails at the idea of inquiring what the highest good
evidently demands. It insists that such and such things are right or
wrong in themselves, entirely irrespective of what the highest good
demands. Having thus in mind a law of right distinct from, and perhaps,
opposed to benevolence, what frightful conduct may not this philosophy
lead to? This is indeed the law of fanaticism. The tendency of this
philosophy is illustrated in the spirit of many reformers, who are
bitterly contending for the right, which, after all, is to do nobody
any good.

(3.) This philosophy teaches a false morality and a false religion. It
exalts right above God, and represents virtue as consisting in the love
of right instead of the love of God. It exhorts men to will the right
for the sake of the right, instead of the good of being for the sake of
the good, or for the sake of being. It teaches us to inquire, How shall
I do right? instead of, How shall I do good? What is right? instead of,
What will most promote the good of the universe? Now that which is most
promotive of the highest good of being, is right. To intend the highest
well-being of God and of the universe, is right. To use the necessary
means to promote this end, is right; and whatever in the use of means
or in outward action is right, is so for this reason, namely, that it
is designed to promote the highest well-being of God and of the
universe. But rightarianism points out an opposite course. It says:
Will right for the sake of the right, that is, as an end; and in
respect to means, inquire not what is manifestly for the highest good
of being, for with this you have nothing to do; your business is to
will the right for the sake of the right. If you inquire how you are to
know what is right, it does not direct you to the law of benevolence as
the only standard, but it directs you to an abstract idea of right, as
an ultimate rule, having no regard to the law of benevolence or love.
It tells you that right is right, because it is right; and not that
right is conformity to the law of benevolence, and right for this
reason. Now certainly such teaching is radically false, and subversive
of all sound morality and true religion.

(4.) As we have formerly seen, this philosophy does not represent
virtue as consisting in the love of God, or of Christ, or our neighbor.
Consistency must require the abettors of this scheme to give
fundamentally false instructions to inquiring sinners. Instead of
representing God and all holy beings as devoted to the public good, and
instead of exhorting sinners to love God and their neighbor, this
philosophy must represent God and holy beings as consecrated to right
for the sake of the right; and must exhort sinners, who ask what they
shall do to be saved, to will the right for the sake of the right, to
love the right, to deify right, and fall down and worship it. There is
much of this false morality and religion in the world and in the
church. Infidels are great sticklers for this religion, and often
exhibit as much of it as do some rightarian professors of religion. It
is a severe, stern, loveless, Godless, Christless philosophy, and
nothing but happy inconsistency prevents its advocates from manifesting
it in this light to the world. The law of right, when conceived of as
distinct from, or opposed to, the law of benevolence, is a perfect
strait-jacket, an iron collar, a snare of death.

This philosophy represents all war, all slavery, and many things as
wrong per se, without insisting upon such a definition of those things
as necessarily implies selfishness. Any thing whatever is wrong in
itself that includes and implies selfishness, and nothing else is or
can be. All war waged for selfish purposes is wrong per se. But war
waged for benevolent purposes, or war required by the law of
benevolence, and engaged in with a benevolent design, is neither wrong
in itself, nor wrong in any proper sense. All holding men in bondage
from selfish motives is wrong in itself, but holding men in bondage in
obedience to the law of benevolence is not wrong but right. And so it
is with every thing else. Therefore, where it is insisted that all war
and all slavery, or any thing else is wrong in itself, such a
definition of things must be insisted on as necessarily implies
selfishness. But consistent rightarianism will insist that all war, all
slavery, and all of many other things, are wrong in themselves without
regard to their being violations of the law of benevolence. This is
consistent with such philosophy, but it is most false and absurd in
fact. Indeed, any philosophy that assumes the existence of a law of
right distinct from, and possibly opposed to, the law of benevolence,
must teach many doctrines at war with both reason and revelation. It
sets men in chase of a philosophical abstraction as the supreme end of
life, instead of the concrete reality of the highest well-being of God
and the universe. It preys upon the human soul, and turns into solid
iron all the tender sensibilities of our being. Do but contemplate a
human being supremely devoted to an abstraction, as the end of human
life. He wills the right for the sake of the right. Or, more strictly,
he wills the good of being, not from any regard to being, but because
of the relation of intrinsic fitness or rightness existing between
choice and its object. For this he lives, and moves, and has his being.
What sort of religion is this? I wish not to be understood as holding,
or insinuating, that professed rightarians universally, or even
generally, pursue their theory to its legitimate boundary, or that they
manifest the spirit that it naturally begets. No, I am most happy in
acknowledging that with many, and perhaps with most of them, it is so
purely a theory, that they are not greatly influenced by it in
practice. Many of them I regard as the excellent of the earth, and I am
happy to count them among my dearest and most valued friends. But I
speak of the philosophy, with its natural results, when embraced not
merely as a theory, but when adopted by the heart as the rule of life.
It is only in such cases that its natural and legitimate fruits appear.
Only let it be borne in mind that right is conformity to moral law,
that moral law is the law of nature, or the law founded in the nature
and relations of moral agents, the law that requires just that course
of willing and action that tends naturally to secure the highest
well-being of all moral agents, that requires this course of willing
and acting for the sake of the end in which it naturally and
governmentally results, and requires that this end shall be aimed at or
intended by all moral agents as the supreme good and the only ultimate
end of life;–I say, only let these truths be borne in mind, and you
will never talk of a right, or a virtue, or a law, obedience to which
necessarily results in universal misery; nor will you conceive that
such a thing is possible.

5. Lastly, I come to the consideration of the practical bearings of
what I regard as the true theory of the foundation of moral obligation,
namely, that the intrinsic nature and value of the highest well-being
of God and of the universe is the sole foundation of moral obligation.

Upon this philosophy I remark–

That if this be true, the whole subject of moral obligation is
perfectly simple and intelligible; so plain, indeed, that “the
wayfaring man, though a fool, cannot err therein.”

Upon this theory, every moral agent knows in every possible instance
what is right, and can never mistake his real duty.

His duty is to will this end with all the known conditions and means
thereof. Intending this end with a single eye, and doing what appears
to him, with all the light he can obtain, to be in the highest degree
calculated to secure this end, he really does his duty. If in this case
he is mistaken in regard to what is the best means of securing this
end, still, with a benevolent intention, he does not sin. He has done
right, for he has intended as he ought, and acted outwardly as he
thought was the path of duty, under the best light he could obtain.
This, then, was his duty. He did not mistake his duty; because it was
duty to intend as he intended, and under the circumstances, to act as
he acted. How else should he have acted?

If a moral agent can know what end he aims at or lives for, he can
know, and cannot but know, at all times, whether he is right or wrong.
All that upon this theory a moral agent needs to be certain of is,
whether he lives for the right end, and this, if at all honest, or if
dishonest, he really cannot but know. If he would ask, what is right or
what is duty at any time, he need not wait for a reply. It is right for
him to intend the highest good of being as an end. If he honestly does
this, he cannot mistake his duty, for in doing this he really performs
the whole of duty. With this honest intention, it is impossible that he
should not use the means to promote this end, according to the best
light he has; and this is right. A single eye to the highest good of
God and the universe, is the whole of morality, strictly considered;
and, upon this theory, moral law, moral government, moral obligation,
virtue, vice, and the whole subject of morals and religion are the
perfection of simplicity. If this theory be true, no honest mind ever
mistook the path of duty. To intend the highest good of being is right
and is duty. No mind is honest that is not steadily pursuing this end.
But in the honest pursuit of this end there can be no sin, no mistaking
the path of duty. That is and must be the path of duty that really
appears to a benevolent mind to be so. That is, it must be his duty to
act in conformity with his honest convictions. This is duty, this is
right. So, upon this theory, no one who is truly honest in pursuing the
highest good of being, ever did or can mistake his duty in any such
sense as to commit sin.

I have spoken with great plainness, and perhaps with some severity, of
the several systems of error, as I cannot but regard them, upon the
most fundamental and important of subjects; not certainly from any want
of love to those who hold them, but from a concern, long cherished and
growing upon me, for the honor of truth and for the good of being.
Should any of you ever take the trouble to look into this subject, in
its length and breadth, and read the various systems, and take the
trouble to trace out their practical results, as actually developed in
the opinions and practices of men, you certainly would not be at a loss
to account for the theological and philosophical fogs that so bewilder
the world. How can it be otherwise, while such confusion of opinion
prevails upon the fundamental question of morals and religion?

How is it, that there is so much profession and so little real
practical benevolence in the world? Multitudes of professed Christians
seem to have no conception that benevolence constitutes true religion;
that nothing else does; and that selfishness is sin, and totally
incompatible with religion. They live on in their self-indulgences, and
dream of heaven. This could not be, if the true idea of religion, as
consisting in sympathy with the benevolence of God, was fully developed
in their minds.

I need not dwell upon the practical bearings of the other theories
which I have examined; what I have said may suffice, as an illustration
of the importance of being well-established in this fundamental truth.
It is affecting to see what conceptions multitudes entertain in regard
to the real spirit and meaning of the law and gospel of God, and,
consequently, of the nature of holiness.

In dismissing this subject, I would remark, that any system of moral
philosophy that does not correctly define a moral action, and the real
ground of obligation, must be fundamentally defective. Nay, if
consistent, it must be highly pernicious and dangerous. But let moral
action be clearly and correctly defined, let the true ground of
obligation be clearly and correctly stated; and let both these be kept
constantly in view, and such a system would be of incalculable value.
It would be throughout intelligible, and force conviction upon every
intelligent reader. But I am not aware that any such system exists. So
far as I know, they are all faulty, either in their definition of a
moral action, and do not fasten the eye upon the ultimate intention,
and keep it there as being the seat of moral character, and that from
which the character of all our actions is derived; or they soon forget
this, and treat mere executive acts as right or wrong, without
reference to the ultimate intention. I believe they have all failed in
not clearly defining the true ground of obligation, and, consequently,
are faulty in their definition of virtue.

On this day...

• 1 Samuel 6 - 2024
• Genesis 13 - 2024
• Haggai 1:12-15 - 2011
• Haggai 1:3-6 - 2011
• 1 Kings 18:36-37 - 2011
• 1 Kings 18:28-29 - 2011
• Psalm 86:10-13 - 2011
• Romans 15:30-32 - 2011
• Romans 15:21 - 2011
• Psalm 84:11 - 2011